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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates novel and unique avenues of corruption in an attempt to reach a better 
understanding of the causes of corruption. In particular, the thesis theoretically and empirically 
examines the implication of the military in politics in breeding corruption and the importance 
of financial development in reducing corruption. The thesis also improves our understanding 
of cross-country variations in inequality and economic growth by providing a deeper analysis 
of growth-inequality relationship with a particular focus on the role of globalisation and 
domestic policy reforms. 
 
To achieve this aim, the thesis contains four core chapters (essays) in addition to an 
introductory chapter, literature review chapter and a concluding chapter. The four core 
chapters can be viewed different from one another. The first two core chapters address the 
causes of corruption. In particular, the first of these two chapters assess the role of military in 
politics in determining corruption levels, and investigate how important financial development 
is for corruption. The other two core chapters provide deeper understanding of cross-country 
variations in inequality, poverty and economic growth. 
 
Recent theoretical developments and case study evidence suggests a relationship between the 
military in politics and corruption. In the third chapter, this study contributes to this literature 
by analyzing theoretically and empirically the role of the military in politics and corruption for 
the first time. By drawing on a cross sectional and panel data set covering a large number of 
countries, over the period 1984-2007, and using a variety of econometric methods substantial 
empirical support is found for a positive relationship between the military in politics and 
corruption. In sum, our results reveal that a one standard deviation increase in the military in 
politics leads to a 0.22 unit increase in corruption index. This relationship is shown to be 
robust to a variety of specification changes, different econometric techniques, different sample 
sizes, alternative corruption indices and the exclusion of outliers. This study suggests that the 
explanatory power of the military in politics is at least as important as the conventionally 
accepted causes of corruption, such as economic development.  
 
The importance of financial market reforms in combating corruption has been highlighted in 
the theoretical literature but has not been systemically tested empirically. In the fourth chapter, 
  ii
we provide a first pass at testing this relationship using both linear and non-monotonic forms 
of the relationship between corruption and financial intermediation. Our study finds a negative 
and statistically significant impact of financial intermediation on corruption. Specifically, the 
results imply that a one standard deviation increase in financial intermediation is associated 
with a decrease in corruption of 0.20 points, or 16 percent of the standard deviation in the 
corruption index and this relationship is shown to be robust to a variety of specification 
changes, including: (i) different sets of control variables; (ii) different econometrics 
techniques; (iii) different sample sizes; (iv) alternative corruption indices; (v) removal of 
outliers; (vi) different sets of panels; and (vii) allowing for cross country interdependence, 
contagion effects, of corruption. 
 
In the fifth chapter, we examine the impact of globalisation on cross-country inequality and 
poverty using a panel data set for 65 developing counties, over the period 1970-2008. The role 
of globalisation in increasing inequality in economies with financial markets imperfections has 
been highlighted in the theoretical literature but has not been systemically tested empirically. 
We provide a first pass at testing this relationship between globalisation and inequality in the 
presence of underdeveloped financial markets. Our study finds a negative and statistically 
significant impact of globalisation on poverty in economies where financial systems are 
relatively developed, however, inequality-reducing effect of globalisation in these economies 
is limited. The other major findings of the study are five fold. First, a non-monotonic 
relationship between income distribution and the level of economic development holds in all 
samples of countries. Second, both openness to trade and FDI do not have a favourable effect 
on income distribution in all selected developing countries. Third, high financial liberalization 
exerts a negative and significant influence on income distribution in developing countries. 
Fourth, inflation seems to distort income distribution in all sets of countries. Finally, the 
government emerges as a major player in impacting income distribution in developing 
countries. 
 
In the last core chapter, we analytically explore and empirically test the relationships between 
economic growth, inequality and trade. This study contributes in the existing literature by 
answering the question why growth effects of income inequality and trade are not definitely 
positive or negative. This study determines the positive effects of inequality and trade on 
growth both in the short run and long run. However, the growth effect of inequality is 
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substantially influenced by the domestic context in terms of the prevalence of credit market 
imperfections. The study identifies credit market imperfections in low-income developing 
countries as the likely reason for a positive relationship between inequality and economic 
growth. Similarly, growth effect of trade is found to be negative in economies where 
inequalities are comparatively high. The results show that inequality does matter for economic 
growth, but in different ways for different regions at different levels of economic 
development. The inequality-growth nexus is significantly negative for the low-income group 
but strongly significantly positive for the high-income one. The findings of the study are 
robust to alternative econometric techniques, specifications, control of nonlinearity, inclusion 
of additional control variables, exclusion of outliers and sub-samples. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Motivation  
 
1.1.1 Corruption  
 
“A rotten apple spoils the barrel.” (English proverb); 
“Corruption of the best becomes the worst.” (Latin proverb); 
“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” (Lord Acton); 
“Corruption is nature's way of restoring our faith in democracy.” (Ashleigh Brilliant). 
 
Corruption, i.e., ‘the misuse of public power for private gain’ is believed to be widespread and 
persistent, in varying degrees, in every country in the world. It contributes to low economic 
growth, stifles investment, inhibits the delivery of public services and increases inequality to 
such an extent that the World Bank has identified corruption as ‘the single greatest obstacle to 
economic and social development’ (World Bank, 2001a). 
 
Corruption is an ancient problem which has existed for many centuries. It was pervasive in the 
times of the Roman and Greek empires (MacMullen, 1988). It is widely accepted among 
scholars and policy makers that widespread economic and political corruption triggered the 
demise of great empires of the past. Current governments have their genesis in earlier 
structures which were ‘rotten to the core’. Now, corruption scandals emerge from in walks of 
life, including business, politics and government. Philosophers, scholars and policy makers 
have grappled with corruption over many centuries. Despite anti-corruption solutions, it could 
not be eliminated completely and in fact it has managed to survive and perpetuates itself, and 
therefore still exists. Although its appearance, degree and manifestations have altered through 
the centuries, worldwide existence and perseverance are its defining characteristics.  
 
Although corruption is an old issue, the explosion in the volume of studies investigating the 
causes and consequences of corruption is fairly recent. Studies on corruption begin to 
proliferate in the 1990s and reached a peak in the same period, with a continuing momentum 
throughout the 2000s. The increasing volume of studies on the causes and consequences of 
corruption awakened policy makers in the early 1990s and there is now an overwhelming 
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consensus that corruption is a significant obstacle to social and economic development. In 
1996, World Bank President James Wolfenson declared war on the “cancer of corruption” and 
since then the Bank has been engaged in a comprehensive war against corruption. 
 
The World Bank actively supports governments in improving transparency, accountability to 
citizens and improvement in delivering services. In this respect, in the fiscal year 2011, the 
Bank provided 11 percent of its lending (US$4.7 billion) to help countries improve the quality 
and accountability of core public sector institutes1. In recent years, other international 
organisations such as the United Nations, the IMF, and the OECD have made corruption a 
significant focus of their agendas and have made important attempts to curb corruption in the 
world, particularly in developing countries that are more prone to corrupt activities because of 
their weak democracies and institutes. 
 
It is widely accepted by economists, development practitioners and policy makers that 
corruption is a problem of developing countries. However, the World Bank’s director for 
Governance, Daniel Kaufmann states that: "It is important to emphasize that this is not simply 
a developing country problem, fighting corruption is a global challenge." Recently, Kaufmann 
notes that: “some of my research tends to challenge orthodoxy, such as taking issue with the 
claim that the developing ‘world’ is corrupt (contrasting wealthy nations); that corruption 
is largely about blatant bribery, and that corruption and macro-economic stability should be 
viewed separately from each other by different types of ‘experts’. I am committing the heresy 
of focusing on the link between corruption and budget deficits in industrialized 
countries. After all, even if politically incorrect to admit it, there are a number of rich 
countries where corruption is widespread, in a variety of forms, illegal and ‘legal’, political 
and financial”2.  
 
In addition, recently, a number of scandals over corruption have shown that rich nations, 
supposedly free from corruption, are also suffering from its effects. In Norway and Sweden 
(regarded as the cleanest nations), for example, state owned companies have been shown to be 
involved in bribe taking. In Germany, former Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Christian 
Democratic party, the CDU, were found to be involved in malpractices and they were 
penalized for receiving illegal campaign funding. A number of corruption scandals have being 
                                                 
1http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,print:Y~isCURL:Y~contentMDK:20040922~menuPK:34480~pagePK:34370~theSitePK:4607,00.html 
2
 http://thekaufmannpost.net/corruption-and-fiscal-deficits-in-rich-countries/ 
  3 
reported in Italy: for example, “A report from the state auditor shows that cases of corruption 
in Italy have increased by more than 200% since 20083.” Similarly, in France “Forty-nine 
businessmen and public housing officials have gone on trial, accused of taking bribes when 
President Jacques Chirac was mayor of Paris”4. Recently, Austria's former chancellor, 
Wolfgang Schüssel, has ended his political career as a corruption scandal continues to unfold 
around him5. In fact, recent emerging major corruption scandals have shaken a striking and 
variety of countries all over the world: the United States, Japan, Italy, France, Germany, South 
Korea, Mexico and the Kenya. 
 
The average level of corruption in European countries during 1984 was a 0.78 unit of the 
corruption index. Given that the corruption index ranges from 0 to 6, where 0 indicates an 
absence of corruption and 6 indicates the highest corruption, such a low value of a corruption 
index implies that European countries were initially close to zero level of corruption. 
However, the average level of corruption in European countries has increased, up to 2.12 in 
2007. Although corruption levels in Europe are still comparatively low, in fact the cleanest 
countries in the world, such as Sweden, Finland and Denmark, are located in Europe, but 
nonetheless the corruption levels have increased by 1.34 unit of the corruption index over the 
period 1984-2007. Such an increase of 1.34 units implies that corruption in European 
countries, on average, has increased by 22% of the corruption index. This is an alarming figure 
for European countries and surely needs to be rapidly addressed in order to avoid the adverse 
socio-economic and political consequences of an increasing rate of corruption (MacDonald 
and Majeed, 2011). 
 
Figure 1-1 shows the results from regressing the corruption index onto a constant and a time 
trend. It is evident from the figure that the relationship between corruption and time is akin to 
an inverted U-shape over the period 1984-92. However, from 1992 to onwards corruption is 
increasing. In fact, the figure clearly shows a rising trend in corruption over the period.  
 
                                                 
3
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8527593.stm 
4
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4641372.stm 
5
 http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,15365554,00.html 
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Figure 1-1: Corruption in European Countries 
 
In order to control corruption, conventions have been signed by international organisations in 
the international arena. Two important conventions are the Anti-Bribery Convention and the 
Convention against Corruption, of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN), respectively. The Anti-Bribery 
Convention was signed in 1997 and came into force in 1999 while the UN convention was 
signed in 2003 and came into force in 2005. The former declared it a crime to offer, give or 
promise a bribe to public officials in exchange for international business deals. The latter 
facilitates powerful new capacities for mutual legal assistance among countries to control 
corruption, such as making it easier to return assets stolen by corrupt leaders. 
 
Since corruption by its nature has adverse economic, social and political effects, the 
importance of anti-corruption policies, in recent years, has significantly increased. The 
effectiveness of these policies depends on a thorough understanding of the roots of corruption. 
However, available evidence on causes of corruption has not been fully explored and much of 
it is disputed. Consequently, it is not easy for governments to formulate coherent, 
comprehensive and effective polices to fight against corruption.  
 
If the experience of the anti-corruption community over the last two decades has taught us 
anything, it is that corruption is an almost omnipresent, multi-faceted problem and that 
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controlling corruption is a complex endeavour. Over the years, a considerable advance has 
been made in developing empirical tools and analytical approaches to improve our 
understanding of why corruption exists to varying degrees across the world and what tools are 
effective to eradicate it. Although now we have a better understanding about corruption than 
we have ever had in the past, it is a fact that a great deal of progress still needs to be made in 
understanding the causes of corruption and in devising effective anti-corruption policies. 
Considering the importance of a thorough understanding of the causes of corruption, this 
thesis provides novel and unique insights into the causes of corruption. In addition, we attempt 
to provide a better understating of the causes of corruption, which are inconclusive in the 
literature.  
 
Cross-country empirical studies of the causes of corruption have investigated a wide range of 
factors such as economic, cultural, political and institutional aspects (see for example 
Treisman, 2000; Serra, 2006; Majeed and MacDonald, 2010). In addition, Ades and Di Tella 
(1997), Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001), Lambsdorff (2006) and Seldadyo and Haan (2006) 
provide extensive literature reviews. In the wake of the proliferation of a large number of 
studies on corruption, a consensus among academicians and policy makers on some of causes 
of corruption is slowly emerging. However, some causes of corruption are still inconclusive 
such as the role of government spending and trade in determining corruption. 
 
Many studies have considered ‘political variables’ (see, for example, Treisman, 2000; Serra, 
2006) and a country’s institutional structure (see, for example, Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003; 
Damania et al., 2004) as important determinants of corruption: specifically, economies with 
political stability and strong institutions are less prone to corruption. In this study we explore 
other avenues that might explain corruption in order to provide a deeper understanding of 
corruption’ incidence and its variation across nations. The motivation behind our search is to 
provide national governments and international bodies with more scientific and factual 
information on causes of corruption so that curse of global corruption can be curbed more 
effectively. This study indentifies the role of military elites in politics as a major factor that 
fosters corruption. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to highlight this 
important determinant of corruption. 
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Figure 2 demonstrates the relationship between the military in politics and corruption over the 
period 1996-2007 for a large cross section of countries. This figure has been constructed to 
view the relationship between the military in politics and corruption using three alternative 
corruption indices that are extracted from the International Country Risk Guide, Transparency 
International and World Bank, respectively. It is evident from all sub parts of the figure that 
the relationship between the military in politics and corruption is positive irrespective of 
which corruption index is being used. 
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Figure 1-2: Corruption and Military in Politics 
 Figure 1-2a                          Figure 1-2b                                    Figure 1-3c 
 
Although studies of the causes of corruption have proliferated in recent years, some of the 
avenues of corruption, other than political factors, such as the role of market imperfections for 
rent seeking and corrupt activities, still remain to be fully explored. Lack of competition in 
product or/and financial markets increases rent seeking activities which are closely associated 
with corruption levels. Theoretical studies predict conflicting effects of competition on 
corruption. On the one hand, lack of competition generates rents (supra normal profits) for 
entrepreneurs, thereby motivating bureaucrats to ask for bribery (Foellmi and Oechslin (2007). 
On the other hand, the presence of these rents increases the values of monitoring the 
bureaucracy in a society (Ades and Di Tella (1999). 
  
This study focuses on the lack of competition in financial markets where lower levels of 
financial intermediation are taken to indicate underdeveloped financial systems. The 
motivation for testing the impact of financial intermediation on corruption is three fold. First, 
theoretical studies predict a relationship between financial reforms and corruption but to the 
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best of our knowledge this relationship has not been tested. Second, theoretical studies predict 
ambiguous effects of financial reforms on corruption and this can only be clarified in an 
empirical setting. Third, theoretical studies indicate the importance of a threshold in shaping 
the link between corruption and financial reforms and again this can only be clarified in an 
empirical context. 
 
The existing literature on the causes of corruption assumes that corruption is explained by 
country-specific factors, meaning that it is independent of corruption in neighbouring 
countries. Nevertheless, unfortunately, corruption is not just a country-specific issue and 
corruption by its nature is not bound to stay within the boundaries of a country. Particularly, 
due to its boundary-free nature, corruption is likely to flourish in EU states, as these countries 
provide a border-free environment for their citizens.  
 
In this study we also take account of contagion nature of corruption. The motivation for spatial 
analysis of corruption is two fold. First, cultural reasons of corruption are closely related to 
cross country interdependence of corruption, as norms about corruption tolerance are more 
likely to spread to neighbouring countries as compared to distant countries. Such 
interdependence of corruption implies that corruption levels may vary less within a region 
because of similar cultural reasons (for example, Paldam (2002) points out that corruption is 
mainly supported by cultural factors). Second, Becker et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence 
of cross country interdependence of corruption.  
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Figure 1-3: Corruption trends in different regions of the world.  
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Figure 1-3 shows that corruption exists in all regions of the world with a varying degree. 
Although corruption is more pervasive in the developing regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa 
but it is likely to increase in developed regions as well because of its border free nature. 
Recently MacDonald and Majeed (2011) provide compelling evidence that corruption in rich 
countries has substantially increased over the period 1984-2007. In addition, according to a 
recent report by Transparency International, “the 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index shows 
that public frustration is well founded. No region or country in the world is immune to the 
damages of public-sector corruption, the vast majority of the 183 countries and territories 
assessed score below five on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean)”6. 
 
Our starting point is that corruption is currently a global concern and poses one of the biggest 
challenges across countries throughout the world. In this respect, this thesis will analyse, 
discuss and contribute to the corruption literature on the two most recent issues significant for 
the reduction of corruption: the military in politics, and financial sector reforms. These two 
issues are examined in the context of developing and developed countries. These two issues 
can be viewed independent of one another. In addition, this study provides a better 
understanding of those causes of corruption which are not conclusive in the current literature. 
Important innovations include considering a wide set of historical, economic, cultural and 
political determinants of corruption and examining some of the previously considered 
determinants at a finer level of detail. Hence, this study not only improves our understanding 
about the existing causes of corruption but also provides new insights into these causes. 
 
1.1.2 Inequality and poverty  
The 20th century saw uneven improvement in living standards of people in different parts of 
the world. According to the World Bank (2001b), poverty has declined over the past twenty 
years but the progress has been unequal. The number of people living below poverty line fell 
from 1.5 billion in 1981 to 1.1 billion in 2001. Despite this development, many countries are 
still facing the problem of poverty and suffering from the vicious circle of the poverty trap. 
Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa rose from 41 % to 46% over the period 1981-2001, while in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia poverty increased to 20% in 2001. Hence, reducing poverty 
has become an important challenge for developing countries. 
                                                 
6
 http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ 
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Economic growth is considered to be a powerful, key force which can significantly reduce 
poverty incidence as rapid and sustained growth creates employment opportunities and high 
wage rates. Nevertheless, the extent of poverty reduction in response to growth primarily 
depends on two factors: initial level of income inequality, and response of inequality to 
growth. According to the well-known Kuznets (1955) inverted-U hypothesis economic growth 
can affect inequality in either direction depending upon the levels of economic development. 
If income inequality increases in response to high economic growth then poverty may not fall 
to a significant level. 
 
According to the Kuznets (1955) inverted-U hypothesis, income inequality increases during 
the early stages of economic development and, after reaching a turning point, declines. 
Although, the Kuznets curve predicts a negative effect of economic growth on inequality at 
higher levels of economic development, surprisingly, poverty is still a long standing problem 
in the world, despite many growth episodes. However, the literature does not predict a definite 
relationship between economic growth and income inequality and so it is difficult to say 
whether growth is good or bad for the poor and whether, in fact, the Kuznets curve holds. For 
this reason, understanding the relationship between economic growth and inequality is a key 
concern for development practitioners and policy makers. 
 
A number of developing countries witnessed high growth levels in different periods but 
poverty still exists since inequalities have increased. For instance, most South and East Asian 
economies grew at a higher rate since 1970s together with increasing inequalities over time. 
On the other hand, Latin American countries growth rates are less than half of the average 
growth rates of South and East Asian economies while maintaining high inequalities. The 
differences in inequalities at a given rate of growth show that different combinations of polices 
and institutions across countries matter for inequalities. It can be argued that leaving poverty 
on economic growth will not serve the purpose but poverty reduction requires high growth 
rates and combination of policies which ensure lower inequalities. Whether globalisation can 
be helpful in reducing inequality and poverty in developing counties is not yet conclusive in 
the both theoretical and empirical literature. 
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It is widely accepted by economists, development practitioners, and policy makers that 
relatively more open economies generate more gains over a long period of time, and policies 
which support openness contribute significantly to economic prosperity, employment 
enhancement and poverty eradication. However, it is also possible that successful open 
regimes, even in the long run, may leave a number of people behind in poverty. Since trade 
liberalization by its nature implies adjustment, it is likely to have distributional impacts that 
normally harm poorer individuals in an economy. The core of this argument is that free trade 
accentuates, rather than ameliorates, poverty and income inequality in poor countries.  
 
Theoretically speaking, the impact of globalisation on inequality is unclear and depends on the 
circumstances of individual countries as well as on the aspect of globalisation involved 
(O’Rourke, 2001). Different theories have been put forward to analyse the effect of 
globalisation on inequality, which can be grouped into three categories (Wade, 2001): 
neoclassical growth theory, endogenous growth theory, and the dependency theory of 
sociologists. Neo-classical growth theory expects income convergence across countries in the 
long run due to increased international mobility of capital. In contrast, endogenous growth 
theory predicts less convergence and, more likely, divergence, as increasing returns to 
technological innovation offset the diminishing returns to capital. Finally, the dependency 
theory suggests that developing countries reap lesser rewards from economic integration as 
they have relatively limited access to international markets and a narrow export base; hence, 
globalisation does not lead to absolute convergence. 
 
In the presence of such diversified theoretical predictions, estimating the actual impact of 
globalisation on inequality and poverty remains largely an empirical issue. The available 
evidence, however, does not produce a consensus and the effect of globalisation on inequality 
and poverty remains ambiguous. Also, no previous study has tried to quantify the relative 
contributions of globalisation and other fundamental variables on inequality and poverty in 
developing countries. Clearly, from the national and international policy perspectives, it is 
imperative to explore both the nature and the importance of various factors in generating 
inequality and poverty. In this study we attempt to fill the gaps in the existing literature and 
lend a fresh perspective to the globalisation, inequality and poverty debate.  
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1.1.3 Inequality and poverty trends in selected regions 
 
Figure 1-4 to Figure 1-8 illustrate poverty and inequality trends in the selected regions. The 
overall message of this simple descriptive explanation is that the poverty is a long-standing 
issue. High inequalities in combination with high poverty rates are major obstacles to social 
and economic development in many countries of the world. Although some countries have 
managed to control increasing trends of poverty, many countries are still trapped in a vicious 
circle of poverty. A deeper understanding of poverty and inequality predictors is important to 
develop pro-poor policy actions. In this respect, this thesis focuses on the role and importance 
of government and globalisation in explaining the cross-country variations in inequality and 
poverty. 
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Figure 1-4: Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa at $1.25 a day (PPP) 
 
Figure 1-4 and Figure 1-5 demonstrate poverty and inequality trends over the period 1981-
2005. The Figure 1-4 shows that the poverty rate in sub-Saharan Africa was 53.4% in 1981 
and, on average, it increased up to 1999 then fell sharply in 2002 and 2005. Although the 
poverty rate in 2005 was 50.9%, this is still a high figure. Figure 1-5 shows inequality 
statistics in Sub-Saharan African countries. The Gini coefficient for individual countries is 
high. In many countries, the Gini values are greater than 40, which are remarkably high. 
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Figure 1-5: Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa  
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Figure 1-6: Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean Countries 
 
Figure 1-6 represents income inequality statistics for Latin America and the Caribbean 
countries. It is clear from the figure that income distribution in this region is highly unequal. 
There is only one country (Uruguay) which has the lowest value of the Gini coefficient (42), 
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which, in effect, is also a high value. On the other hand, two countries (Colombia and 
Honduras) have the highest value of the Gini coefficient, that is, 58. 
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Figure 1-7: Poverty in Europe and Central Asia at $1.25 a day (PPP) 
 
Figure 1-7 shows that poverty in Europe and Central Asia has increased from 1.8% to 3.7% 
over the period 1981-2005. Although poverty incidences in this region are comparatively low, 
the increasing trend of poverty is noteworthy and calls for policy attention. Finally, Figure 1-8 
shows that poverty in South Asia was 59.4 in 1981 and it fell to 40.3 over the period 1981-
2005. Again, although poverty fell, this is still a high figure and needs to be addressed.  
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Figure 1-8: Poverty in South Asia at $1.25 a day (PPP) 
 
 
1.1.4 Economic growth 
Rapid and sustained economic growth is a central concern of economists and policy makers. 
One of the most important issues of economic literature is to explore the course of economic 
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growth and investigate the factors that determine it. This issue has been receiving considerable 
attention for a long time and is likely to continue to be the most important topic in future. In 
fact, it is true that the inspiration for the whole subject of economics is based on on the 
research on this particular topic. The father of economics, Adam Smith, addressed questions 
about the causes of variations in wealth across nations, as the title of his famous work, An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, indicates. Now, even after more 
than 200 years, determining the causes of growth differences across nations or within a nation 
over time is still an interesting issue. In fact, this question has been addressed again and again 
by economists. One of the most important causes of cross-country growth differences is the 
role and importance of income inequality. The question whether growth impact of inequality is 
positive or negative has long been an active topic for research among economists and policy 
makers. However, theoretical and empirical research into the economic growth effect of 
inequality has produced very mixed results. 
 
On the one hand, theoretical studies by Kaldor (1957), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) and 
Galor and Tsiddon (1997a, 1997b) predict a positive growth impact of inequality through 
incentives, physical capital accumulation, saving rates or investment indivisibility mechanism. 
On the other hand, theoretical studies by Galor and Zeira (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), 
Persson and Tabellini (1994), and de la Croix and Doepke (2003) predict a negative growth 
impact of inequality. The negative growth impact of inequality comes about through socio-
political instability, imperfections in credit markets, fiscal redistribution and distortion, and 
fertility differential channels. Thus, extant theoretical literature does not provide a definite 
relationship between inequality and growth.  
 
Similarly, on the empirical side, findings on the growth impact of inequality are also mixed, at 
best. On the one hand, Partridge (1997), Li and Zou (1998), Forbes (2000), and Lundberg and 
Squire (2003) provide empirical evidence that the growth impact of inequality is positive, 
while, on the other hand, Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Wan, Lu 
and Chen (2006), and Sukiassyan (2007) provide empirical evidence that the growth effect of 
inequality is negative. However, Barro (2000) shows that the growth impact of inequality is 
insignificant in a large sample of both developed and developing countries. 
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International trade is another important factor which plays a critical role in determining cross-
country variations in growth. Assessing growth performance in an open economy is an issue 
of considerable debate and interest. However, neither theoretical nor empirical studies have 
provided a definite conclusion about the growth impact of trade (see, for example, Edwards, 
1993; Lopez, 2005 for further details). Theoretical research on growth and trade suggests that 
long term economic growth may benefit from increased international trade because trade 
facilities technological advancements in importing countries and it also extends market size 
(see, for example, Grossman and Helpman 1990, 1991; Baldwin et al., 2005; Alesina et al., 
2000; and Bond et al., 2005).  
 
Some theoretical studies, on the other hand, suggest a negative impact of increased trade on 
economic growth. If some economies specialise in those sectors where comparative 
disadvantage holds then increased trade can hamper long-run economic growth (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1990, 1991). In this respect, Redding (1999) points out that trade openness 
might contribute adversely to long-run growth, if an economy specialises in those sectors 
where dynamic comparative disadvantages hold. Similarly, trade might contribute negatively 
to long-run growth if economies specialise in those sectors where learning by doing and 
innovation opportunities have largely been exhausted (Lucas, 1988; Young 1991). In such a 
type of economy, protection in selected sectors can foster long-term economic growth. 
 
To this end, this study raises a noteworthy question as to why growth effects of inequality and 
trade vary across developing countries and investigates the deeper causes of negative growth 
effects of trade and inequality. In particular, this study investigates the role of variations in 
cross-country variations in credit market imperfection and initial inequities in determining 
growth effects of inequality and trade.  
 
In sum, this thesis is motivated by the need to provide further perspectives in the corruption, 
inequality, and economic growth debate. This is achieved by investigating further potential 
avenues through which the causes of corruption can be explained. Thus, rather than simply 
examining the existing causes of corruption, this study specifically investigates new avenues 
of corruption which have been ignored in the existing literature. Similarly, this study seeks to 
provide a deeper understanding of cross-country variations in inequality, poverty and growth, 
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with a particular focus on the role of globalisation and taking non-linear relationships into 
account. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
In the light of the background to the study and motivation, this study seeks to address the 
following questions in Chapters Three and Four: (1) Does having the military in politics foster 
corruption across nations? (2) Does the role of military in politics cause have a different effect 
on corruption depending on the existing level of corruption? (3) Does high financial 
intermediation reduce corruption? (4) Is the relationship between high financial intermediation 
and corruption perhaps non-monotonic? (5) Do spatial corruption, regional panels and past 
levels of corruption matter in shaping the link?  
 
In Chapters Five and Six, which investigate the cross-country variations in inequality, poverty 
and growth, we address seven key issues: (1) Does economic growth benefit different 
economic actors equally or does it comes at the cost of increased inequality leaving some in 
society poorer? (2) Is the effect perhaps different over the path of development in the long 
run? (3) Does globalisation have spillover benefits which are shared equally? (4) What is the 
role of government in the process - does government spending reduce potentially existing 
inequalities and poverty? (5) Is inequality harmful for growth? (6) Does the effect of 
inequality on growth vary over the path of development and across regions? (7) Does the 
impact of trade on growth depend upon the existing level of inequalities in developing 
countries? 
 
1.3 Aim and Structure of the Thesis 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate various avenues of corruption in an attempt to reach a 
better understanding of the causes of corruption. In particular, the thesis will empirically 
examine the implication of the military in politics in breeding corruption and the 
complementarity between financial development and corruption reduction across countries. 
The thesis also improves our understanding of cross-country variations in inequality and 
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growth with, a particular focus on the role of globalisation and the importance of domestic 
policy reforms. 
 
To achieve this aim, the thesis will contain four core empirical chapters (essays) in addition to 
an introductory chapter, literature review chapter and a concluding chapter. The four empirical 
chapters can be considered different from one another. The first two empirical chapters will 
address the causes of corruption. In particular, the first of these two chapters will assess the 
role of the military in politics in determining corruption levels, and investigate how important 
financial development is for corruption. The other two empirical chapters will provide a 
deeper understanding of cross-country variations in inequality, poverty and economic growth. 
 
Second chapter is entitled Review of Literature: Causes of Corruption. This chapter provides a 
systematic review of the literature in addition to definitions and measurement issues of 
corruption. One important contribution of the second chapter is that it provides a detailed 
review of literature on causes of corruption in developed European countries using diverse 
sources. To best of our knowledge, a systematic and comprehensive review of literature on 
corruption in the developed European countries is absent from the literature on corruption.  
 
The third chapter is entitled Corruption and the Military in Politics: Theory and Evidence 
from around the World. This chapter will theorise the role of the military in politics and 
empirically test the hypothesis that the military in politics may positively influence corruption 
levels across countries, as the presence of soldiers in politics causes power and wealth 
maximisation that may breed corruption, and civilian-dominated governments may help 
militaries to extract wealth as a reward for their loyalty and support for regime stability. The 
analysis and evidence in this chapter will be used to as a robustness check for the next 
empirical chapter, which will investigate whether financial intermediation has an influence on 
corruption. 
 
The fourth chapter is entitled Corruption and Financial Intermediation in a Panel of Regions: 
Cross-Border Effects of Corruption. This chapter empirically tests the hypothesis whether 
financial reforms help in combating incidence of corruption levels. This chapter also takes 
account of non-linear nature of the relationship between financial liberalisation and corruption. 
In addition, this chapter models the role and importance of the contagious nature of corruption. 
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This chapter aims to demonstrate the importance of complementarity between financial 
development and corruption reduction. 
 
The other two empirical chapters will study the distributive and poverty effects of 
globalisation and the contribution of inequality to economic growth. The first will investigate 
the role played by globalisation in determining the cross-country variations in inequality and 
poverty; i.e., this chapter tests whether globalisation has favourable effects on developing 
countries. The chapter aims to demonstrate the importance of a non-monotonic relationship 
between economic development and inequality and the response of developing countries to the 
globalised world. This chapter is entitled Distributional Consequences of Globalisation: A 
Comparative Dynamic Analysis. 
 
The second chapter will investigate the role played by inequality, trade and some other 
important factors in determining the cross-country variations in growth; i.e., this chapter tests 
whether inequality has favourable effects on developing countries. This chapter aims to 
demonstrate the importance of an optimal level of inequality and the response of more 
segregated developing countries to the globalised world. This chapter is entitled Economic 
Growth, Inequality, Trade and Credit Market Imperfections: A Cross Country Analysis. 
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2. Review of Literature: Causes of Corruption 
 
2.1 Background 
 
Corruption is an ancient problem which has existed for many centuries. Wesson (1968) notes 
that corruption has existed from the time when the first manifestation of the huge, elaborate 
and self-serving apparatus of the state came into existence as far back as the Egyptian Old 
Kingdom. It is widely accepted among scholars and policy makers that widespread economic 
and political corruption triggered the demise of great empires of the past. Many autocratic and 
tyrannical regimes suffered from ill-advised practices and corrupt activities.  
 
Corruption was pervasive in the times of the Roman and Greek empires (MacMullen, 1988). 
Webber and Wildavsky (1986) note that corruption of tax collection was so great at that time 
that it was found useful to privatise tax collection by auctioning rights to collect taxes. Current 
governments have their genesis in earlier structures which were ‘rotten to the core’. Now, 
corruption scandals emerge from in walks of life, including business, politics and government. 
The sums range from small payments to bribes running into millions of dollars. 
 
Philosophers, scholars and policy makers have grappled with corruption over many centuries. 
Despite anti-corruption solutions, it could not be eliminated completely and in fact it has 
managed to survive and perpetuate itself, and therefore still exists. Although its appearance, 
degree and manifestations have altered through the centuries, worldwide existence and 
perseverance are its defining characteristics. In recent years, elimination of widespread 
corruption has been a key concern of domestic governments and international organisations. 
 
The literature on corruption is diverse and growing, as researchers from different academic 
disciplines such as sociology, law and politics are increasingly interested in studying its causes 
and consequences. Corruption has attracted attention in the main stream of economics over 
past few decades as economists are ever more interested in understanding the structure of 
organisations and agency problems. The growing interest on the part of economists in 
understanding corruption in recent years can be traced back to the pioneering work of Rose-
Ackerman (1975, 1978). Texts on the economics of organisations and microeconomics are 
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increasingly likely to include a discussion of corruption (Brickly et al. 1996) and agency 
problems (Kats and Rosen, 1994).  
 
2.2 Defining Corruption  
Corruption takes on different forms and functions in different contexts, as it is a complex and 
multifaceted problem with multiple causes and effects. The incidence of corruption ranges 
from a single act of an illegitimate payment to the widespread malfunction of a political and 
economic system. The problem of corruption has been viewed either as a norm, an individual 
moral problem, or as a structural problem of economics and politics. As a result, definition of 
corruption ranges from the broad terms of ‘misuse of public power’ and ‘moral decay’ to strict 
legal definitions as an act of bribery and a transfer of tangible resources (Andvig et al., 2000). 
 
Corruption is a growing area of study in various academic disciplines such as law, sociology 
and economics. In fact, the study of corruption is by its nature multidisciplinary and dispersed, 
ranging from detailed reports of single corruption scandals to universal theoretical modelling. 
Researchers study it as a problem of economic, social, political, cultural or moral decay or, in 
most cases, as a combination of these factors. The complex and multifaceted nature of 
corruption has given rise to agreement in academic and policy circles that it pervades many 
societies and there are no ‘quick fix’ solutions to it. 
 
When individuals representing state and public authority seek private wealth maximisation by 
misusing public resources then such behaviour is usually understood and referred to as 
corruption. The World Bank (1995), Transparency International (1998) and others use the 
following working and encyclopaedic definition of corruption: it is the abuse of public power 
for private benefit (or profit). Corruption is also referred to as a transaction between public and 
private agents through which collective goods are illicitly exchanged for private payoffs 
(Heidenheimer et al., 1989). Rose-Ackerman (1978) also emphasises the same point by 
arguing that corruption exists at the interface of the public and private sectors. 
 
Nye (1967, p. 416) defines corruption as “behaviour that deviates from the formal duties of a 
public role (collective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, 
private clique) wealth or status gains”. An updated version with the same elements is the 
definition by Khan (1996, p. 12) corruption is “behaviour that deviates from the formal rules 
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of conduct governing the actions of some one in a position of public authority because of 
private-regarding motives such as wealth, power, or status.” 
 
Huntington (1968) points out that scarcity of political opportunities generates corruption as 
individuals use wealth to buy power and when political opportunities are few then incidents of 
corruption occur as political power is misused to pursue wealth. 
2.2.1 Rent seeking and corruption 
Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman (2000) states that the term ‘rent-seeking’ is often used in place 
of corruption and there is a large area of overlap. However, corruption is ‘a misuse of public 
power for private gain’ while rent-seeking is derived from the economic term ‘rent’ i.e. 
earnings in excess of all relevant costs, and equals monopoly profits. Rent-seeking is not 
necessarily illegal or considered as immoral in a society, or necessarily uneconomical if 
reinvested productively. However, in practise, it is largely unproductive, wasteful and 
economically inefficient. 
 
2.2.2 Basic economic analysis of corruption 
Becker (1968) originally developed a standard economic model of crime which is useful for 
the economic analysis of corruption. According to this model, individuals carry out a cost-
benefit analysis of corruption. The expected benefits could be in the form of bribes, favours 
and payments in kind while costs could be in the form of probability of being detected and the 
monetary sum (or equivalent) of the punishment should they be convicted. Corruption is likely 
to occur if the net expected gain is positive. 
2.3 Measuring Corruption 
 
Since corruption by its nature is a secret and illicit activity, it is difficult to obtain precise 
information on the degree of corruption in a country. This difficulty is also a barrier to the 
classification of countries according to their relative levels of corruption. Despite this 
difficulty, useful insights into the incidence of corruption can be obtained by surveying experts 
and firms in a country. Although it is difficult to quantify corruption, we know it when we see 
it. There are many survey-based corruption perception indices that are currently becoming 
increasingly available. We will discuss three of them because they cover a relatively large 
sample of countries and they have been used in research studies. 
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 (a) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Index. 
Political Risk Services, a private investment risk service, produce this index every year since 
1982. The ICRG corruption index is apparently based on the opinions of experts and is 
supposed to capture the extent to which “high government officials are likely to demand 
special payments and to which “illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower 
levels of government” in the form of “bribes connected with import and export licenses, 
exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans.” 
 
(b) World Bank Corruption Index 
The World Bank provides six indictors of governance, known as Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI). These indicators are based on the views of a large number of enterprise, 
citizens and expert survey respondents in developing and industrial countries. The individual 
data sources for the aggregate measures are taken from a diverse variety of survey institutes, 
think tanks, non-government organizations, and international organization. One of these 
indicators is Control of Corruption (CC) which is widely used in academic research.7 The CC 
index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 where -2.5 indicates an absence of corruption while 2.5 shows 
full scale corruption. The CC index 2006 is based on 33 surveys and expert assessments from 
30 institutions. A detailed discussion on the methodologies of the CC index is available in 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010). 
(c) Transparency International (TI) Index 
Transparency International, an international nongovernmental organization dedicated to fight 
corruption worldwide, produces this index every year since 1995. The main objective of the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by TI is to provide data on extensive perceptions of 
corruption with in countries. The CPI bases on a weighted average of approximately ten 
surveys of business people and assessments by country analyst. Using different methodologies 
and diverse sampling frames, the CPI consists of credible sources. It ranks countries on a one-
to-ten scale where one is the least corrupt while ten is the most corrupt. 
 
                                                 
7
 The other indicators are: Voice and Accountability; Political Stability; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory 
Quality and Rule of Law. 
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The CPI has different advantages and disadvantage as it bases on a survey of surveys. The 
averaging process used to produce the TI index may reduce the measurement errors, if the 
measurement errors in different surveys are independently and identically distributed (iid), 
however, iid assumption may not hold. In addition, the averaging process may introduce new 
measurement errors when cross-country rankings are produced, since different surveys cover 
different subset of countries. It is important to note that TI indexes should not be used to 
measure changes in corruption level over time for a particular country as TI indexes in 
different years are derived from potentially different set of surveys,  
 
The next section reviews the literature on causes of corruption with particular focus on those 
causes which have been disputed or received least attention such as trade openness and role of 
remittances in determining corruption. 
2.4 Historical roots of corruption 
Scholars consider historical factors as important roots of the existing levels of corruption. For 
instance, legal theories suggest that quality of government, including corruption, depends on 
the kind of law codes that are in place. In history, common law legal codes have their origins 
in the efforts of property owners to restrict the discretionary power of the Crown (Glaeser and 
Shleifer 2002). In addition, it is also suggested that independent judiciary systems in those 
countries which adopt British law play an important role in curbing corruption (see for more 
details, La Porta et al., 1999) 
2.4.1 British colony 
Historical roots of corruption also can be traced in countries which were former British 
colonies. Theory sees former British colonies as having better civil services because of the 
influence of the British bureaucracy. Scholars note an almost obsessive focus on the 
procedural aspects of law in Britain and some of its former colonies. In Eckstein’s words, 
“The British . . . behave like ideologists in regard to rules and like pragmatists in regard to 
policies. Procedures, to them, are not merely procedures, but sacred rituals” (Eckstein, 1966, 
p. 265). According to this system, British servants focus procedural aspects of the law, which 
increase the ability of subordinates and judges to challenge hierarchies to enforce the law. A 
threat to hierarchies clearly increase the chances that official corruption will be exposed 
(Treisman, 2000). 
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Colonial heritage of a nation is also linked with the incidence of corruption. This variable 
captures “command and control habits and institutions and the divisive nature of the society 
left behind by colonial masters” (Gurgur and Shah, 2005, p. 18). Empirical evidence on this 
variable shows conflicting effects. On the one hand, countries with colonial heritage tend to 
suffer more from corruption (Gurgur and Shah, 2005) while on the other hand countries with a 
long heritage (British colony) tends to be clean countries (Treisman 2000). 
 
Another historical factor which influences corruption is legal system of a country. According 
to La Porta et al., (1999) countries which adopted common law systems seem to have more 
effective judicial system than those who adopted civil law system. Treisman (2000) notes that 
common law system and former British colonies have overlap but it is not perfect, therefore he 
examines the separate influence of common law on perceived corruption and finds out that 
those countries which adopt common law systems tend to be less corrupt. 
 
The linkages between history and corruption are not simple and remain to be fully studied in 
the literature (see Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 22). However, one of proposed links between history 
and corruption is the role of historical precedents and customs that might shape institutions 
and cultural norms in a country (knack and Keefer, 1995; Lambsdorff, 2006; and Paldam 
2002). This link implies that established practices and norms in old countries might be 
difficult to abandon and it also implies that many of these established practices might be 
viewed as corrupt over time by outsiders. Corruption in these economies might be considered 
a norm of doing business and thus might have become socially acceptable. This all means, 
over time, potential bribe-givers become familiar with the mechanism of offering bribes (see 
Lambsdorff and Teksoz, 2004). On the other hand, it is also possible that enforcement 
mechanism and institutional strengths might be well established in old countries, thereby 
making corruption less likely. Using a sample of European countries, recently, MacDonald 
and Majeed (2011) investigate the role of history of a country in determining current 
corruption levels. There study does not find significant influence of history on corruption 
however combined effect of the history of a nation with law or political stability significantly 
explains corruption.  
2.4.2 Religion  
Another way in which historical traditions and cultures might affect the corruption is thorough 
the influence of religion (Treisman, 2000). Protestant religion is less hierarchical in 
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comparison to other religions (such as the orthodox and catholic churches and Muslims). The 
Protestant church arose in part as opposition to state sponsored religion and played a role of 
opposition to the abuses of the government (Treisman, 2000). Tresiman (2000) finds a 
negative influence of the Protestant tradition on corruption.  
2.4.3 Ethnic and linguistic fractionalization 
Theories consider ethnolinguistics fractionalization as long-living cause of corruption such as 
Mauro (1995) notes that countries which are more ethnically fractionalized tend to be more 
corrupted. In ethnically divided societies state officials and politicians tend to favour those 
people which belong to their own ethnic group.  
 
The empirical evidence, nevertheless, is not clear. La Porta et al. (1999) find that governments 
in more ethnically divided societies exhibit poor performance while Treisman (2000) does not 
find evidence that linguistic fractionalisation has a direct effect on corruption. In a recent 
study, Alesina et al. (2003) finds that ethnic and linguistic fractionalization has a significant 
effect on corruption that is corruption is higher in nations which are ethno-linguistically 
diverse. 
2.5 Contemporary causes of corruption 
In this section we review the theories which describe the contemporary causes of corruption 
such as economic, political and institutional aspects. These theories are more useful for anti-
corruption policies compared to the theories based on historical factors because some of 
factors among the causes of corruption are policy amenable. 
2.5.1 Income levels 
There are a number of ways through which income levels may affect corruption. The high-
income countries can expected to afford high quality institutions. In addition, many factors 
such as education, urbanization, access to mass media and depersonalized (‘arm’s-length’) 
relationships are closely associated with higher income levels and they diminish the tolerance 
of the public toward corruption. The recognition that corruption violates the broader between 
the public and private sphere also depends on the level of development. The principle of 
‘arm’s-length’ implies that economic decision involving more then one party should not be 
manipulated through personal relationships. All economic agents should be treated on equal 
bases which is necessary condition for a well functioning market economy. 
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Corruption violates the principle of ‘arm’s-length’ and causes inefficiency and unpredictability 
in transactions (Schleifer and Vishny, 1993; Myrdal, 1968). This insight can be explained as 
follows (Paldam, 1999): from household’s perspective demand for honest behaviour is high at 
higher income levels while from firm’s perspective ‘honesty’ saves time that becomes more 
important when countries grow rich. Thus, honesty is hypothesised as production factor. 
Another important reason to believe that economic development reduces corruption is social 
stigma. It is argued in the literature that social stigma changes with economic development 
process. For instance, Ekpo (1979) notes that social stigma may be lower in societies where 
lines between public and private are not clearly drawn and gifts are not clearly differentiated 
from bribes. 
 
Economies which are at lower levels of economic development generate minimal wealth for 
the average citizen which, in turn, breeds structural motivation for corrupt behaviours. 
Economic insecurity, if not out right poverty, in low-income economies implies that a 
marginal supplement to income of an average citizen can considerably improve living 
conditions. In other words, marginal value of money is greater in poor economies as compared 
to wealthy economies. The higher utilities attached to marginal incomes affect both bribe 
givers and takers: paying a bribe is worth if gains are greater than costs. In fact, government 
jobs that provide the opportunity of extra income supplements become attractive.  
2.5.2 Size of government/control of economy and corruption 
In the case of imperfect competition or when government intervention restricts free entry, rent-
seeking literature emphasizes the link between corruption and opportunities for individuals to 
gain access to sources of higher than average rent (see Rose-Ackerman, 1999). From this point 
of view, a reduction of non-generic state regulation is useful for fight against corruption. 
Therefore, corruption is expected to be associated with the intervention of government 
(Chafuen and Guzmàn, 1999; Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000). An increased participation of the 
state in the economy gives leverage to state officials in giving access to economic resources 
and opportunities, thereby increasing the likelihood of corruption (Tanzi, 1998). This 
mechanism is strengthened if state officials receive lower salaries. Van Rijckeghem and 
Weder (2001) explore this issue and find the evidence that lower salaries cause a significant 
effect on corruption.  
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Thus, on the one hand larger governments may increase corruption because of a greater 
bureaucracy and red tap and also more opportunities to seek bribery (Rose-Ackerman 1999). 
While on the other hand, larger governments can spend more resources on law enforcement 
and can also spend more resources on checks and balances. It means larger governments might 
effectively control corruption (La Porta et al., 1999). Tresiman (2000) provides rather 
indecisive evidence of the size of the government in affecting corruption. 
 
Table 2-1: Government Spending and Corruption 
(1). Government Spending Deters Corruption 
Authors  Subject Data Econometrics 
Technique  
Sample 
Size 
Fisman-Gatti 
(2002), 
Decentralization 
and Corruption 
Cross sectional 
1980-1995  
OLS, 2SLS 59 
Montinola and 
Jackman (2002) 
Sources of 
Corruption 
Cross sectional 
1980-83 1989-92 
OLS 66 
Bonaglia et al. 
(2001) 
Globalisation and 
Governance 
Cross sectional 
1984-1998 
OLS, OLS 
(IV) 
- 
La Porta et al., 
(1999). 
Quality of 
Government 
Cross sectional 
different year, 
mostly 1990s 
OLS 47-152 
(2). Government Spending Encourages Corruption 
Authors  Subject Data Econometrics 
Technique  
Sample 
Size 
Ali-Isse (2003)  Determinants of 
Economic 
corruption 
Cross sectional 
1982-90,1995-99 
OLS - 
(Rose-
Ackerman, 1999) 
Corruption and 
Government 
Theoretical Study - - 
(3). Government Spending is insignificant for Corruption 
Authors  Subject Data Econometrics 
Technique  
Sample 
Size 
Montinola and 
Jackman (2002)  
Sources of 
Corruption 
cross sectional 
1980-83 1989-92 
OLS 66 
Pellegrini-
Gerlagh (2008)  
Causes of 
Corruption 
Cross sectional 
1994-2003 
WLS 106 
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  Theory of Government Spending and Corruption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5.3 Political indicators 
The political factors capture the democratic environment of a country, the effectiveness of its 
judicial system and the origin of its legal system. The role of an established democracy has 
been highlighted in several studies of corruption (see, among others, Treisman, 2000, and 
Paldam, 2002). It is widely believed that corruption is related to the deficiencies of the 
political system and that an established democracy, by promoting political competition and 
hence increasing transparency and accountability, can provide a check, albeit an imperfect 
one, on corruption. Other characteristics of the political environment, including electoral rules 
(Persson et al., 2003) and the degree of centralization (Treisman, 2000, and Fishman and 
Gatti, 2002) may also be important in explaining corruption. 
 
The judicial system also helps in controlling corruption (Becker, 1968). Efficient and strong 
legal systems with well specified boundaries protect property rights and provide firm 
framework for economic activities. Contrary to this, weak legal systems can effectively 
enforce contracts and undermine free market mechanism, thereby reducing incentives for 
agents to participate in productive economic activities. 
2.5.4 Political stability 
Political stability is another important variable that affects corruption levels. It is widely 
accepted in academic circles that corruption is rooted form political deficiencies. An 
established democracy promotes political competition, transparency and accountability (to the 
voter), thereby reducing corruption. If we look at democracy, from dynamic point of view 
An Increase in government Size 
An increase in bureaucracy  Stronger checks and 
balances 
Control over resources and 
discretionary power increases 
Threat of punishment and 
imprison 
Corruption increases Corruption decreases 
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instead of procedural, it leads us to political stability. On the one hand, political stable 
administrations create productive incentives for bureaucrats because they face less chances of 
dismissal and find more opportunities for long-term development of their official careers. It 
means political stability motivates bureaucrats to build an open and honest reputation for 
career advancement. On the other hand, a secure position in bureaucracy may help maintain 
‘patronage and corruption’ reputation and relations (Treisman, 2000).  
 
One of the important elements that determine pervasiveness of corruption in public sector is 
defined as ‘public morale’ that reflects faith in country administrators (such as politicians and 
policy makers). In economies where polices are unanticipated or policy makers renege on their 
commitments or policy changes are not pure democratic, the economy creates economic chaos 
that, in turn, negatively affect public morale. This study proxy the economic chaos with high 
inflation rates because high inflation rates reflect macroeconomic imbalances. Another 
outcome of high inflation rates is redistribution of national wealth that may lead to a further 
drop in the public morale. (Paldam, 2002; Majeed and Macdonald, 2010). In the literature high 
inflation rates are also used as a proxy for political instability. 
2.5.5 Trade openness and corruption  
Analyzing how trade openness impacts governance and how it spurs or curbs corruption 
implies to clearly diagnose causes and effects of corruption and to take into consideration 
various factors. To carry out that we need to depart from basic stylized facts to more complex 
theories and empirical evidence. In this section we try to answer the key question why and 
how trade openness influences the level of perceived corruption in a given country? 
Apparently, an assessment of direct relationship between openness to trade and corruption 
seems difficult, however rent seeking literature provides the base to develop sound theoretical 
linkages between two.  
 
Krueger (1974) provides the first mechanism between rent seeking activities and imports 
restrictions. The quantitative restrictions on imports, in contrast to tariff, and other official 
permissions to imports, generate considerable opportunities for economic rent seeking 
activities because of monopolistic powers entitled to legal importers. In order to exploit these 
opportunities, agents may legally compete or illegally seek rent seeking activities such as 
smuggling, black market, bribery and corruption. Krueger (1974) confirms that these rent 
seeking activities force an economy to operate at a level below its optimal and lead to 
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deviation between social and private costs and hence cause a welfare cost in addition to trade 
restrictions. 
 
In successive academic papers, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980) and Bhagwati (1982), have 
extended Krueger’s concept of rent seeking activities to a whole array of Directly 
Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) providing further arguments in favour of free trade. 
Recently Gatti (1999) provides empirical evidence of the explicit relationship between 
restricted trade and corruption. Indeed, the author detangles two effects of inward looking 
policies on corruption: the “direct policy distortion” and the “foreign competition effect”. 
Where direct policy distortion implies that high restrictions to free trade encourage private 
agents to seek favouritism from public officials offering bribes. And foreign competition 
effect implies that high barrier to international transactions hamper competition between 
domestic and foreign firms, such a decline in competition leads to high margins for corruption 
and rent seeking. 
 
In another study, Ades and Di Tella (1997), provide further insights into the corruption-rent 
seeking mechanism. They present evidence that the level of rents in general and market 
structure in particular determine the intensity of corruption in an economy. They argue that 
variation in rents size as a result of changes in competition cause ambiguous effects on 
corruption. On the one hand, lower levels of competition provide opportunities to bureaucrats 
to extract more rents from the firms they control. On the other hand this situation also implies 
that it is more valuable for the society to avoid corruption and increase the accountability and 
monitoring of its bureaucracy. Theoretically, net impact of competition on corruption is 
ambiguous. Investigating the net impact of these two possible tendencies requires empirical 
test. 
 
However, real world exhibits some examples of possible association between both. For 
instance, Nigeria provides a striking example of positive association between rents and 
corruption. In 1980s, oil exports of Nigeria generated 80% of government revenue and created 
extraordinary opportunities for corruption. Ades and Di Tella (1997) develop a model based 
on three types of variables that determine corruption: wages of the bureaucracy, the level of 
monitoring by civil society and the level of profits of domestic firms. In order to capture 
bureaucratic wages and monitoring, their study uses general level of economic development 
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(GDP per capita, schooling) and political development (Gastil index of political rights). They 
proxy degree of competition with the share of imports in GDP, the concentration of fuels and 
mineral exports in the composition of total export and the distance from the world’s major 
exporters. Evidence of their study suggest that corruption is higher in countries where 
domestic firms are less exposed to foreign competition or countries with concentrated exports. 
 
Wei (2000) advances a final third mechanism on the relationship between globalisation and 
quality of institutions by explicitly evaluating differences in the costs and benefits of 
monitoring government officials. The central idea is that quality of institutions and their 
capacity to curb corruption crucially depend on the resources a country allocates to this end. A 
country chooses to invest more in building good public governance when benefits are larger or 
costs are smaller. 
 
Since international investors and traders can easily divert their businesses from one country to 
another than domestic ones, corruption and bad governance discourage more strongly to 
business decisions of foreign stake holders than domestic one. Such a diverse effect of 
corruption between domestic and foreign stake holders justifies strong corruption reducing 
policies in relatively more open economies. Given resulting larger benefits, an economy that is 
more exposed to international markets would find it optimal to allocate more resources to 
building good institutions and end up with a lower level of corruption than a less open inward-
looking one. 
 
These implications of the model depend on two key assumptions. First, the impact of 
corruption on international transactions is stronger than domestic ones. Wei (2000) justifies 
this assumption arguing that international investors enjoy stronger bargaining power relative 
to domestic procedures. Furthermore, enforcement costs for international contracts increase 
more steeply with bad governance. Second, assumption about direction of causality implies 
that openness is exogenous and it comes before corruption.  
 
Does trade openness increase corruption and if so, how? The answers to this question can be 
traced from the initial experience of erstwhile and USSR and transitional economies of 
Eastern Europe “where essential steps to privatize the economy and rewrite the rules of 
commerce after the demise of socialism were often accompanied by widespread corruption” 
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(Transparency international, 2005, p.271). Trade liberalisation introduces and increases 
imports of new goods and services. The availability of a variety of imports increases the 
marginal utility of income of consumers if they have a desire for a variety of goods. This 
effect is likely to be more significant in developing countries which lack the ability to produce 
a variety of goods and services domestically. Similarly, increased imports of different goods 
increase the marginal utility of bribe income for custom officials, thereby increasing 
incentives for bribe-seeking.  
 
Trade openness may also generate new opportunities for corruption. Tanzi (1998) reports that 
trade liberalisation has created new opportunities for corruption as paying bribes gives 
advantages in obtaining foreign contracts or privileged access to markets, or some specific 
gains such as tax incentives. Paying bribes maximises the mutual interests of politicians and 
firms. Politicians want to stay in office by re-election and they need money to finance their 
campaigns, while firms need business incentives. Thus, politicians have an incentive to award 
contracts or other benefits to those firms that pay them bribes. 
 
Small countries trade more as they produce fewer goods internally. Market discipline, in an 
open economy, improves governance. However, this argument is not necessarily true as it 
ignores the possibility that small size increases the per capita rent, which motivates custom 
official to extract more bribes for the aforementioned reason that a small nation trades more 
and imports of a variety of goods, creating incentives for corrupt behaviour of custom 
officials. Therefore, greater openness could lead to a higher incidence of corruption.  
 
Hisamatsu (2003) contributes to the literature on corruption by finding the importance of 
foreign demand for corruption through trade. He tests the argument that countries trading with 
corrupt countries also import corruption. The empirical findings of his study confirm the 
proposition. It is usually considered that corruption is explained by domestic factors. Since 
corruption is an outcome of demand and supply, foreign demand for corrupt acts, other than 
domestic factors, can also affect the level of corruption in an importing country. Torrez (2002) 
examines the relationship between trade and corruption to test the argument that restricted 
trade shifts resources from productive activities to rent- seeking activities such as corruption. 
The study shows that a negative relationship holds for most of the empirical evidence, but this 
relationship is not robust. 
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Recently, using a panel data set for 146 countries over a long period, Majeed (2011b) 
contributes in the area of trade-corruption linkages by discovering a presence of threshold and 
significance of complementary policy reforms in shaping the link. The study suggests that in a 
linear specification openness to trade is corruption increasing while its effect is negative in a 
non-linear specification. The author exhibits that this non-linear nature of the relationship is 
worth noting and lend support to answer the question why previous empirical results of the 
relationship between the degree of openness to trade and corruption index are so different 
from one another. Furthermore, he finds empirical support to the proposition that this is not 
just openness to trade that can reduce corruption but there are complimentary policy reforms 
that cause a decline in corruption. The analysis shows that the combined effect of trade 
openness and high bureaucracy quality or financial reforms are corruption reducing.  
 
The vast majority of studies summarized in Table 2.2 appear to conclude that trade openness 
decreases corruption thus rejecting the hypothesis that trade openness could increase 
corruption. 
 
 
                          Theory of Openness and Corruption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
An increase in trade openness 
Reduces monopolistic rents 
enjoyed by firms 
Liberalization typically 
increases imports 
And decreases their ability to 
pay a bribe 
Imports introduce new 
goods and services 
Thereby reducing 
bureaucratic corruption 
Corruption increases 
MU of bribe income of 
corruptible officials’ 
increase 
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Table 2-2 Trade Openness and Corruption (Trade openness decreases corruption) 
Authors  Subject Data Estimation 
Technique  
Sample  Non 
linearity 
Policy 
complim
entary 
Gatti (2004)  Corruption and 
openness 
Simple Pooling 
1982-2000 
OLS - No No 
Knack-Azfar 
(2003) 
Trade intensity and 
corruption 
Cross sectional 
1995-99 
OLS 40-98 No  No 
Persson et 
al. (2003) 
Electoral rules and 
corruption 
Cross sectional & 
Panel1990s 
OLS 80 No No 
Fisman-Gatti 
(2002) 
Decentralization 
and corruption 
Cross sectional 
1980-1995  
OLS, 2SLS 59 No No 
Bonaglia et 
al. (2001) 
Globalisation and 
governance 
Cross sectional 
1984-1998 
OLS, OLS 
(IV) 
- No No 
Frechette 
(2001) 
Determinant of 
corruption  
Panel data 
1982-1998 
Fixed 
Effects 
135 No No 
Wei (2000) Corruption and 
global capital flows 
Panel data 
1994-96 
Fixed 
Effects  
99 No No 
Ades-Di 
Tella (1999) 
Rents, competition 
and corruption 
1980-83 1989-90 OLS, 2SLS 52, 31 No No 
Laffont and 
N’Guessan 
(1999) 
Competition and 
corruption in a 
agency relationship 
Theory  - - No No 
Leite-
Weidmann 
(1999) 
Natural resources 
and corruption  
Cross sectional 
1970-90 
OLS, 2SLS 72 No No 
Trade openness increases corruption. 
Gurgur-Shah 
(2005) 
Localization and 
corruption 
Cross sectional 
1997 
OLS 30  No No 
You and 
Khagram 
(2005) 
Inequality and 
corruption 
Cross sectional 
1996-2002 
OLS, 2SLS 129 No No 
Trade openness is insignificant for corruption. 
Pellegrini-
Gerlagh 
(2008) 
Causes of 
corruption 
Cross sectional 
1994-2003 
WLS 106 No No 
You-Khagram 
(2005) 
Inequality & 
corruption 
Cross sectional 
1996-2002 
OLS, 2SLS 129 No No 
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Table 2-3 Main Empirical Studies on Determinants of Corruption (I) 
Authors (Year of Pub.) ED G Ed NE Op Re EL BL RL 
MacDonald-Majeed (2011) -* -*   +*    -* 
Rock (2009) -* -*  + -   + +*  
Pellegrini-Gerlagh (2008) -* +  +* - -* - -  
Dreher et al. (2007) -*  -*  +   -* -* 
Serra (2006) -*     -*    
Kunicova-R.Ackerman (2005) -*         
Lederman et al. (2005), -*      +*   
Gurgur-Shah (2005), -* -   +*  +   
Braun-Di Tella (2004) -*    +     
Damania et al. (2004) -*        -* 
Alt-Lassen (2003) -*  -*       
Brunetti-Weder (2003) -*  -*    +  -* 
Graeff-Mehlkop (2003) -*         
Herzfeld-Weiss (2003) -*        -* 
Knack-Azfar (2003) -*    -*     
Tavares (2003) -*         
Ali-Isse (2003)  +* -*      -* 
Bruentti-weder (2003) -*  -*  +*     
Persson et al. (2003) -*  -**  -* -* -   
Fisman-Gatti (2002), -* -*   -  +   
Paldam (2002-01) -*     -*?    
Swamy et al. (2001) -*        -* 
Frechette (2001) +*  +* -*      
Bonanglia et al. (2001) -* -*  +* -* -* -*   
Wei (2000) -*    -*     
Treisman (2000) -*   + - -* +* -*  
Rauch-Evan (2000) -*  -*       
Sandholtz-Koetzle (2000) -*    -* -*    
Ades and Di Tella (1999) -*  -* + -*     
La Porta et al. (1999) -* -*   - - + -*  
Goldsmith (1999) -*         
Van Rijckeghem-Weder (1997) -*  -*       
ED= Economic Development; G=Government Spending; Ed=Education; PR=Political Rights; NE= Natural 
Endowment; OP=Openness; Re=Religion; EL=Ethno-linguistic; BL=British Legal System; RL=Rule of law 
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Table 2-4 Main Empirical Studies on Determinants of Corruption (II) 
Authors (Year of Pub.) De BC F Dc PR PI EF Pop Inf 
MacDonald-Majeed (2011) -*      -*  +* 
Rock, Michael T (2009) +/-*         
Pellegrini-Gerlagh (2008) -* - -* -*  +*    
Dreher et al. (2007) -*         
Serra (2006) -* -*    -*    
Kunicova-R.Ackerman (2005) -*   +*   -*   
Lederman et al. (2005) -*  -* -*      
Gurgur-Shah (2005) -* +*  -*   -*   
Braun-Di Tella (2004) -*    +    +* 
Damania et al. (2004) -*   +*    +*  
Alt-Lassen (2003)        +*  
Brunetti-Weder (2003)   -*       
Graeff-Mehlkop (2003)       -*   
Herzfeld-Weiss (2003) -*         
Knack-Azfar (2003) -*       +*  
Tavares (2003)  +*      -*  
Ali-Isse (2003)    -*   -*   
Bruentti-weder (2003)   -*  +     
Persson et al. (2003)     -     
Fisman-Gatti (2002)    -*    +*  
Paldam (2002-01) -*      +*  +* 
Swamy et al. (2001) -* -*        
Frechette (2001) -*         
Bonanglia et al. (2001) -*         
Wei (2000) -*   -*      
Treisman (2000) -* -*  +* - -* -*   
Rauch-Evan (2000)          
Sandholtz-Koetzle (2000) -* -*     -*   
Ades-Di Tella (1999) -*    +     
La Porta et al. (1999)          
Goldsmith (1999) -*   +*   -*   
Van R-Weder (1997) -*         
De= Democracy; BC= British Colony; F=Freedom of Information; Dc= Decentralization; PR= Political Rights; 
PI=Political Instability; EF= Economic Freedom; Pop= Population; Inf. = Inflation 
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2.5.6 Role of remittances in a recipient economy  
Whether a remittance contributes positively or negatively to the macroeconomic performance 
of a recipient economy is a controversial issue in theoretical studies and many studies 
empirically assess the effect of remittances on the recipient economy’s performance and reach 
different conclusion despite using the same data sources (see, for example, Barajas, 2009). 
 
Remittance receipts may exert a negative influence on labour force participation for the 
following reasons. Since remittances inflows can be viewed as income transfer, individual 
recipients may prefer to switch this unearned remittance income with labour income. Chami, 
Fullenkamp, and Jajah (2003) argue that irrespective of the intended use of remittances, there 
are various moral hazard problems linked with remittance receipts. Remittance monitoring and 
management is extremely difficult because remittance senders and receivers are separated by a 
distance and remittances are sent under asymmetric information. Thus, moral hazard problems 
may induce an individual to spend resources on leisure and reduce labour work. 
 
In a recent study, Barajas et al. (2009) argue that the availability of remittance inflows 
decreases the motivations for individuals to monitor and evaluate the domestic governments’ 
policy performance. The remittance inflows create a moral hazard problem for the domestic 
government as the cost of poor performance of the domestic government is at least partially 
shifted to the remittance sender because whenever things go wrong at home, remittance 
transfers are likely to increase. The main point of this argument is that high remittance inflow 
may undermine good domestic governance. We focus this argument on a specific aspect of the 
quality of the domestic institution that is corruption. In future research this argument can be 
extended to alternative measures of the quality of institutions, for example, rule of law. 
 
We extend the negative relationship of remittances and labour participation to the quality of 
domestic institutions. Individuals with high remittances do not take account of the quality of 
domestic institutions and prefer to solve economic issues through remittance senders and may 
use this unearned money to ‘grease the wheels’ for speedy work in public sectors.  
 
Recently, Majeed (2011b) contributes in the existing literature on sources of corruption by 
analyzing the distribution of dependent variable (corruption). The results in this study support 
earlier findings in the literature on sources of corruption such as economic prosperity, 
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economic freedom, legal strengths and quality of the bureaucracy (all of these variables help 
significantly in combating corruption). In addition to confirming earlier findings, results of the 
study also provide new insights. Among the least corrupt countries, remittances do not appear 
to increase corruption but significantly promote corruption among most corrupt nations.  
 
2.5.8 Other causes of corruption 
Some other important causes of corruption are: decentralization, economic freedom, internet 
users and newspapers’ circulation. The role of all these variables is considered to be 
negatively associated with corruption levels.  
 
2.6. Survey of the Literature: Corruption in Europe 
Having reviewed causes of corruption, now we discuss causes of corruption in European 
countries. This separate section is linked with earlier discussion in following ways. First, this 
section reinforces the point that corruption is also a problem of developed countries. Second, 
this section helps us in understanding the most important causes of corruption. Third, these 
sections together imply that corruption is a global curse with a varying degree in the 
developed and the developing world. In this section we systematically attempt to review the 
literature in relation to corruption in European countries using a number of research sources 
such as surveys, reports, academic articles, stylized facts, and scandals. Using extant literature 
we support the proposition that corruption is a growing threat in rich countries as well and 
now corruption has become global challenge. 
 
In EU member states some nations are suffering more from corruption while some nations are 
relatively clean. Rapid economic transactions, labour mobility, uniform trade policies, 
widespread information are among the potential sources which shift cross-borders cultural and 
political norms within the member states. Since corruption by its nature is contagion, it is 
more likely to spread within EU countries. Here counter argument can be built that why we 
assume that corruption is a growing threat and why do we not suppose that contagion nature of 
corruption will potentially transfer anti-corruption norms from top clean economies to 
relatively corrupt economies, thereby reducing corruption. 
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Theoretically this is possible, however, in reality the situation is opposite for following 
reasons. First, the number of clean economies in EU countries is rather small while relatively 
corrupt economies are greater in number. Second, a number of evidence gathered in this 
section using reports, surveys, scandals, speeches, scholarly arguments, and facts from around 
the European countries prove that corruption on average is growing. Third, some countries 
recently joined EU such as Latvia, Hungary these countries are highly susceptible to 
corruption prone activities. Fourth, economies which are supposedly free from corruption are 
also suffering from corruption as recent corruption scandals have shaken them as well. Fifth, 
corruption indices show that on average corruption is increasing in European countries. 
 
According to constitutional treaty 2004 of the European Union Member Sates, one core 
objective of European Union is to offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice 
without internal borders. The existing corruption and its growing threat is a major obstacle to 
meet this goal. The Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 2005, 2007, and 2009 remarkably 
show that majority of the Europeans believe that corruption is a major problem of EU member 
states. 
 
In the intervening years of surveys, there are a number of corruption scandals emerged in 
member states, including Finland, Malta, Austria, Spain and UK. Many of these corruption 
scandals have involved public officials and politicians with wide media coverage both within 
country and across member states in EU. In the same period global financial crises have hit the 
European countries and their negative effects are still being felt which has put additional 
burden on the government of member states in EU. 
 
Euro barometer (2009) reports that one main reason of corruption in Europe is lack of real 
punishment for corruption. The respondents form different European countries report this 
view: 58% in Slovakia, 41% in Spain and 37% in Sweden. Lack of transparency in public 
spending is another reason for corruption, Eurobarometer (2009) reports. The respondents 
from different European countries support this view: 41% in Latvia, 36% in Austria and 35% 
in the Netherlands. 
 
The overall picture which emerges from the survey is rather negative as majority of the 
European believe that corruption is a major issue in their country and it persists in institutions 
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at every level. In addition, majority of the Europeans agree that corruption exists within 
European Union institutions. 
 
Majority of the Europeans (seven out of ten) think that although corruption is inevitable but 
most respondents also think that government is not taking enough actions to control 
corruption. This is general consensus among Europeans that successful prosecutions to curb 
corruption are not sufficient and even when there are, the sentences declared by courts are 
rather lenient. 
 
What is overall causing increase in perceptions of corruption in European countries? Emerging 
corruption scandals in member states are increasingly continuing in perceptions of corruption. 
One other reason could be the continuing economic impact of the financial crises, report says. 
Overall the main concluding message from the report is that “for the majority of Europeans, 
corruption continues to be seen as a major problem, and they believe more action needs to be 
taken to fight and prevent it.” 
 
According to the latest survey on corruption by Special Euro barometer (2009), 94% of the 
respondents in Cyprus believe that corruption is widespread in the police and wider public 
sector. One reason of perceived high corruption is appointments in public sectors are not based 
on merit, 54 % of the Cypriots agree with this reason. Another reason for high corruption is 
poor hold of law as 40% Cypriots believe that laws are not enforced while 43% believe that 
the lack of enforcement is not subject to any real punishment.  
 
The Global Corruption Barometer (2010) has revealed that corruption in Portugal has 
increased during the past three years. The data shows that 83% of the Portuguese consider 
corruption has risen since 2007. Luís de Sousa, President of Transparência e Integridade 
(TIAC)8 argues that “this worsening of people’s perception of corruption in Portugal, is in part 
due to corruption scandals involving politicians and business people from the financial sector 
being more widely exposed in the media.” 
 
                                                 
8Transparência e Integridade (TIAC) is Portugal’s link to Transparency International in Portugal. 
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In June 2011, Transparency International UK (TI-UK)9 has issued a research report which 
examines the levels of corruption in 23 sectors and institutions in UK. “The research report 
represents a ‘corruption health-check for the UK’ in which the diagnosis is ‘growing threat, 
inadequate response’.” The report shows that corruption is a much greater problem then 
recognized and there is an inadequate response to its growing threat. The report identifies 
following sectors and institutions where corruption is particularly prevalent: prison system, 
political parties, parliament and sport. 
 
The report suggests that we lack knowledge of the full extent of corruption in the UK, 
particularly in key sectors and institutions. The inadequate, uncoordinated and incoherent 
policy response has caused a culture of impunity in certain areas. Although corruption is not 
endemic in the UK and also key pillars of the UK’s national integrity systems are robust but 
they are not free form weaknesses. In fact some of the most trusted institutions are vulnerable 
and there are insufficient steps to diagnose and cure corruption. 
 
The report provides shocking finding on the links between organised crimes and incidence of 
corruption in the UK. The organized criminals have targeted UK Border Agency, police and 
prison. They exploit social housing to facilitate prostitution and drug trafficking or to house 
illegal immigrants. The employment of illegal workers damage free competition in labour 
market and it is considered a single largest corruption threat to the construction sector. The 
involvement of key officials into corruption in above mentioned areas allow wrong-doing.  
 
According to the report, 53.4% of respondents believe that corruption has increased in the last 
three years. The report also highlights the corruption risks related to government policy. The 
cut in government spending in specific areas and rapid institutional changes may create an 
environment that largely increases the risk of corruption. 
 
The report discovers organized crime as a root cause of graft in Britain. The organized 
criminals have targeted staff of the UK Border Agency, prison service and police force. The 
report explains the net working of criminals with government officials by refereeing an 
analysis by Britain’s Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA). The analysis shows that 
                                                 
9
  http://www.transparency.org.uk/ti-uk-programmes/corruption-in-the-uk 
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organized criminal maintain “corrupt relationship” with official in law enforcement and the 
criminal justice system. 
 
The report refers a leaked study by the Metropolitan Police which shows that in England and 
Wales there were 1000 corrupt officers working in the prison system in 2006. The estimates 
also suggest that there were 600 inappropriate relationships between a prisoner and a prison 
officer. The report shows that prisoner mainly target prison staff because they are easily 
accessible and they receive less anti-corruption training 
 
The report notes that 65% of the respondents view political parties as most corrupt sector. The 
main reason begins this view that most of the political parties receive funding from private 
donations instead of the state-£59.2 million in comparison to £8.1in 2009-2010. The report 
says that funding is not necessarily corruption prone, since legally there is no limit on funding, 
the approach to senior politicians can buy arouses of corruption. 
 
According to the report parliament is the third most corrupt sector. In 2008-2009, expenses 
scandals have raised the questions on integrity of politicians as many parliamentarian 
members claimed public money for private purposes. “One of the key concerns over the 
scandal was the extent to which the legislature tried to minimize the information made 
available to the public,” the report notes. 
 
According to a survey issued in 2009, 78% of the respondents in Iceland believe that 
corruption in private sector is rather high (grade 4 or 5 on the scale of 5). A similar trend has 
been observed in the public opinion of corruption among the members of ruling party where 
number of respondents who believe corruption has increased from 12% in 2007 to 71% in 
2009. In addition, 40% of the Icelanders consider that public officials are corrupt (Capacent-
Gallup, 2009). 
 
According to Global Integrity Report (2004)10 corruption in Germany is spreading like a 
cancer and it has become part of today’s German reality. The report says that public officials 
are involved in bribery, managers misdirect money into their own pockets and politicians 
misuse resources for their personal gains. In 2002, a garbage processing plant in Cologne has 
                                                 
10
 http://globalintegrity.org/reports/2004/2004/country65a8.html?cc=de&act=notebook 
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been exposed to corrupt activities as it has been reported that an official from the Social 
Democratic Party had taken at least €174000 in irregular payments allegedly linked to the 
plant. 
  
Norway is considered among clean economies, however, in recent years, according to Global 
Integrity Report (2009)11, corruption is increasing in this country as well. There are two main 
reasons which describe the recent spike in corruption. First is related to legal strengths in the 
country, in 2003 a new corruption article has been introduces in Norwegian panel code. The 
new article gives more authority and flexibility to prosecuting authorities. This article has 
extended the maximum limit of sentence on corrupt activities (six to ten year) and it also 
allows to prosecuting authority to punish Norwegians who commit corruption abroad that was 
not possible in old law. The second reason is that now media has increased its efforts in 
exposing corrupt activities.  
 
The report reveals some examples of exposed corruption in Norway. An official from tax 
department received bribe for “fixing” the tax form. In police department, two policeman 
received money from a prison in reward of arranging an illegal leave. Similarly, a psychologist 
and a psychiatrist asked for bribes to issue false health certificates to prisoners. 
 
In four different cases, the rehabilitation of public buildings has been exposed to corruption as 
civil servant, responsible for the rehabilitation received bribes. Usually, these cases involve a 
civil municipality servant who can influence procurement and tender process in favour of 
private enterprises in exchange for bribes. 
 
The CEO of two public companies in Norway has misused his position for private gain. He is 
alleged to transfer more than 100 million Norwegian kroners (US$ 17.7 million) from the two 
public companies into his private accounts. In 2008, he was sentenced by district court for 
eight years 
 
According to Global Integrity Report (2009)12 ccorruption is a major issue in Slovakia. 
Political corruption is widespread, contracts are awarded to party supporters, tenders are over 
                                                 
11
 http://report.globalintegrity.org/Norway/2009/notebook 
12
  http://report.globalintegrity.org/Slovakia/2009/notebook 
  44 
priced and questionably managed. Slovakians pay bribes of expensive alcohol to professors to 
secure admission in prestigious universities, to doctors in exchange for special medical 
treatment.  
 
Experts refer to such a widespread corruption in Slovakia to historical heritage that existed 
under communist rule (1948-89). The historical corrupt behaviour accustomed Slovaks to 
manipulate the system for private gains such as a new car, a flat, special medical treatment. 
The report cites “it was a part of people’s everyday life” 
 
Even Prime Minister Robert Fico reveals that he bribed a bottle of cognac to a physician for 
treatment of his father before the Velvet Revolution in 1989. In 2008, at a press conference, 
Fico told that it was acceptable to reward political supporters and friends if their proposals 
remain in legal limits. 
 
In Hungary, aaccording to Global Integrity Report (2008)13, evidence on corruption ranges 
from small payments to high profile corrupt activities. Hungarian often participates in small 
corrupt practices such as a box of chocolate or small money expedites the process of a new ID 
card. Recently, it was discovered that many Budapest drivers pay lower parking fees to 
parking controlling companies instead of stiffer official parking prices. Tax evasion is also 
part of the culture. Overall, corruption contaminates many parts of Hungarian society. It 
persists in the departments of issuing permits and licenses, in distribution of EU subsides, 
local government procurement, local government and commercial bribery. 
 
Although, it takes four days by train to reach Moscow from central station of Bishkek in the 
Kyrgyz Republic but trains are always full on this route. The travel by train is relatively cheap 
and local business transport goods to Russia. According to Global Integrity Report (2008)14, 
Kyrgyz customs officials demand bribes from the passengers irrespective whether they are 
transporting legal or illegal goods. The custom officials consider the amounts earned from 
bribes as secondary source of their incomes. The custom officials do not charge fixed tariffs, 
they get whatever is easily manageable to get form the pockets of the travelers and they share 
this amount with higher ranking officers.  
                                                 
13
 http://report.globalintegrity.org/Hungary/2008/notebook 
14
 http://report.globalintegrity.org/Kyrgyz%20Republic/2008/notebook 
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Corruption among custom official is rather widespread in Kyrgyz Republic. The officials seek 
money on imported goods. The imports of the automobiles are among the most profitable 
goods. For instance an import of Lexus needs 76800 rubles (US$3000) to qualify the clearance 
process by the officials. The amount earned is split between duty officer and high level custom 
officials. In 2007, Kyrgyz customs reported US$100 million import from china while Chinese 
customs reported US$200 million exported. This way custom staff in Kyrgyz is known as the 
second most corrupt government agency where as the first most corrupt agency is law 
enforcement. 
 
Financials audits in Kyrgyz Republic are helpful in spotting misdeed. The report refers to the 
experience of financial managers and accountant of one large government sector who believe 
that the only way to clear financial reports is to bribe the auditors. It further adds that auditors 
charge 10% of the underused or mishandled budget to clear the reports. 
 
In 2007, Ministry of Finance in Kyrgyz was declared the worst institution for violation of 
financial discipline. Financial audits report that 52 of its departments are corrupt and 
nontransparent. Other than this, government inspections carried out in 2007 report that more 
than US$566000 of the budget was misspent. 
 
According to a report of Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD)15, corruption in 
Netherlands is more prevalent in public sector than political sphere. In public sector corruption 
is more common at local levels than central administrative bodies. These are the construction 
companies which are mainly responsible for local level administrative corruption. These 
companies pay bribes to local officials in relation to access to public contracts and making the 
contracts profitable. One other type of local level corruption is related to red-light districts. 
Individuals linked to organized crimes buy residential places in or near red-light areas and 
then give bribes to official in municipality for changing the classification of the place from 
‘residential’ to ‘brothel’. 
 
                                                 
15
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/report_csd_/report_csd_en.pdf 
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De Graaf et al. (2008) analyze the scale, nature and outcome of corruption cases in the 
Netherlands. They note that civil servants who are found to be susceptible to corruption are 
rather high profile officials in the civil service organization. The research shows that both 
bribe giver and taker know each other well before the violation integrity occurs. Whether 
corruption exists and matters in Netherlands, the authors argue that those who look for 
corruption in Netherlands they will find it, although it is not extensive. They point out that 
every second working day a new corruption investigation begins some where in the 
government apparatus in the Netherlands. The main conclusion of their study is “that the glass 
is both ‘half full’ and ‘half empty’.” 
 
Costas-Pérez et al. (2011) provide evidence on corruption in Spanish using a data set based 
upon press reports published over the period 1996-2009. There data show that corruption 
scandals emerged during 1999-2003 and peaked just before the 2007 elections. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that corruption in European countries was lower in 1980s but in 
recent years it is increasing (MacDonald and Majeed, 2011). Costas-Pérez et al. (2011) show 
that corruption scandals cause adverse effect on election outcome which is consistent with an 
argument in conventional literature that people in developed countries do not tolerate 
corruption. 
 
Whether corruption perception determines corruption? Cabelkova and Hanousek (2004) carry 
out an empirical analysis for Ukraine and show that higher the corruption perception in an 
organization motivates an individual to offer bribe, thereby increasing corruption. The authors 
note information about corruption scandals in mass media may lead to high corruption because 
corruption scandals seldom result in legal action in Ukraine. Their study emphasizes the 
importance of institutional and government polices to combat corruption. The scandals 
converge by media can lead to reduction in corruption if legal actions are more probably to 
happen otherwise media converge will lead to more corruption. 
 
Del Monte and Papagni (2007) examine causes of corruption in Italy over the period 1963-
2001. Estimates of their study suggest that economic variables (government expenditures, 
level of economic development) affect corruption but explanatory power of the economic 
variables is low. While, political and cultural influences (party concentration, presence of 
voluntary organisations, absenteeism at national elections) significantly affect corruption. The 
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authors argue that corruption in Italy has increased due to changes in political and institutional 
system and corruption has plagued other sectors, such as judiciary, which were free from 
corruption in the past. Since it is believed that known offender can continue corrupt practices 
with little risk of punishment corruption goes on and on in Italy. 
 
McCarthy (2003) evaluates corruption incidence for the economy of Ireland and argues that 
political corruption has increased sharply in recent times. The author emphasizes a review of 
policy structure to curb corruption particularly in two areas: the zoning of land and the 
allocation of licences by beauty contests. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
A review of the literature on causes of corruption shows that corruption is a multi-faced and 
complex problem which has existed over many centuries and there are diverse factors, such as 
historical, cultural, social, economic, legal and political aspects, explain occurrence of 
corruption. Many of corruption causes are still inconclusive, many have received least 
attention, many remains to be discovered and many are not robust. What we understand form 
the literature on corruption is that corruption is a global challenge and multi-dimension in its 
nature. First section of this chapter reviews the causes of corruption in general and second part 
of this chapter reviews corruption incidence in developed European countries. Both sections 
together imply that corruption is a global challenge and the most important causes of 
corruption are institutional and legal strengths of a nation. 
 
We can conclude the survey of literature for European countries as follows: (1) corruption is a 
realty of today’s Europe and EU member states and it is a growing threat while European 
countries lack coherent, coordinated and deep anti-corruption policies, (2) at the time of 
writing, socioeconomic conditions and the ongoing financial crises, are increasing corruption 
perceptions and actual corruption, (3) legal strengths are important in fight against corruption, 
(4) in some countries corruption exists among high level officials which is likely to spill over 
at lower levels in due course, (5) in some sectors and institutions corruption is endemic, while 
in some it is absent, however, it is likely to spread in clean sectors and institutions as well 
eventually, (6) perceptions about lack of punishment or lenient punishment also cause more 
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corruption, (7) the role and efforts of media are important in exposing corruption scandals, 
particularly involvement of politician into corrupt activities (8) recent financial crises and their 
negative effects are putting pressure on existing resources. 
 
Although a number of studies have examined determinants of corruption but most of these 
determinants are not robust. In a recent study Serra (2006) shows that only five determinants 
(PCY, democracy, colonial heritage, Protestants and political stability) are robust. Our study 
not only differs from existing literate by isolating novel and unique sources of corruption but 
these sources are also robust to a number of robustness checks. In addition, this study provides 
better understanding of those causes of corruption which are not conclusive in the current 
literature. Important innovations include considering a wide set of historical, economic, 
cultural and political determinants of corruption and examining some of the previously 
considered determinants at a finer level of detail. Thus, this study not only improves our 
understanding about existing causes of corruption but also provides new insights into the 
causes of corruption. 
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3. Corruption and the Military in Politics: Theory and 
Evidence from around the World 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
“A rotten apple spoils the barrel.” (English proverb); 
“If you go with the lame, you will learn to limp.” (Italian proverb); 
“Whoever sleeps with a blind-man wakes up crossed-eyed.” (Turkish Proverb); 
“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” (Lord Acton); 
“Corruption is nature's way of restoring our faith in democracy.” (Ashleigh Brilliant). 
 
Although, corruption, i.e., ‘misuse of public power for private gain’ is disliked in its essence 
because of its detrimental effects on the development of a country, it is pervasive and exists in 
every country of the world, with varying degrees. Apart from the general negative 
consequences of corruption, it is considered a major obstacle in reducing inequality, poverty 
and infant mortality in developing countries.  
 
However, corruption perhaps, like the poor, will always be with us. In many foreign deals, 
what would normally be regarded as under-the-table payoffs are aboveboard: from the 
shrewdly sophisticated kickback schemes of the Middle East and Latin America, to the virtual 
Mafia-style and shakedowns of sub-Saharan Africa and Indonesia, the universal game of 
bribery in the pursuit of profit goes on and on16.  
 
It is widely accepted by economists, development practitioners and policy makers that 
corruption is a real and ever present problem for developing countries. However, recently a 
number of scandals over corruption have shown that rich nations, traditionally regarded as 
corruption free. In Norway and Sweden (often seen as the cleanest nations), for example, state 
owned companies have been found to be involved in bribe taking. Similarly, in Germany, 
former Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Christian Democratic party, the CDU, were shown to 
be involved in malpractices and they were penalized for receiving illegal campaign funding.17 
In fact, recent emerging major corruption scandals have affected a striking variety of countries 
                                                 
16
 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,922462,00.html#ixzz0acS3mTSS 
17
 The CDU received donations from arms industries and it was shown in the process of investigation that the money was indeed a 
commission paid by the company Thyssen for exporting armored tanks to Saudi Arabia. 
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all over the world: United States, Japan, Italy, France, Germany, South Korea, Mexico and the 
Kenya. 
 
In recent years international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the 
IMF, and OECD have made corruption a significant focus of their agendas and have made 
important attempts to curb corruption in the world, particularly developing countries that are 
more prone to corrupt activities for their weak democracies and institutes. Understanding the 
significant effects of corruption on a country’s development process has motivated researchers 
to investigate why corruption exists and what determines its high degree of variation across 
countries. Research on the determinants and effect of corruption has proliferated in recent 
years (see for example Lambsdorff, 2006 for an excellent review of the relevant literature). 
Cross-country empirical studies of the causes of corruption have investigated a wide range of 
factors such as economic, cultural, political and institutional aspects (see for example Serra, 
2006). In addition, Ades and Di Tella (1997), Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001), Lambsdorff (2006) 
and Seldadyo and Haan (2006) provide extensive literature reviews. In the wake of the 
proliferation of a large number of studies on corruption, a consensus among academicians and 
policy makers on some of causes of corruption is slowly emerging. However, contentious 
results still abound as researchers adopt different measures of corruption, different 
conditioning information sets, or, more importantly, different samples (see, for example, Ades 
and Di Tella, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2002; Serra, 2006).  
 
Many studies have considered ‘political variables’ (see, for example, Treisman, 2000; Serra, 
2006) and a country’s institutional structure (see, for example, Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003; 
Damania et al., 2004) as important determinants of corruption: specifically, economies with 
political stability and strong institutions are less prone to corruption. In this paper we explore 
other avenues that might explain corruption in order to provide a deeper understanding of 
corruption’ incidence and its variation across nations. The motivation behind our search is to 
provide national governments and international bodies with more scientific and factual 
information on causes of corruption so that curse of global corruption can be curbed more 
effectively. This study indentifies the role of military elites in politics as a major factor that 
fosters corruption. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to highlight this 
important determinant of corruption. 
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According to recent estimates of the World Bank, every year more than US$ 1 trillion is paid 
in bribes. The estimates also suggest that countries that control corruption, using anti 
corruption measures, such as improvement in governance and rule of law, can dramatically 
increase their per capita income by a staggering 400 percent. The Institute's director for 
Governance, Daniel Kaufmann, states that the calculated US$1 trillion figure, using 2001-02 
economic data, is based on actual bribes that are paid in both developed and poor countries. 
The figure for bribes is striking in comparison to the actual size of the world economy at that 
time, which was just over US$30 trillion (this figure does not include stealing of public assets 
or the embezzlement of public funds). The director states that "It is important to emphasize 
that this is not simply a developing country problem, fighting corruption is a global 
challenge.” 
 
The embezzlement of public funds is a very serious matter in many settings, however 
assessing the extent of global embezzlement of public funds is not easy. According to 
Transparency International estimates, for example, the former Indonesian leader Suharto 
embezzled somewhere between $15-35 billion from his country, while Abacha in Nigeria, 
Mobutu in Zaire and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, each may have embezzled public 
assets of up to $5 billion. It is noteworthy that all of these leaders, except Ferdinand Marcos, 
have military background meaning that military involvement in politics with the outcome of 
corruption and kickbacks.  
 
Recent corruption reports and case studies across the globe have shown that military elites in 
government are no less corrupt then civilian government officials (see for detail, Kieh and 
Agbese, 2004). Recently, Rumsfled, the former secretary of defense in the US, raises evidence 
of government, military corruption. The secretary says (admits) that “according to some 
estimates we cannot track $2.3 trillion in transactions”18. This is such a huge amount that if we 
divide it between all American citizens then the share for each (every) man, woman and child 
would be $8000. Similarly, the New York Times provides evidence of a vague monetary 
transaction in the defense department of USA, that is “the defense department spent an 
estimated $100 million for airline tickets that were not used over a six-year period and failed 
to seek refunds even though the tickets were reimbursable.”19 
                                                 
18
 CBS News, 1/29/02, U.S. Secretary of Defense raises evidence of government, military corruption 
19
  New York Times, 6/9/04 
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This paper adds to the literature on the causes of corruption by addressing the following 
questions: (1) Does having the military in politics foster corruption across nations? (2) Does 
the role of military in politics cause have a different effect on corruption depending on the 
existing level of corruption? (3) What is the role of government in reducing the incidence of 
corruption? (4) What is the effect of inflation on corruption, and does the effect vary from the 
most clean to the most corrupt countries? 
 
This study differs in several important aspects to previous work in this area. First we believe 
that this study is unique as it provides the first analysis of the military in politics, both 
theoretically and empirically, and therefore should provide a deeper understanding of the 
causes of corruption. Second, this study not only replicates earlier findings in the literature on 
corruption but also provides a better explanation of those causes of corruption which are 
inconclusive and have received least attention using recent data sets. Third, in contrasts to 
previous studies which generally focus one or two years of data, we use both cross sectional 
and panel data sets over a long period of time. Fourth this study contributes to the existing 
literature on the sources of corruption by analyzing the distribution of the dependent variable 
(corruption). Fifth, existing studies on the topic focus on either panels or cross sectional data 
bases which do not distinguish between developing and developed countries; in this study we 
make that distinction clear. Sixth, in this study we use a variety of econometric techniques to 
account for time dynamics and to control for the problem of endogeneity.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 provides a comprehensive discussion of a theoretical model of 
military involvement in politics and its links with corruption. Section 4 provides a discussion 
of the data, while section 5 presents a model and estimation procedure. In section 6 we present 
our empirical findings. Section 7 is our concluding section.  
 
3.2. Literature Review 
This section has been subdivided into four sections. In section 3.1 we provide a 
comprehensive review of the literature related to military in politics and corruption, which we 
have gathered using academic articles, analyzing case studies, considering scholarly 
arguments and speeches from all over the world. In section 3.2 we discuses theoretical model 
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of the causes of the military engagement in politics, while theories of civil-military relations 
are explained in section 3.3. Finally, we present a theory of the relationship between military 
in politics and corruption in section 3.4. 
 
3.2.1 Literature review: military in politics and corruption  
Ball (1981) analytically evaluates the political role of third-world militaries for two reasons. 
First, the military-dominated governments are least responsive to the needs and voices of the 
poor majority in developing world. In addition, in order to curb civilian demands and unrest, 
military-dominated governments use arms far more frequently than civilian-dominated 
governments. Second, as the role of the military in politics grows, so its control over scarce 
resources of the country increases and a greater amount of these scarce resources is channeled 
into the military sector or activities closely related to the military. 
 
The author identifies four major societal groups that most likely benefit from the involvement 
of the military in the economic and political life of a country: domestic civilian groups, the 
military as an institution, the individuals within the military and foreign groups. Using 
examples and case evidences, the author outlines the reasons why each of theses groups may 
favour military intervention into the economic and political life of a country. The author also 
discusses the ways in which the interests of these four groups coincide. One important reason, 
among others, for them to favour military intervention in politics, is the maximization of 
personal wealth through corrupt activities. In other words, corruption is an important element 
attached to military intervention in the political and the economic life of a country. 
 
When the militaries seek to get involved in the political process of a country, allies are sought 
among bureaucrats, technocrats and politicians. In military-dominated government the 
collaboration of the civil service is vital because a country can not be administrated solely 
with military man power, not even one as entrenched as that in Brazil, Thailand and Indonesia. 
It is generally argued that the military and the civilian bureaucracy are best allies (Edward 
Feit, 1973). 
 
Military leaders improve their personal financial condition by frequent involvement in the 
economic system. To do this, they seek close working relations with local and foreign 
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businessmen. The military manages a secure business environment while businessmen provide 
capital and entrepreneurial skills. The engagement of the military in economic corruption is 
greatest when the military are involved in the political process. In other words, the 
opportunities for economic corruption for the military are greatest when its role in politics 
increases. The civilian leaders provide opportunities for senior army officials to increase their 
personal wealth in reward for their loyalty to the stability of the political regime. Politicians 
may approach the military for direct intervention in government, to limit the power of political 
opponents, or the politician may tacitly acquiesce to such involvement. For instance, the 
occurrence of a series of coups in Sierra Leone in 1967 was motivated by Albert Margai who 
wanted control of the government (Anton Bebler, 1973). 
 
It is generally argued in the literature on the political role of the military in third-world 
countries that the armed forces defend the interests of the middle class or, more specifically, 
the interests of the third world elites. It is true, for example, in the case of Latin America 
where the elite seek military intervention in order to exclude the mass of the population from 
political and economic decision making. The elites want such exclusion because they have a 
fear that increased participation of the poor people in the economic and political system will 
alter the rules of game, which will not be favourable to the elites. Third world elites not only 
defend themselves against the dissolution of a political and economic system, which enables 
them to accumulate personal wealth and power, but they also want to maintain their position 
within that system (Eboe Hutchful, 1979). 
 
The military as an institution 
As an institution the military has many justifications for seeking a political role. Four 
important reasons are discussed below20. First of all, the military wants to maintain an increase 
in the military’s share of national resources. Case studies often note that one reason for a 
military take over a rise in military expenditures is evidenced, such as a rise in salaries, new 
military hardware are ordered, and new facilities are provided to the officers and their 
families. For instance, military expenditures rose by an average of 22% per year in Ghana over 
the period 1966-69, following a military coup against Nkrumah’s government (Anton Bebler, 
                                                 
20
 See for example ball (1981) for more details. 
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1973). This is in fact a reflection of the fact that prior to the coup Nkrumah had placed the 
army on an austerity budget. 
 
A second reason for the role of military in politics is simply the maintenance and survival of 
the armed forces within a country and this is often seen when attempts are made to undermine 
military hierarchy. For example, in the case of Brazil, President Goulart tried to counter the 
power of top military officers and consequently was overthrown by the military in April 1964 
(Eric A Nordlinger, 1977). The military also gets involved in political power if a politician, 
who was removed by the military in past, becomes active again. For example, it is one of the 
key reasons for the coups in Ecuador and Guatemala during 1963 (Martin Needler, 1964; 
Nordlinger, 1977).  
 
A third reason for military involvement in politics is fear of national disintegration. For 
example, military officers often argue that their intervention in politics is necessary because 
civilian governments are inefficient, corrupt and incapable of governing a country and as a 
result the country is plagued by widespread political, economic and social disorders. In fact, a 
military intervention or take over becomes easy in the presence of weak, poorly elected 
civilian-dominated governments. These governments often fail to respond to the voices and 
needs of a large segment of society. As a result, military-dominated governments are initially 
welcomed because they promise to curb corruption and to respond to the needs of the poor 
people. However, in practice military governments do not follow through on these pledges. 
The evidence shows that the military-dominated governments appear as inefficient and corrupt 
as their civilian predecessors.  
 
A fourth reason for military involvement is the extension of the concept of ‘national security’ 
to include internal securities. Militaries not only devise military techniques and doctrine for 
confronting domestic insurgency but they are also interested in the social and political reasons 
for insurgency. In countries where civilian-dominated governments are more unrepresentative, 
the military comes to power in an attempt to institutionalize their role, such as in Indonesia, 
Chile and Brazil. At present, most developing world militaries are mainly concerned with 
internal security that implies in future military officers throughout the world will be more 
interested in politics and government. 
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Individuals within the military 
The enhancement of personal power and wealth is a key factor and a top priority for 
individuals within the military who seek a political role for the military. It is evident from case 
studies of military-dominated governments that the maximization of personal power and 
wealth is indeed a very high priority for a large number of coup leaders. There are a number of 
ways through which individuals within the military, especially officers, enhance their personal 
wealth. It is often the case that military expenditures increase because officers want high 
salaries, better housing, other privileges, such as medical and educational facilities, for their 
families.  
 
More lucrative opportunities are associated with the involvement of military officers in the 
political process of the country. “The best opportunities are, of course, in those counties where 
bribery, rake-offs and other forms of corruption flourish as a matter of course” (Nordlinger, 
1977). In Sudan, for example, military officers acquired restricted public land for their own 
use, undertook public projects for their own benefits and demanded money for the provision of 
import licenses. Following the first coup in Ghana, for example, the salaries of the military 
officers rose substantially and foreign exchange was used to buy luxury goods, like Mercedes 
Benz automobiles, for military officers (Nordlinger, 1977). 
 
In general, personal wealth maximization is easy to achieve in cases where the military take 
over the government, but this is not a necessary condition, as the enhancement of personal 
wealth is also facilitated even in civilian-dominated governments where military officers are 
appointed to top bureaucratic posts, which provide them with ample opportunities for 
enriching themselves through corruption and kickbacks. These top bureaucratic positions 
allow them to get involved with private companies and divert government expenditures into 
investments that are mutually beneficial for military officers and private companies. Similarly, 
they may also divert economic development assistance to their own uses as well as for bribe 
seeking by favouring the interests of private companies. Indonesia and Thailand are the best 
examples of this type of arrangements. Bienen and Morell (1974) conclude for Thailand that: 
“Widespread participation in and tolerance of corruption play a crucial role in maintaining 
military cohesion, cutting across factional or personal cleavages to produce common 
requirements for mutual protection. Factional competitors on governmental issues may sit on 
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the same corporate boards or participate jointly in the spoils from a participate contract. If no 
one at the top is ‘clean’, no one can betray his fellows”.  
 
Furthermore, Silcock (1967) for the case of Thailand, “lists 154 government enterprises which 
are capitalized at $490 million. Of these, forty-nine, are capitalized at $393 million, or 80 
percent of the total, and are administered by the prime minister’s office and the ministries of 
defense, interior, and communications, all of which are headed by army generals. Writing of 
fourteen major enterprises which are owned and managed by the Ministry of Defence, Silcock 
comments, ‘…they produce little which is of any military significance, and... bring little return 
to the government. Their chief function appears to be to provide livelihood and patronage.”  
 
Tangri and Mwenda (2003) provide an excellent documentation of corrupt military 
procurement in Uganda since the late 1990s. They point out that military corruption began to 
rise when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government in power began acquiring 
more and larger military equipment, mainly through third parties. In the late 1990s, many 
tenders were entered into for aircraft, tanks, guns, food rations and uniforms. These deals 
invariably created opportunities for bribes and kickbacks which benefited most to the army 
officers, middle man and top government officials. For instance, in the 1996 the NRM 
government decided to buy four MI-24 helicopter gunships from Russia. This decision 
motivated many interests to lobby the government to supply helicopters. Among them a 
Kampala, Emmanuel Katto, brother in law of the Ugandan Chief of Defense Staff General 
James Kazini, contacted his overseas partners and successfully lobbied to secure the contract 
for his overseas partner in a company Consolidated Sales Corporation (CSE). This deal 
produced a contract without any bidding taking place and the Ugandan government paid $12.2 
million dollar to CSE for the helicopter gunships, but in reality these helicopters were 
purchased from a company in Belarus for only $4.7 million which means that $4.5 million was 
the cost of corruption. Furthermore, the helicopters were in such bad condition that they 
remained grounded at Enteblx air force base. So, in reality government lost $12 million on the 
deal. 
 
Tangri and Mwenda (2003) also document illicit business activities of top military 
commanders of the Ugandan army engaged in military operation in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC). In August 1998, Ugandan soldiers were deployed to curb the rebels 
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threatening the security of Uganda and destabilizing the stability of NRM government. 
Nevertheless, the Ugandan Peoples Defense Force (UPDF) crossed the border security and 
entered into the areas of Eastern Congo to plunder the natural resources. 
 
In fact, Congo became a veritable treasure trove for top military commanders who became 
wealthy from stealing and resource plunder, together with their civilian partners. Specifically, 
officers have been engaged in smuggling resources - gold, diamonds, timber and coffee - from 
the DRC to Uganda. The in charge of operation, major-general Salim Saleh has been alleged 
of rewarding his own company a $400,000 monthly tender to supply UDPF with commodities 
in Gulu. Salim Saleh was also involved with Trinity Investment Limited (TIL). This company 
was alleged for not paying import duties to ruler while importing into DRC and for not paying 
taxes while exporting gold, timber and coffee into Uganda. 
 
Tangri and Mwenda (2003) note weak and limited accountability on matters of military and 
civil servant corruption. They write “and not a single army officer, senior civil servant or top 
government minister has found prosecution or punishment for their alleged misdeeds”. The 
authors also note that military intervention in government affairs is high because there were 
mutual interests like president Museveni wanted to keep his power and kept strong ties with 
top military officials to ensure their loyalty.  
 
Money generated through corrupt procurement was awarded to top military officials for their 
loyalty and spent on NRM’s political patronage system to ensure stability and strong power of 
the government. In fact, top military officers-Salim Saleh and James Kazinin-have been 
identified as being massively involved in many of the corruption deals. The military officers 
benefited from corrupt deals and substantial funds have been reserved for president’s political 
projects. This is why when president Museveni’s presidency was challenged in 2001, many 
commanders supported Museveni and campaigned against the presidency challengers. Many 
senior army officers were “particularly sensitive to any threats to prosecute or follow them up 
for any commissions or omission under Museveno” (Aliro, 2002). Wakabi, (2000) also notes 
that the above discussed military corruption is closely associated with Ugandan politics. For 
example, president Museneri was involved in military corruption and support of corrupt 
elements. The president refuted “claim of corrupt business dealing and embezzlement by his 
top military commanders”. 
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Amuwo (1986) documents the role of military in politics and corruption for the state of Niger. 
The author notes that military involvement in politics is based on good factors-rigor, 
accountability, order, probity, discipline, etcetera- but actually these vaunted factors are of 
limited utility once military officers get in involved in the political process and governance. In 
fact, they are also involved in the internal dynamics of the civil society due to financial and 
economic advantages. The author says that military growing class badly spoils its own hands 
instead of implementing anti-corruption measures.  
 
Recently, the Niger state governor, Bakongida Aliyu, blamed corrupt practices in the Niger to 
the involvement of military in the politics. He said the military rule has eroded service 
delivery in all sectors of the national economy. The governor argued that the incursion of the 
military into politics bred corruption because the military rule makes it difficult for people to 
resist poor service dealing. He said “the military instituted corruption and the old men who 
were supposed to talk were contented with little gifts’. He further said ‘during the military 
regime, we had people who could not make one N1 million in 10 years making it in one 
day”.21 
 
Ghosal (2009) evaluates the recent military intervention in the politics of Bangladesh. The 
main hypothesis of this study is that military involvement in politics is changing its pattern in 
countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh. The study labels this new pattern ‘power with out 
responsibility’ which would seem to bode ill for domestic development in both countries. 
Ghosal argues that in Bangladesh, as in Pakistan, the army does not necessarily directly come 
to power but controls the establishment in the background and destabilizes politicians. If this 
type of military intervention benefits the country then the military takes the credit, but if it 
does not benefit the country the blame is passed to the establishment. Ghosal concludes that “a 
new model of military intervention in politics—rule without responsibility and 
accountability—has emerged in Pakistan and Bangladesh, which obviously has both long- and 
short-term implications for political developments in third world countries and, thus, requires 
closer scrutiny and analysis”. 
 
                                                 
21
 (Source:http://thenationonlineng.net/web2/articles/24167/1/Military-institutionalised-corruption-says-Aliyu/Page1.html) 
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Moudud Ahamn, criticizes military involvement in government and blame massive corruption 
in Bangladesh to military’s involvement in government. Specifically, he criticizes the military 
take over of Bangladesh in 2001. He gives the reference of International Transparency (2008) 
which shows that corruption has increased since the military take over in January 2007. He 
argues that the problem with military intervention is that people are deprived of the choice “to 
have any voice or control at all over those aspects of their destiny and daily life which 
interfere with the state”. He says that “a military dictator decides on his own. He becomes, in 
effect, an unelected King answerable to no one”. He further argues that Bangladesh is facing 
state plundering by military rulers just like Pakistan and Indonesia. The people of Bangladesh 
are being deprived of their liberty and the military intervention is causing economic and social 
disorder.22 
 
Bhakti et al. (2009) document the history of the military in Indonesia, its role in politics and its 
role in perpetrating violence. The role of the military in politics had been defined during the 
Sukarno (1945-1965) and Suharto eras (1966-1998). However, following military reform era 
(beginning mid-1998), the role of the military has been reduced. Despite various stages of 
military reform, the military involvement in politics in different forms still exists. The authors 
argue that given the historical dual role of the military, the military “has been able to set 
agendas and perpetrate violence without civilian oversight”. For instance, this has led to 
different acts of violence in Papua, perpetrated by the police and military. 
 
The case evidence, at least from Thailand and Indonesia, suggests that corrupt patron-client 
networks are mainly controlled by political elites in the government, the military, and the 
bureaucracy (Rock, 2000; Rock and Bonnett, 2004). Rock (2000) argues, with reference to 
Thailand’s bureaucratic polity, that a centralized patron-client corruption network between 
political elites, senior bureaucrats and top military officers developed in the presence of the 
military in politics and in the absence of a democratic process. “In this centralized patron-
client network, senior government officials provided protectionist rents to a small number of 
Sino-Thai entrepreneurs in exchange for kickbacks. As in Indonesia, the government protected 
private property and extracted rents at a low enough tax rate to entice entrepreneurs to invest, 
which they did”.  
 
                                                 
22
 http://moududahmed.com/3.html 
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In the case of Indonesia, Mcleod (2005) argues that the president managed a franchise system 
during Soeharto’s New Order government. This franchise system provided strong incentives 
for public officials to pursue growth oriented policies and enrich themselves through corrupt 
activities. “In this model, rents were collected by simple extortion and by public sector 
policies that enabled the regime’s cronies to amass protectionist rents. Government officials – 
in political parties, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, the military – and Soeharto’s family 
participated in this franchise system through kickbacks, awards of government contracts, and 
through the granting of monopolies to cronies. Soeharto’s franchise system protected both 
private property and taxed economic activities at a low enough rate to encourage private sector 
actors to invest in productive activity”. 
  
Tangri and Mwenda (2008) conduct a case study on Uganda and point out that Uganda state 
elites - government officials, bureaucrats, army - have maximized personal wealth by seeking 
kickbacks and corruption. Apart from corrupt activities, other motives have been political 
consolidation for the elites. They note that top political administrators and military officials 
were allowed to exploit their positions for personal gain and they were also obliged to use 
their funds to support the stability of the political regime. In fact, resources from high levels of 
corruption have been used for both political mobilization and personal wealth maximization. 
“They argue that state elites – cabinet ministers, senior civil servants, and army officers – have 
abused their positions for personal gain”. 
 
Kieh and Agbese (2004) argue that in the African experience of the military and politics is one 
in which the main motivation in nearly every military coup is an anti corruption stance. 
However, in practice, once they are in office, the military do not show a lesser tendency 
towards corruption compared to civilian politicians. In reality, facts and figures about 
systematic plundering of the public treasury in Ghana, Nigeria, Zaire, and many other 
countries show that military elites are even more corrupt than civilian politicians. For 
example, Gen. Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Gen. Sani Abacha of Nigeria have been alleged 
to have been involved in corrupt enrichment through the transfer of the state’s budget into the 
private coffers of the head of state. 
 
McNulty (1999) contends that Mobutu’s fortune estimated at “between $6 billion and $10 
billion in 1997…was accrued at the expense of his country’s economy and natural resources, 
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through creation of the quintessential vampire state” William Reno (1998) has shown how 
Mobutu systemically privatized the public coffer by allocating the bulk of government 
revenues to the presidency. Ude (1999) provides an analysis of the scope of corruption under 
the Abacha regime, in which Abacha and his family members looted huge sums of money 
from state coffers. Following the sudden death of Abacha in June 1998, his family left the 
official residence in haste and many of their belongings were not removed. The items left 
behind were 52 luxury cars and a stock of local and foreign currency in huge industrial crates, 
among other items. Abacha’s successor, appropriated the embezzled money from the family 
and, under intensive pressure, made the family return over 220 billion Naira to the 
government. 
 
In addition, Kieh and Agbese (2004) note that in cases where military officers are not 
massively engaged in looting of the state treasury, they tend to increase substantially defense 
budget and this bodes ill for the country’s economic welfare. In virtually every African 
country during a military regime, expenditures on defense and security massively increase 
while expenditures on education, health and social services decline. For example, following a 
military coup in Liberia, defense and security expenditures increased dramatically from $17.8 
million to $44.6 million over the period 1978-81 (Elwood Dunn and Byron Tarr, 1988).  
 
Obasanjo (1999) also contends for Nigeria that military involvement in politics fosters 
corruption. He asserts that “no matter how noble the intentions of the pioneer coup-makers 
may have been, the prolonged involvement of the military in the administration and 
management of the state had aggravated the problems of political instability and deepened 
corruption within our society”. Soldiers in Ethiopia came to power promising to bring justice, 
administrative efficiency and a corruption free society but Apter and Rosberg (1994) note that 
military rulers control over politics and the economy in fact increased corruption and ruined 
the economy. 
 
Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha23, in an online interview conducted by despardes.com’s Editor-in-
Chief Irshad Salim, reveals that military generals in Pakistan are worth Rs 500 million (US 
$9.8 million) each. She explains the way in which the military establishment of Pakistan has 
                                                 
23 She is an ex civil servant a scholar of Pakistan's military and security affairs and a regular contributor to several 
Pakistani and internationally renowned opinion journals.  
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systemically looted the country and points out that the military generals are no more than 
thieves. 
 
In Siddiqa-Agha (2007) it is revealed that the military is entrenched in the corporate sector of 
the country and Pakistan's companies are in the hands of senior army officials. The private 
business empire of Pakistan’s military is worth approximately £10 billion. Both in-service and 
retired army officials control secretive industrial conglomerates, which manufacture 
everything from cement to cornflakes and the military also owns 12m acres of public land. Her 
findings suggest that the Pakistan army, through predatory engagement in the political and 
economic process, has amassed great wealth. She also points out that the military elites foster 
economic corruption in partnership with other civilian elites, such as the civil bureaucracy and 
entrepreneurial class. It is worth noting that Siddiqa-Agha’s book has been banned in Pakistan.  
 
Recently, Thailand’s military-backed government has been alleged to have been involved in 
corruption cases involving illegal campaign donations. In April and May 2010, Red Shirt 
protestors in Thailand created chaos and may cause a collapse of the military-backed 
government for its corrupt activities and uneasy political paradigm.24 
 
3.2.2 Theoretical models of causes of military engagement in politics 
In this section we present theoretical models of the causes of military engagement in politics. 
The literature provides many theoretical models as explanatory framework for military 
involvement in politics. These theoretical models can be classified as follows: the personalist, 
corporatist, manifest destiny, Marxist and integrative theoretical models. We now briefly 
discuss each of these models. 
 
The personalist model  
According to this model the military intervene in the political arena of a country for three 
reasons. First, the military rulers seek intervention in politics for personal power enhancement. 
Second, poor socioeconomic conditions of the country are justified for staging a coup, but the 
essential motive behind such coups is the personal agenda of military rulers for raw power and 
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self-aggrandizement. Third, usually, it is the military leader himself who is the principal agent 
for the execution of the coup plot, with the support of his likeminded fellows and assistants. 
 
The corporatist model  
According to this model the military is a corporate entity meaning that individuals within the 
army have certain collective tendencies ‘that make them develop a singleness of purpose’ 
(Welch, 1987). Basically, the armed forces consider themselves a separate corporate body and 
all civilian groups as another corporate body. The armed forces consider themselves 
remarkably different from civilians. Certainly, such a perception on the part of the military 
represents ‘the conduct of civil-military relation as a zero sum game’. 
A further element of the model is that the armed forces share a collective interest, such as the 
maintenance of high military budget, the protection of military status, the protection of 
military rules, procedures, and norms and so on. The military intervention in politics is 
inevitable if civilian regimes attempt to undermine the collective interests of the army.  
 
The manifest destiny model 
The term manifest destiny model was coined by Finer (1988). This model is based on the 
concept that military officials are arrogant and they consider themselves superior to civilians 
and consider they are the only saviour of the interests of the nation.  
According to this model the military justifies its intervention on the bases that civilian regimes 
suffering from mal-administration and chaos and it is the military that can effectively protect 
and defend the national interest. 
 
Marxist model 
The Marxist model is based on following main arguments. First, the model links the military 
in politics with the issues embodied in the general crises of underdevelopment and predatory 
effects of the capitalist system. It treats the problem of military in politics as part of crises of 
underdevelopment while the crises of underdevelopment have their genesis in globalisation of 
the capitalist system and the imposition of colonialism. Second, the capitalist system has 
created two general classes, the propertied and the non-propertied. According to the model 
state officials tend to protect and promote narrow particularistic interests of the propertied 
class. Third, the inequality of resource distribution causes class confliction, resentment, and 
struggles. These struggles are likely to destabilize incumbent civilian regimes. Fourth, in such 
  65 
a state of affairs, the military find an opportunity to step in political sphere of the nation. 
However, historically, the military protects interests of the few elites (ruling class).  
 
The integrative model 
This model is based on the idea that military intervention is not motivated by a single factor 
but by a confluence (host) of factors. These factors can be categorized as personal, corporatist, 
the messianic complex, social, political and economic. The economic, political and social 
problems under civilian regimes, in combination of other motives of the armed soldiers, are 
usually justified for the military coups or engagement in politics. 
 
3.2.3 Theories of civil-military relations 
The literature provides three major theoretical models of civil-military relations: the Classic 
(or Western), Communist (or subjective control) and the Praetorian models (for further details 
see: Welch, 1976; Herspring and Volges, 1978; Adekson, 1981; Kolkowicz and Korbonsk, 
1982; Crouch and Haji, 1985; Kieh and Agbese, 2004). 
 
The classic model  
The classic model of civil-military relation is supposed to prevail in the developed market 
economies. The essential proposition of the model is submission and subordination of the 
military to civilian control and supremacy. According to the western model, the military 
neither participates in politics nor questions the political supremacy of elected politicians. In 
fact, elected politicians and the military have a clear and unambiguous separation of power 
where the military respects supremacy of the politicians. In this context, Kemp and Hurdlin 
(1994) claim that it is a moral obligation of soldiers to respect civilian control. In the same 
way, Finer (1975) emphasizes that the respect for civilian supremacy by the military in fact 
holds back political intervention. Under the classic model, the role and responsibilities of the 
military are set up by civilian authorities and the military cannot surpass the parameters of the 
rule and responsibilities established by the civilian authorities. In these societies citizens have 
a right to evaluate national security policies. A major advantage of the civilian control is that it 
promotes professionalism within the armed forces. As Huntington (1957) notes that essential 
objective of civilian control and supremacy over the military is maximization of autonomous 
military professionalism. 
  66 
 
The communist model  
The communist model of civil-military relations does not assume political independence of the 
military. According to this model the military engages in politics through the ruling political 
party and follow the ideology of the party. The purpose of participation is to guard and 
maintain the hegemony (supremacy) of the ruling political party over state and society. As 
Perlmutter (1982) notes, other than guarding the heroic party the military ‘identifies its value 
with that of the party’. In brief, under this model, the military is not free from politics and its 
political role depends on the ruling political party. 
 
The praetorian model  
In the praetorian model, civil-military relations are not stable as in the classic model and the 
military elites are among the top contenders (candidates) for political power. This model 
prevails in those countries where political institutions are weak and fragile, in combination 
with the issues and crises of underdevelopment, Politicians lake the ability to hold civilian 
supremacy over armed forces. Huntington (1968) contends that “in a praetorian system there is 
the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining and moderating 
group political actions. Social forces confront each other nakedly: no political institutions, no 
corps of professional political leaders are recognized and accepted as legitimate intermediaries 
to moderate group conflicts. Each group employs means which, reflect its peculiar nature and 
capabilities to decide upon office and policy…. The techniques of military intervention are 
simply more dramatic and effective than the others”. 
 
3.3 Theory: military in politics and corruption  
This study asks whether the involvement of the military in politics fosters corruption. 
Although historical facts, case evidence, recent emerging corruption scandals all over the 
world, as well as scholarly argument suggest a relationship between the military, politics and 
government surprisingly, no one to our knowledge has systematically developed theoretical 
links of the relationship and, equally, no one has tested this relationship. 
 
The available evidence on the relationship between the military in politics and corruption is 
largely based on country level descriptive studies and focuses on information culled from 
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scandals, allegations, speeches and reports. Although such studies do indeed suggest there is a 
relationship, they do not provide any firm econometric or statistical analyses. This is the 
novelty of our study in that we compile evidence on the relationship between the military in 
politics and corruption from around the world and analyze it using econometric methods for a 
large set of countries over a long period of time. 
 
The purpose of this section is to develop a systematic and logical theory (the links or channels) 
of the relationship between military in politics and corruption. It is important to mention that 
the involvement of military in politics is caused by a host of factors and generates a range of 
consequences. In this study, however, we just focus on a particular aspect of the consequences, 
namely corruption, and leave the analysis of other consequences such as the impact on 
inequalities and poverty for future research. 
 
Why and how does having the military in government foster corruption? In order to answer 
these important questions, we will develop theoretical channels/links that consider the 
importance of the military budget, power and wealth, collusion amongst the elite in a country, 
control of top administrative positions, natural resources and foreign groups in shaping the 
link. 
 
Military spending 
The role of military spending is critical in shaping the relationship between the military, 
government and corruption because it is the factor that motivates top military officials to 
intervene in government for maintenances or increase of the share of military in national 
resources. Most often, military coups occur when democratic governments attempt to keep the 
military on an austerity budget. Once military commanders hold positions in part of the 
government machinery, or in extreme cases when democratic governments are replaced by a 
military regime, then increase in military spending is inevitable. Of course the opportunity 
cost of the rising military spending is seen in reduced public spending elsewhere in the 
economy, such as education, health and welfare subsidies, among others and this has knock on 
consequences for human capital formation (in terms of lower finance available for education 
and health), among others, and weakens the strength of anti-corruption measures. 
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Secondly, when militaries have a greater share in the national resources of a country then 
procurement of military hardware and arm trades are the inevitable out comes. Both historical 
evidence and current patterns show that the military procurement is highly susceptible to 
corruption because of limited scrutiny, audit and massive over payments. Another reason for 
corruption in the case of military procurement is the lack of competition. For example, Wilson 
et al. (2006) provide evidence that governments tender out 50 percent or more of their defense 
procurement requirements to a single supplier. Similarly, according to a survey by Control 
Risks (2006), one third of international defense companies realized that they had lost out on a 
contract in the last year because of corruption by a competitor. 
 
Military operations other than war (MOOTW) principles are an extension of war fighting 
doctrine. Embodied in these principles is the dominance of political objectives at all levels of 
MOOTW25. In the literature on military operations there is distinction between war and other 
operations. For example, Story and Gottlieb (1995) provide a military operational frame work 
in which they divide military operations into combat, noncombat and simultaneous operations. 
The combat operations include war, operations to restore order and retaliatory actions while 
noncombat operations include show of force, truce-keeping, support and assistance operations. 
Some military operations could involve combat and non combat at the same time and these 
operations are considered as simultaneous operations. The simultaneous operations are 
combating terrorism, exclusion zone operations, ensuring freedom of navigation, non 
combatant evacuation operations and recovery operations. 
 
In the presence of the military operations (either combat or non combat operations) one direct 
effect is a rise in the military budget. The military officials find further discretion (flexibility) 
over manipulation of the military budget for private gains. For example, according to 
Transparency International (2007) defense institutions (ministries and armed forces) are 
“profiteering from soldiers’ payroll (e. g. extracting percentages from total cash; ghost 
soldiers; adding cronies on secret pay rolls)”. A range of the military operations increase 
military control over security posts. According to Transparency International (2007) defense 
officials extract money to pass security and other check points. 
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The military operations could be corruption prone because monitoring of field commanders is 
not strong as the evidence suggest from African countries. Specifically, when troops are 
deployed in a large and complex terrain then checks on fields’ commanders are limited.  
 
Fourthly, military leaders often manipulate tenders for personal gain. The tenders for even 
routine items like uniforms and food are often severely manipulated and usually awarded to 
companies which are non competitive in order to create payoffs for military officials. Finally, 
top military officials manipulate the military budget for personal and family reasons, such as 
salaries, medical support, education, foreign visits and so on. Having discussed these 
arguments, we can say that an unjustified rise in military spending with out tight monitoring 
and accountability leaves the margin for kickbacks and corrupt activities. 
 
Personal power-wealth maximization and regime stability 
In this case, civilian governments seek military engagement to mobilize the military support 
for regime stability. The civilian leaders provide opportunities for senior army officials to 
increase their wealth as a reward for their loyalty in ensuring the stability of the political 
regime and, in turn, the military officials also spend part of their time accumulating wealth 
(through corruption and kickbacks) for political patronage and to ensure the stability and 
strong power of the government. Both top officials in the military and civilian leaders want to 
maximize their vested interests, where political leaders want regime stability and the military 
want personal gains without sacrificing their status within the military hierarchy. The joint 
motive of power-wealth maximization and regime stability is best served through pay-offs. 
 
Top bureaucratic and administrative positions 
According to the manifest destiny theoretical model (Finer, 1988), military commanders are 
arrogant and consider themselves superior to the civilian rulers and seek to hold top 
bureaucratic and administrative posts. However, they lack a professional approach and attempt 
to control things with power and by satisfying the interests of few and it is often the case that 
they exploit their power in administrative and bureaucratic posts for private gain. In doing so, 
they award government contracts to private companies in reward for money. 
 
Elites’ collusion 
  70 
Military elites have a tendency to collude with political, administrative and bureaucratic elites 
in society. The basic motive behind collusion of all of these elites is the exclusion of the mass 
of the population from economic and political decision making processes. The elite want such 
exclusivity because they fear that increased participation of the poor people in economic and 
political system will alter the rules of the game which will not be favourable for the elite. The 
elites not only defend against the dissolution of the political and economic system, which 
enables them to accumulate personal wealth and power, but they also want to maintain their 
positions within that system. 
 
The elites also control corrupt patron-client networks. The centralized corrupt patron-client 
networks usually evolve with the involvement of the military into politics and are likely to 
vanish in the presence of democratic process. The basic purpose of centralized patron-client 
networks by the elites is to provide protection rents to entrepreneurs in exchange for 
kickbacks. The elite collusion rewards few at the cost of the mass of the population, thereby 
generating important income inequalities in economies where these factors exist.  
 
Kickbacks and corruption are the key elements, among others, that keep the elites united and 
protect mutual interests. Exclusion of the mass of the population from economic and political 
decision making inhibit (limit) their abilities to monitor corruption or, most importantly, even 
if it is generally known that corruption deals take place, the public can not force or devise 
punishment because their voice is low and usually curbed. 
 
The institutions like judiciary, law and order all are weekend in the presence of strong ties of 
the elites and the system cannot itself make break the unison of the elites. In order to protect 
their mutual interests, and in view of a possible conflict amongst the elite, they develop family 
ties through institutions such as marriage, to reinforce their interests. 
 
Dissolution of the elites is unlikely because if any one class of elites disagrees with others and 
isolates itself from the group, then the cost of isolation is much higher than the gain. The 
major cost of isolation is possible legal prosecution (action) against past misdeeds. This is 
analogous to the prisoner’s dilemma where benefits are maximized if no one betrays the 
others. 
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Because armed soldiers have the power to rebel against the state or create a coup, their 
independence from politics serves as an ever present threat to the body politic if they are 
tempted to become corrupt. Conversely, if the military itself departs from its professionalism 
and joins the civilian elite then there is no further threat to corruption unless some form of 
mass revolt from the general public occurs, which is indeed a rare case. In other words, civil-
military collusion to safeguard mutual interests, particularly corrupt activities, does not face 
accountability and monitoring challenges. 
 
Natural resources and rent seeking 
There is a vast body of literature that provides theoretical models and empirical evidence on 
the relationship between natural resources and rent seeking activities. Many studies find that 
natural resources generate rent seeking activities (see for example Leite and Weidmann, 
2002). In a very recent study, Bhattacharyya and Holder (2010) predict in their game-theoretic 
model that (only) economies where the quality of democratic institutions is poor, natural 
resources cause corruption. They also provide empirical support for their theoretical prediction 
by testing the proposition for 124 economies over the period 1980-2004.  
 
We apply and extend the theory of natural resources, rent seeking and corruption to the 
relationship between military, government and corruption. In the context of classic models of 
the role of military (Huntington, 1957; Kemp and Hurdlin, 1994), soldiers cannot manipulate 
economic resources for private gain; however, in the case of so-called praetorian models 
(Huntington, 1968) they have control over economic and natural resources. The basic point is 
that the military have control over natural resources once they get involved in the political and 
economic sphere of a country and, additionally checks and balances on military official are 
limited. In this context they will plunder natural resources for themselves, and divert natural 
resources to the military and associated sectors. On the other hand, for countries which are 
resource abundant but have strong democratic institutions, the classic models of military’s role 
in politics suggest that their rent seeking activities are checked by the accountability of 
democratic governments to their the people. 
 
During military regimes, or military backed government, the distribution of public lands is 
often skewed towards armed forces and commercial housing schemes come under the control 
of top military officials and the control of such housing schemes also generate kickbacks and 
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corruption opportunities for the military commanders. Similarly, exploration of natural 
recourses is highly risky and requires a huge investment and the multinational companies that 
invest in the exploration of natural resources normally receive a commission for their 
exploration.  
 
Foreign elites (groups) 
Foreign governments, specifically from developed countries, may support military 
engagement in politics, as a means of advancing their own political-strategic and economic 
interests. It is relatively easy to manipulate the policies of developing countries through 
military backed governments, rather than through civilian governments. This is a vast topic 
and there are a number of issues that are important in shaping the role of foreign groups; 
however, we shall focus on the link of foreign elites in the presence of military in governments 
and its effect on increasing corruption. 
 
Foreign businessmen (elites) look for countries where a secure business environment is 
available especially if it is available in a military regime or military-dominated government. 
The military provides a safe and secure environment. This is not on a voluntary basis, but 
military officials look for their private gains and wealth enhancement via kickbacks and 
corruption. Furthermore, militaries can easily manipulate national polices because they are not 
accountable to the general public and policies may be manipulated to favour the interest of 
foreign elites in reward for money. 
 
Military governments spend a lot of money on infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges 
and so on and their spending generally satisfies the requirements of foreign elites plus tenders 
of the projects to generate kickbacks opportunities. Similarly, arm trades also flourish during 
the regimes of military-backed governments and these trades require massive spending of 
money and are subject to limited scrutiny and accountability. 
 
The MNCs flourish in military dominated governments, and these firms consider bribes as just 
as a cost of production and transfer this amount in the price of their goods and enjoy many 
privileges under military regimes. The military dominated governments also privatize public 
entities on non competitive bases to foreign stake holders and enrich themselves with the 
commission. For example, according to Transparency International (2007) defense institutions 
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(ministries and armed forces) are “profiteering from income from state-owned assets (e.g. 
below-price sales of property portfolios; selling of surplus equipment; below price 
privatizations)”. 
 
In general, military officers enrich themselves by receiving pay-offs in return for facilitating 
the interests of particular companies. “An open-door policy to foreign capital may also 
facilitate the acquisition of substantial support from multilateral and bilateral agencies. Well-
placed military officers will be able to divert some of these funds to their own uses” (Ball, 
1981). Finally, we develop two flow charts to provide a summary of the links between the 
military in politics and corruption. Following the above discussion, we isolate those links of 
the military and corruption that are relatively more conducive to explaining the relationship 
between the military in politics and corruption. The first chart shows that corruption is 
beneficial between groups in the presence of the military in politics while second chart 
provides a quick snapshot of the positive relationship between the military in politics and 
corruption. 
 
 
Who benefits from the military involvement into the political and economic life of a 
country?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A link between military in politics and corruption 
Domestic civilian groups  The military as an 
institution  
The individuals within the 
military 
Foreign groups  
Similar interests between groups, such as power and 
wealth maximization.  
Corruption is an important element that is mutually 
beneficial. 
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Channels of Military in Politics and Corruption  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vested interests of regime 
stability and personal wealth 
maximization 
Contracts 
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private companies 
in reward of 
money 
 
Poor suffer, income 
distribution become 
worse 
Justification of Military Intervention in Politics 
New model of Military in Politics ‘Power without accountability’ 
Maintenance of an 
increase in 
military’s share of 
national resources  
Maintenance of the 
integrity of the armed 
forces  
Fear of national 
disintegration 
Wider concept of 
‘national security’: 
maintenance of 
internal security 
Military involvement in politics increases 
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and rent seeking 
activities are 
closely associated 
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without 
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Military 
spending 
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bureaucratic 
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administrators 
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diversion for military 
associated sectors 
Foreign 
groups 
 Less resources available for productive 
sectors e.g. less resources to monitor 
corrupt bureaucrats and investment in 
human capital 
Procurement of military 
hardware and arms trade 
Military operations are 
likely to expand 
Tenders 
manipulation 
for private 
profits 
Military operations are corruption prone; soldiers extract money to 
pass military check posts; checks on field commanders are limited 
Limited scrutiny and audit and massive over payments, 
military procurements are highly susceptible to corruption 
Lucrative offers to military 
officers in reward for 
political mobilization 
Kickbacks maximize 
mutual vested interests  
For example, 
uncompetitive 
privatization of 
domestic industries  
Rich elites are motivated 
towards corruption for vested 
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model: personal 
power 
enhancement  
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3.4. Data Description 
The ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) corruption index and corruption perception 
index (CPI) by Transparency International index both are used in corruption studies. We 
prefer ICRG because most previous studies use it and the index covers a large number of 
countries and a long period of time. The comprehensive nature of the ICRG index gives it an 
edge over other available indices. The ICRG also has a high correlation with other indices that 
have been used in the literature, such as the Transparency International and Business 
International (see Treisman, 2000 for more details) indices. We also carry out a simple 
correlation matrix for three alterative corruption indices over the period 1996-2007. The 
correlation matrix indicates that the correlation between the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) corruption index and the Transparency International (TI) corruption Index is 0.87 
while the correlation between ICRG and World Bank (WB) corruption Index is 0.88. The 
correlation between TI and WB is 0.98 and it implies that these indices are consistent, even 
although they are based on a subjective rating.  
 
The other variables used in this study are reported in Table 3-1. We average the data over a 5-
year non-overlapping period, 1984-2007. In this way we have five observations, in most 
instances, for all of the countries in our sample. The 5 year average periods are: 1984-88, 
1989-93, 1994-98, 1999-03, 2004-07. In Table 3-2 we present some descriptive statistics of 
the data and Figure 1 shows the relationship between the military in politics and corruption for 
cross sectional and panel observations. In the first row of the figure the last two scatter plots 
contain panel observation while all other scatter plots contain cross-sectional observations. 
This scatter plotting of the data confirms a positive relationship between the military in 
politics and corruption. There are outliers at a low level of military in politics while at higher 
levels military in politics outliers are absent (we address this issue in separate estimates for 
outliers and find a robust and positive relationship). Figure 2 simply also includes developing 
countries and this demonstrates a positive relationship as well.  
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the relationship between the military in politics and corruption over the 
period 1996-2007 for a large cross section of countries. This figure has been constructed to 
view the relationship between the military in politics and corruption using three alternative 
corruption indices that are extracted from the International Country Risk Guide, Transparency 
International and World Bank, respectively. It is evident from all sub parts of the figure that 
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the relationship between the military in politics and corruption is positive irrespective of 
which corruption index is being used. 
 
Figure 4 shows a comparison of the military in politics and corruption across regions over the 
period 1984-2007. Two things are evident from this figure. First, both variables are positively 
associated. Second, in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), East Asia & Pacific (EAP), Lat 
America & Caribbean (LAC), Middle East & North Africa (MNA) and South Asia (SA) this 
relationship is strongest. However, in the case of Europe & Central Asia (ECA) and Europe 
(EU) this relationship is not as strong and is weakened by the presence of outliers (it is also 
clear in the subsequent regional figures). 
 
Figure 5 contains a comparison of the military in politics and corruption across countries and 
within a region of East Asia & Pacific (EAP) and demonstrates a strong positive relationship. 
Figure 6 replicates the above comparison for Europe & Central Asia (ECA) and shows that the 
relationship between the military in politics and corruption is positive. However, in this region 
some outliers exist and these are Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Turkey. Figure 7 replicates the 
same comparison for Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) and depicts a positive relationship as 
well.  
 
Overall we conclude that the relationship between the military in politics and corruption is 
strongly positive across the countries, regions and within the region. This relationship also 
holds in sub samples, alternative corruption indices and different time periods. Although there 
are a few outliers, these outliers are too few to weaken the main results. 
 
Finally, in this section, we provide a discussion how the ICRG indices for rule of law and the 
military in politics are derived. The variable rule of law has been derived from two sub-
components namely ‘law’ and ‘order’. The variable law is based on the performance of 
following factors: “the strength and impartiality of the legal system, the extent of the case 
precedent, and the consistency of legal and legislation and practice” (ICRG, 2008). The 
variable order is based on the assessment of popular observance of the law. This reflects 
partially a compliance of the population to be self-regulating “but also has to do with the 
numbers of police who enforce the law, the training of police forces and judicial employees 
(lawyers, judges, court clerical and technical staff), and the willingness of these forces to 
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engage in enactment of the laws of the country” (ICRG, 2008). This is possible that a country 
might have a high rating for law in terms of its judicial system but a low rating for order in 
terms of its political deficiencies meaning that law is compromised for a political objective. 
For example, pervasive strikes entailing illegitimate practices or inadequate number of lawyers 
to prosecute and defend accused criminals (ICRG, 2008). 
 
The variable military in politics has been described in the International Country Risk Guide 
(2008) as follows: The military is not elected by anyone and for that reason, its intervention in 
the political process of a country, even at a peripheral level, is harmful for the democratic 
process and accountability. Some of its other important implications are as follows: the 
military may be involved in government on account of an actual or created internal or external 
threat to national sovereignty. This situation implies the distortion of government policy 
because certain policy options need to be required and implemented to meet this threat; for 
instance, a reallocation of budget in favour of the military at the cost of other important budget 
allocations. The threat of a military take over can force an elected government to change its 
policy in line with the desires of the military or may even replace it by another government 
more acquiescent to the wishes of the military. If a military take over, or a threat of take over, 
indicates inability of the present government to function effectively then the economy will 
pose high risks for foreign businesses and a full-scale military regime poses the greatest risk. 
Although a military regime may temporarily provide stability and therefore reduce risks for 
businesses in the short term, in the longer term risk will almost certainly rise for two major 
reasons: the system of governance will be become corrupt and, second, the continuation of 
such a government may create an armed opposition.  
 
3.5. The Model and Estimation Technique 
In this section we specify the estimating equation we use to capture the military – corruption 
links. The equation is based on the theoretical and empirical literatures on the causes of 
corruption. 
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3.5.1 The model 
In order to specify a corruption model, we follow the existing theoretical and empirical 
literatures on this topic. The recent growing literature on the sources of corruption builds on 
two bench mark studies by Treisman (2000) and La Porta et al. (1999). In developing a 
corruption model, the first step entails specifying the important control variables. The key 
control variable used in extant corruption models is economic development, generally 
measured by per capita income (PCY). There is consensus in the literature that nations at the 
top of the economic development ladder have a tendency to be the most clean (least corrupt), 
whilst nations at the bottom of ladder of economic development tend to be most corrupt. This 
suggests that the expected sign for PCY is negative. In the third step, the studies introduce few 
selective control variables that capture institutional, political and cultural dimensions of the 
corruption. We then introduce a set of other control variables which have now become 
standard, such as those that capture institutional, political and cultural dimensions of the 
corruption. The third step in our strategy is the introduce what we regard as a new source of 
corruption, that has not so far been quantified in corruptions studies, namely the role of 
military in politics. In particular we ask whether the involvement of the military in the political 
life of a country fosters corruption. In doing so, we collect case evidence from all over the 
world and provide a systematic documentation of the evidence of the military in politics and 
corruption. Having compiled our case evidence, we then systematically develop theoretical 
channels (links or considerations) to develop a base for empirical testing. Thus, the novelty of 
this study is not only the introduction of a hitherto missing source of corruption but also to 
systematically develop a theory linking military in politics and corruption by compiling 
evidence from around the world and scholarly arguments. In addition, while performing 
robustness analysis, we use a large number of control variables that have hitherto not been 
analyzed directly in literature. For instance, we use a variety of military related variables, such 
as military expenditure, military size, and arms trade. Similarly, we analyze institutional 
variables, such as religion in politics, investment profiles, internal conflict and external 
conflict. Given the above, our estimation equation is:  
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where Cit denotes corruption, MPit is an index for military involvement in politics and has a 
range between 0 to 6, Xit represents a set of control variables drawn from the existing 
corruption literature, Yit is per capita income proxy for economic development/prosperity, ui is 
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a country specific unobservable effect, vt is a time specific factor and εit is an i.i.d. disturbance 
term. The expected sign for our key variable of interest β1 is positive.  
 
3.5.2 Estimation technique 
We now discuss the estimation procedure used for our different corruption specifications. In 
order to maximize the sample size and produce efficient parameter estimates, we follow the 
norm in the corruption literature we use a panel data base, that is our data base has both time-
series and cross-sectional dimensions. As is now well known, in the context of the corruption 
literature Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is not an appropriate estimator since it suffers from 
the problem of omitted variable bias. For example, if a region, country or some group-specific 
factors affect corruption, the explanatory variables would capture the effects of these factors 
and estimates would not represent the true effect of the explanatory variables. To avoid this 
problem, Baltagi (2001) has proposed using fixed effect econometric techniques. However, in 
the presence of a lagged independent variable this technique also produces biased parameter 
estimates a Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimator is required which addresses both 
endogeniety and also the problem of omitted variables bias. In addition to the 2SLS estimator 
we also use alternative econometric techniques, such as Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood (LIML), Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) and System-GMM. 
 
In this study, we rely mainly on the generalized method of Moments (GMM) estimation 
technique that has been developed for dynamic panel data analysis by Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1990), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1997). 
GMM controls for endogeneity of all the explanatory variables, allows for the inclusion of 
lagged dependent variables as regressors and accounts for unobserved country-specific effects. 
GMM estimation requires a sufficient instrument list and following the standard convention in 
the literature, the equations are estimated using lagged first differences as instruments. 
3.6. Results and Discussions 
 
In this study, our estimation proceeds in the following steps: First, we present estimates where 
we condition only on our key variable of interest, namely the military in politics. Second, in 
addition to using a panel data set we also present purely cross sectional estimates based on our 
total sample of countries. We also use the purely cross sectional data because: for 
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comparability purposes, since most of the existing literature is based on cross sectional 
studies; the variation in corruption is in fact dominant across countries rather than over time; it 
facilitates an extra robustness check of our results. Third, following the approach in other 
studies, and despite its deficiencies noted above, we also present results obtained using OLS 
econometric methods, before moving on to different econometric techniques which serve as 
robustness check and address the possible problem of endegeneity. Fourth, we introduce 
quantile regression analysis for military in politics in order to capture the distributional profile 
of the dependent variable, that is the corruption perception index. 
 
Fifth, in order to address the problem of endogeneity, we employ different instruments, such 
as distance from the equator, legal origin and own lags of variables. Sixth, our overall data 
sample contains all available countries contained in the ICRG data set, which is 146, but this 
size is reduced to 129 because the economic freedom and per capita income terms are not 
available for all countries. We split the sample into developed and developing countries and 
conduct a separate analysis for developing countries. Seventh, we divide the world into seven 
regions: East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle 
East & North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and Others. We prefer regional 
fixed effects over country fixed effects because variation in corruption comes across the 
regions for cultural and spacious reasons. 
 
Eighth, we introduce an extensive list of corruption determinants while performing sensitivity 
analysis. During such sensitivity analysis we focus on two things. First, we use existing 
determinants of corruption that have been widely analyzed in the literature. Second, we focus 
on those determinants of corruption which are controversial in the literature or which have 
received least attention in other empirical studies. Ninth, although corruption does not have a 
widely accepted functional form (in the same way that, say, consumption is a function of 
income, almost every study employ PCY as determinate of corruption. Further more the recent 
literature on the robust determinants of corruption (see, for example, Serra, 2006) has shown 
that the level of economic development/prosperity is a robust determinate of corruption. We 
also therefore employ the level of development as a determinant. Tenth, in order to control for 
the time factor, we also introduce five time dummies that are based on five year averages 1988 
(1984-88), 1993 (1989-93), 1998 (1994-98), 2003 (1999-03) and 2007. 
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Eleventh, we systematically replicate our findings while controlling for outliers: (1) we 
exclude those countries which have full scale military involvement in politics; (2) Similarly 
we exclude those countries which have minimum scale military involvement in politics; (3) 
We exclude those countries which are the most corrupt nations; (4) Finally we exclude those 
nations which are the least corrupt. Our main finding of the positive relationship between the 
military in politics and corruption remains robust (these results are not reported here but are 
available from the authors on request). Twelfth and finally, we replicate our findings using 
two alternative corruption indices, the Transparency International corruption index and World 
Bank corruption index. Our main findings are robust to the use of the alternative corruption 
indices as well; however, we do not report these results. 
 
Table 3-3 reports the cross sectional estimation results for corruption and military in politics 
for 130 countries, over the period 1984-2007, for a range of specifications. The parameter 
estimates for the military in politics is significant with the correct sign across the different 
specifications. The coefficient on military in politics ranges from approximately 0.24 to 0.13 
in last two columns of the table. So on the basis of the largest estimate, a one unit increase in 
the standard deviation of military in politics produces a 0.24 unit increase in the corruption 
index. The value of the R2 is reasonably high and the p-value of the F-Stat is significant in all 
regressions. The level of economic development is consistently significant at the 1% level and 
that is consistent with earlier studies on corruption. 
 
The economic freedom term also produces a significant coefficient at the 1% level of 
significance in all regressions, indicating that a higher degree of economic freedom reduces 
corruption, and this finding is consistent with a number of empirical studies, such as Treisman, 
2000; Graeff and Mehlkop, 2003.  
 
An important element that determines pervasiveness of corruption in the public sector of a 
country is ‘public morale’; that is, faith in country managers (authorities, policy makers). In 
nations where policies fail, or policy makers renege on their commitments and promises, the 
economy generates economic chaos that adversely affects economic morale. In this study we 
proxy this economic chaos with high inflation rates, since high inflation indicates 
macroeconomic imbalances. Furthermore, an important outcome of a high inflation rates is the 
redistribution of national wealth that may cause a further drop in the public morale. The 
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significantly positive coefficient on inflation would seem to support this hypothesis and our 
result here is consistent with Paldam (2002), and Braun-Di Tella (2004).  
 
As a sensitivity analysis and a robustness check on the main findings in Table 3-3, we report 
in Tables 3-4 and 3-5 the results from conditioning on additional factors, HFI (High Financial 
Intermediation), common law, remittances, a colonial term and the share of Protestants in the 
population. For example, in Table 3-4 we replicate the results of Table 3-3 by only including 
developing countries. As can be seen the findings for the sample of developing countries are 
similar to the full sample of developed and developing countries.  
 
The coefficient of military in politics remains in the range of 0.12 to 0.20 in our sensitivity 
analysis. Interestingly the highest value arises in the regression in which we control for the 
legal factor, common law, and the factor share of Protestants in the population. Of the 
additional conditioning variables all are correctly signed although the common law and 
colonial terms are not statistically significant.  
 
How may the significantly negative coefficient on the religion term be explained? Religion is 
seen to affect the pervasiveness of corruption in a country since it influences the social and 
cultural characteristics of a society. In principle, religion is thought to discourage corruption. 
However, its influence may vary between hierarchal religious systems (such as, Catholicism, 
Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam), and egalitarian religions. In countries where equalitarian 
religions are prominent there is evidence that they tend challenge the status quo more 
frequently. For example, protestant churches have traditionally been apart from government 
and inclined to monitor abuses of the government (Treisman, 2000). Furthermore, La Porta et 
al. (1999) argue that religion may influence the quality of legal system that in turn affects the 
extent of corruption. 
 
The sensitivity analyses reported in Table 3-4 indicates that our main findings are robust with 
the only change being that government spending loses its level of significance when we 
control for either common law or protestant. The R2 statistic is also reasonably high in all 
regressions and the F-Stat is also significant in all regressions. 
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In Tables 3-6 to 3-8 we re-examine the basic specifications of Table 3-3 using both OLS and 
quantile regressions and different specification of the corruption model. Tables 3-6 to 3-8 
include three variables as benchmark: military in politics, PCY and economic freedom. The 
specification in Table 3-6 includes inflation excluding government spending while the 
specification in Table 3-8 includes both inflation and government spending. We use a quantile 
regression analysis here as an additional robustness check. The quantile regression analysis 
was been initially introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and provides parameter estimates 
at multiple points in the conditional distribution of a dependent variable.  
 
Our quantile regression results are based upon 100 bootstrapping repetitions. In our 
estimations lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) indicate least corrupt countries while higher quantiles 
(e.g., Q0.9) indicate most corrupt countries. 
 
The estimates for OLS yield a base line of mean effects while quantile estimates provide 
conditional distribution of dependent of variable that is corruption. In both the OLS and 
quantile regressions, greater economic prosperity in a country is seen to lower corruption, 
which is consistent with the findings of several studies on the causes of corruption (see Serra, 
2006). The results show that both political freedom and economic freedom help in reducing 
corruption. A larger government may devote more resources to strengthen the checks and 
balances and as a result reduce corruption. In the same way, a high quality bureaucracy is also 
helpful in reducing corruption. 
 
The effect of the military in politics on corruption is always positive, generating high 
corruption indexes; it means military in politics is correlated with more corruption. The 
military in politics substantially fosters corruption. This effect is more pronounced in the half 
of the conditional distribution; i.e., among the mean/median corrupt countries.  
 
The analysis of conditional distribution of our dependent variable (corruption) supports our 
main finding in two ways. First, main results of the study are not weakened by the 
observations lying in both tails of the distribution. Second, existing levels of corruption are not 
as important as military in politics matters in increasing existing levels of corruption. 
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The effect of economic freedom is nearly always negative, causing lower indexes; i.e., 
economic freedom is correlated with less corruption. However, the effect of inflation is more 
significant at lower quantiles as compared to higher quintiles, and this finding remains 
consistent even after controlling for government spending. 
 
OLS estimates suggest inflation matters a lot in increasing corruption, but the quantile 
regression results do not uniformly confirm this. Specifically, controlling for government 
consumption, inflation substantially increases corruption, but only in the bottom bottom-half 
of the conditional distribution (among the less/least corrupt). As inflation increase in the 
less/least corrupt nations, ceteris paribus, they experience an increase in corruption. 
 
Though inflation is the potential source of corruption in the OLS regression, its effect is not 
consistent in the quantile regression. Its effect is more significant in the lower part of the 
distribution; that is inflation promotes corruption in less and least corrupt nations while its 
effect is positive in top part of distribution but not significant. 
 
The effect of government consumption is strongest at the median/mean of the conditional 
distribution. While comparing the tails of the distribution, this effect is significant in the upper 
most quantile, suggesting that increasing the size of government in most corrupt nations may 
reduce corruption. 
 
In Table 3-9 we present the results for military in politics and corruption after controlling for 
regional effects. In the literature, corruption is considered as a regional phenomenon meaning 
that corruption varies more across regions (for cultural reasons) compared to variations within 
a region (see Paldam, 2002). In order to capture regional variations (heterogeneity) we 
introduce regional dummy variables to assess whether our main findings are robust to 
inclusion of regional specific dummy variables. The estimated coefficients of the dummy 
variables for Europe & Central Asia (ECA) and Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) are each 
positive and statistically highly significant. The results indicate that ECA and LAC regions are 
0.7 and 0.6 points, respectively, more corrupt than the average for all countries. The dummy 
variables for all other regions are insignificant with positive signs, except East Asia and 
Pacific which is negatively signed. Our results are robust to inclusion of regional controls. The 
coefficient on military in politics fluctuates between 0.12 and 0.15 and it is highly significant 
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with the correct sign in all columns of the table. The effect of government spending is negative 
and significant but it is not robust. The results show that the positive effect of inflation on 
corruption is robustly significant.  
 
Table 3-10 replicates the finding of Table 3-9 for a restricted sample of developing countries. 
The coefficient on military in politics slightly increases and fluctuates between 0.13 and 0.17. 
However, the direction of the link and level of significance are robust in the restricted sample 
as well. The effect of government spending is consistently negative and significant in the case 
of developing world which has been also confirmed from the quantile analysis that the role of 
government in fighting against corruption in more corrupt countries is pronounced. In the case 
of inflation results are opposite between sample. In case of whole sample, the positive effect 
of the inflation on corruption is robust while in the case of restricted sample level of 
significance slightly drops while the direction of link remains the same.  
 
Corruption flourishes in an environment of unrestrained bureaucracy, but it can be contained 
when the laws of the land are vigorously enforced. Moreover, when the administration or the 
political order is considered as illegitimate, the social pressures against acts of corruption 
become less important. Corruption can therefore be effectively curtailed by an administration 
that enjoys an enduring legitimacy. 
 
The level of corruption depends on the extent to which the laws of the land are binding and 
enforced. Corrupt officials are rational welfare maximizers, they weigh the pecuniary benefits 
from corruption against its cost. The personal cost of corruption is the loss of a job and the 
jail-time if caught and persecuted. Individuals will act corruptly so long as the perceived gains 
from corruption outweigh the costs. The probability of detection is lower the more 
lackadaisical the judicial system is. Judicial laxity reduces the opportunity cost of being 
corrupt. Hence, countries with strict laws and efficient judicial systems tend to be less corrupt 
and vice versa (Ali and Isse, 2003). 
 
In a nutshell, the legal strengths of a country play an important role in reducing corruption 
levels. If nobody is above the law then the incidence of corrupt activities are least likely. This 
study uses a rule of law index as a proxy for the legal strength of a country. This index has 
been used by a number of studies such as (Ali and Isse, 2003 and Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003). 
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This index shows the extent to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the 
established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes. This index also 
reflects the degree to which countries have a strong court system and an orderly succession of 
power. The expected sign for this variable is negative because both theory and empirical 
studies show that a strong rule of law curbs corruption-prone activities. 
 
Recently, MacDonald and Majeed (2011) show in a sample of European countries that the rule 
of law in an important factor which can combat corruption. Their study finds robust 
relationship on this particular variable. The results of their study suggest that the coefficient on 
law fluctuates between 0.3 and 0.5. It implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in legal 
strength is associated with a decrease in corruption of 0.26 (or 0.43) points, 26% (or 40%) of a 
standard deviation in the corruption index. 
 
Column eight in Table 3-12 shows benchmark results with an addition control of the rule of 
law. The coefficient on this variable turns out to be significant with expected negative sign. 
The effect of this variable appears to be more important in comparison to other control 
variables for following reasons. First, it is noteworthy that this represents a much larger effect 
on corruption than any of the other variables. Second, the level of significance for this variable 
is the highest. Third, the R2 also improves in the case of this variable. Fourth, the coefficient 
on military in politics slightly drops although level of significance and direction of the 
relationship remain robust. These all point altogether imply that law variable is an important 
determinant of corruption. 
 
Column 8 (Table 3-14) reports the results for benchmark model using random effects 
econometric technique. Our observation on the rule of law variable is consistent in this as 
well. First, it is noteworthy that this represents a much larger effect on corruption than any of 
the other variables. Second R2 also improves in the case of this variable. In Table 3-17, this 
variable has been added in benchmark regression while performing sensitivity analysis with 
other variables. The effect of this variable is consistent in all the regressions. 
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3.7. Conclusion  
 
In recent years attention has focused on the importance of the elimination of global corruption. 
For example, international organizations such as the United Nations and World Bank have 
been advocating anti-corruption measure, such as greater transparency in government deals 
and contracts. Additionally, individual governments have been improving and strengthening 
the rule of law to monitor and punish corrupt officials. Despite these initiatives, policy makers 
often face the challenge of isolating the various avenues of corruption because of a lack of 
understanding of the various causes of corruption. This is because some institutional, political 
and cultural effects on corruption are very subtle and hard to quantify. This study contributes 
to our understanding of the causes of corruption by identifying a novel avenue of corruption, 
namely military participation in politics. This source of corruption is extremely important for 
both academic researchers and policy makers as it stems from the institutional, cultural and 
political settings of a society which are usually hard to quantify. 
 
We use both cross sectional and panel data for a large set of countries over a relatively long 
time period. To identify a relationship between military involvement in politics and 
corruption, we draw extensively on existing case studies, scholarly arguments, and historical 
evidence from around the world. Having done this, we systematically develop a theory which 
links the military, government and corruption and we test this empirically. The theoretical and 
empirical analysis of this study is unique because it analyzes the relationship between the 
military in politics and corruption and this has not hitherto been addressed in the literature. 
The analysis shows that the presence of the military in politics significantly adds to corruption 
in a society. In particular, the results reveal that a one standard deviation increase in the 
presence of military in politics leads to a 0.22 unit increase in corruption index. This effect 
arises because the presence of the military in politics expands the role of military officials in 
government and they usually hold the key to bureaucratic and administrative positions in the 
government machinery, controlling the scarce resources of the military sector, sectors related 
to military and other non productive activities. These sectors are least accountable to the 
public and so public resources can be exploited for private gain, in the control of elections, the 
distortion of market systems, and these can all cause a rise in corruption. Although even when 
the military are involved in the political process, resources are devoted to infrastructure and 
other development projects, the hidden motive behind such projects is the maximization of 
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rent, for example, with MNCs competing for business contracts through bribes instead of fair 
market competition. 
 
Our study is also novel because it evaluates the conditional distribution of the military in 
politics and corruption using a quantile regression analysis. The results reveal that the effect of 
military in politics on corruption is always positive, causing high corruption indexes: the 
military in politics substantially fosters corruption. This effect is more pronounced in the half 
of the conditional distribution; i.e., among the mean/median corrupt countries. The analysis of 
the conditional distribution of our dependent variable (corruption) supports our main finding 
in two ways. First, the main results of the study are not weakened by the observations in both 
tails of the distribution. Second, existing levels of corruption are not as important as military 
in politics for increasing existing levels of corruption: the positive relationship between the 
military in politics is consistent through out the scale of corruption.  
 
Another important feature of our analysis of the causes of corruption is that while considering 
a wide set of corruption sources we particularly focus on a key set of determinants of 
corruption, such as government spending and inflation. The results show that the effect of 
government spending is significantly and robustly negative. However, in quantile regressions, 
the effect of government consumption is strongest at the median/mean of the conditional 
distribution. While comparing tails of the distribution, this effect is significant in the upper 
most quantile, suggesting that increasing the size of government in the most corrupt nations 
may reduce corruption. In the case of inflation, OLS estimates suggest inflation matters a lot 
in increasing corruption, but quantile regression results do not uniformly confirm this. 
Specifically, controlling for government consumption, inflation substantially increases 
corruption, but only in the bottom bottom-half of the conditional distribution (among the 
less/least corrupt). As inflation increase in the less/least corrupt nations, ceteris paribus, they 
experience an increase in corruption.  
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Table 3-1: Description of Variables 
Variable  Definitions Sources 
Per capita real GDP GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$).  World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Secondary school 
enrollment 
The secondary school enrollment as % of age group is 
at the beginning of the period. It is used as a proxy of 
investment in human capital. 
World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Credit as % of GDP Credit as % of GDP represents Claims on the non-
financial private sector/GDP. 
World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
M2 as % of GDP It represents Broad money/GDP. World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Trade Liberalization It is the sum of exports and imports as a share of real 
GDP. Data on exports, imports and real GDP are in 
the form of annual averages between survey years. 
World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Corruption  ICRG corruption index rescaled from 0 (absence of 
corruption) to 6 (highest corruption). 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS 
group. 
Corruption  Transparency International corruption index rescaled 
from 0 (absence of corruption) to 10 (highest 
corruption). 
Transparency International  
Corruption  World Bank corruption index rescaled from -2.5 
(absence of corruption) to 2.5 (highest corruption). 
World Bank  
Democracy  ICRG index 0-6 scale; where 6 indicate high degree 
of democracy. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS 
group. 
Military in Politics ICRG index rescaled 0-6; higher risk ratings (6) 
indicate a greater degree of military participation in 
politics and a higher level of political risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS 
group. 
Religion in Politics ICRG index 0-6 scale: higher ratings are given to 
countries where religious tensions are minimal. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS 
group. 
Ethnic Tensions ICRG index 0-6 scale; higher ratings are given to 
countries where tensions are minimal. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS 
group. 
Rule of Law ICRG index 0-6 scale; where 6 indicate high degree 
of law and order. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS 
group. 
Bureaucracy Quality ICRG index 0-4 scale; where 4 indicate high degree 
of law and order. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS 
group. 
Government 
Stability 
ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high 
risk and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS 
group. 
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high 
risk and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS 
group. 
Investment Profiles ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high 
risk and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS 
group. 
Internal Conflict ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high 
risk and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS 
group. 
External Conflict ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high 
risk and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS 
group. 
Economic Freedom Freedom House data. index rescaled 0 (low economic 
freedom)-7 (high economic freedom) 
Fraser Institute. 
HFI The level of Financial Intermediation is determined 
by adding M2 as a % of GDP and credit to private 
sector as % of GDP. 
World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Inflation  Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Government 
Spending  
General government final consumption expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Remittances  Workers' remittances and compensation of 
employees, received (% of GDP) 
World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Military Spending  Military expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Arm Trade Arms exports plus arms imports (constant 1990 US$) World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Urbanization  Urban Population  World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
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British Colony A dummy variable that is 1 for British Colony  http://flagspot.net/flags/gb-colon.html 
Common Law Binary variable which equals 1if the country’s 
company law or commercial code is English common 
law, equals 0 otherwise 
Treisman (2000) 
Protestant  Share of Protestants in 1980 Treisman (2000) 
British  British legal origin La Porta et al. (1997) 
French French legal origin  La Porta et al. (1997) 
Scandinavian  Scandinavian legal origin  La Porta et al. (1997) 
Socialist Socialist legal origin  La Porta et al. (1997) 
Germany  Germany legal origin La Porta et al. (1997) 
Equator  Distance from equator La Porta et al. (1997) 
 
Table 3-2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Corruption 675 2.932585 1.322528 -.0333328 6 
Per Capita Income 653 6949.03 9566.997 84.89059 53800.33 
Remittances 523 2.847373 4.769296 .0018351 42.54366 
High Financial Lib. 562 95.77334 197.5284 5.237262 4410.351 
Openness 644 78.72449 47.99039 2.566213 442.2996 
Government 635 16.04497 6.173756 4.05478 46.35652 
Democracy 675 3.6823 1.607773 0 6 
Economic Freedom 673 4.403913 1.942066 1 7 
Urbanization 693 1.81e+07 4.72e+07 91250.07 5.34e+08 
Military in Politics 675 3.715646 1.785895 0 6.033333 
Bureaucracy Quality 675 2.139725 1.171961 0 4 
Socio Economic 675 5.68345 2.131201 .0208333 10.775 
Government Stability 675 7.566057 2.006066 1.466667 11.5 
Internal conflict 675 8.765272 2.564226 .0333333 12 
External conflict 675 9.604507 2.118613 0 12 
Investment Profiles 675 7.057228 2.339163 .8000001 12 
Religion in Politics 675 4.591332 1.320474 0 6 
Rule of Law 675 3.667232 1.45727 .55 6 
Ethno linguistic 675 3.932934 1.427448 0 6 
Consumer P Index 621 41152.82 1023276 7.20e-10 2.55e+07 
Inflation 615 74.31995 434.1466 -4.207125 6523.051 
Credit Private 635 103.5882 775.4475 .7621964 12437.82 
Net Users  554 9.167496 16.75737 0 82.23592 
Military Sp/Government 296 10.34746 9.270922 0 53.5601 
Military Sp/GDP 583 2.785165 3.350683 0 43.7737 
Education 633 66.66573 32.51444 3.31139 156.3496 
Arm exports 276 4.20e+08 1.52e+09 0 1.27e+10 
Aram imports 573 2.06e+08 4.05e+08 0 3.70e+09 
Arm Trade 259 7.99e+08 1.63e+09 8666667 1.33e+10 
 
 
 
  91 
0
2
4
6
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
0 2 4 6
Military in Politics
bandwidth = .8
Lowess smoother
0
2
4
6
co
rr
0 2 4 6
mpo
0
2
4
6
0 2 4 6
mpo
Fitted values corr
0
2
4
6
co
rr
0 2 4 6
mpo
0
2
4
6
0 2 4 6
mpo
corr Fitted values
alb alg
ang
arg
arm
ausaut
aze
bah
ar
ban
bel
bel
bol
bot
bra
bru
bul
bur
cam
can
chi
chncol con
cog
cos
cotcro cub
cyp
cze
czh
den
dom
ege
ecu
egy
els
est
eth
fin
fra
gab
gam
ger
gh
gre
gua
gui
gunguy
hai
hon
hoghun
ice
ind
indo
ira
irq
ire isr
ita
jam
jap
jor
kaz
ken
korkuw
lat
leb
lib
liby
lit
lux
mad
malw
maly
mal
t
mex
mol
mon
m r
moz
mya
nam
n t
nca
nze
nic
nig
nia
nor
oma
pakpan
pap
par
per
phi
pol
por
qat
r m
russau
s
ser
sem
sie
sin
slo slv
som
sou
sok
spa
sri
sud
sur
swe
swt
syr
tai
t n
tha
t g
tri tun tur
uae uga
ukr
uk
us
uru
uss
ven
vie
wger
yemzam
zim
0
2
4
6
co
rr
0 2 4 6
mpo
 
Figure 3-1: Corruption and Military in Politics 
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Figure 3-2: Corruption and Military in Politics in Developing Countries 
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Figure 3-3:  Figure 3 a                          Figure 3b                                    Figure 3c 
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Figure 3-4: Corruption and Military in Politics (Regional Trends) 
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Figure 3-5: Corruption and Military in Politics (East Asia and Pacific) 
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Figure 3-6: Corruption and Military in Politics (Europe and Central Asia)
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Figure 3-7: Corruption and Military in Politics (Latin America and Caribbean) 
 
Figure 3-8: Alternative Corruption Indices (Correlation) 
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Table 3-3: Corruption and Military in Politics: Cross Sectional (CS) Estimation (I) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.48 
(10.74)* 
0.26 
(5.13)* 
0.15 
(2.70)* 
0.12 
(1.96)* 
0.12 
(2.09)** 
PCY  -0.000 
(-7.09)* 
-0.000 
(-6.40)* 
-0.000 
(-5.99)* 
-0.000 
(-6.20)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
  -0.19 
(-4.18)* 
-0.21 
(-4.88)* 
-0.18 
(-3.97)* 
Government 
Spending 
   -0.02 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.88)*** 
Inflation     0.000 
(2.18)** 
R 0.45 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.68 
Adj. R  0.44 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.67 
F  115.25 
(0.000) 
98.57 
(0.000) 
80.06 
(0.000) 
58.54 
(0.000) 
52.28 
(0.000) 
Observations  146 135 132 130 128 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 3-4: Corruption and Military in Politics: CS Estimation (II) for Developing 
Countries 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.21 
(4.65)* 
0.24 
(5. 41)* 
0.18 
(3.60)* 
0.134 
(2.47)* 
0.133 
(2.47)* 
Economic 
Prosperity 
 -0.114 
(-3.52)* 
-0.117 
(-3.50)* 
-0.127 
(-3.83)* 
-0.108 
(-3.16)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
  -0.086 
(-1.76)* 
-0.10 
(-1.98)* 
-0.104 
(-2.01)** 
Government 
Spending 
   -0.024 
(-1.98)*** 
-0.027 
(-2.27)*** 
Inflation     0.0005 
(1.73)*** 
R 0.18 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.36 
Adj. R 0.17 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.32 
F  21.64 
(0.000) 
18.65 
(0.000) 
12.67 
(0.000) 
10.10 
(0.000) 
9.34 
(0.000) 
Observations  99 96 94 92 89 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3-5: Corruption and Military in Politics: CS Estimation (III): Sensitivity Analysis 
Variables Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.12 
(1.96)* 
0.12 
(2.09)** 
0.12 
(2.06)** 
0.11 
(2.03)** 
0.12 
(1.94)** 
0.21 
(3.25)* 
0.20 
(3.10)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-5.99)* 
-0.000 
(-6.20)* 
-0.000 
(-4.43)* 
-0.000 
(-7.46)* 
-0.000 
(-5.80)* 
-0.000 
(-5.95)* 
-0.000 
(-5.63)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.21 
(-4.88)* 
-0.18 
(-3.97)* 
-0.18 
(-3.82)* 
-0.096 
(-1.84)*** 
-0.22 
(-4.54)* 
-0.15 
(-2.72)* 
-0.14 
(-2.59)* 
Government 
Spending 
-0.02 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.88)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.50) 
-0.03 
(-2.06)** 
-0.02 
(-1.65)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.56) 
-0.01 
(-1.08) 
Inflation  0.000 
(2.18)** 
     
HFI   -.001 
(-1.84)*** 
    
Remittances     0.02 
(1.60)*** 
   
British 
Colony 
    0.025 
(0.18) 
  
Common law      0.01 
(0.09) 
 
Protestant       -0.007 
(-2.16)** 
R 0.65 0.68 0.58 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.77 
Adj. R 0.64 0.67 0.57 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.76 
F  58.54 
(0.000) 
52.28 
(0.000) 
31.06 
(0.000) 
55.11 
(0.000) 
55.11 
(0.000) 
52.64 
(0.000) 
56.46 
(0.000) 
Observations  130 128 117 119 119 91 91 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3-6: Corruption and Military in Politics: OLS vs. Quintile Regression: 
specification 1 
Variables  OLS Q0.1 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.9 
Military in 
Politics 
0.16 
(2.89)* 
0.064 
(0.76) 
0.20 
(2.78)* 
0.20 
(2.88)* 
0.09 
(1.08) 
0.13 
(1.12) 
PCY -0.000 
(-6.65)* 
-0.000 
(-4.97)* 
-0.000 
(-4.59)* 
-0.000 
(-4.38)* 
-0.000 
(-3.34)* 
-0.000 
(-2.66)* 
Economic 
Freedom  
-0.17 
(-3.68)* 
-0.29 
(-3.31)* 
-0.29 
(-2.30)* 
-0.14 
(-2.42)* 
-0.20 
(-2.48)* 
-0.14 
(-1.20)* 
Inflation 0.0006 
(-1.99)* 
0.0009 
(2.16)* 
0.0007 
(1.96)** 
0.0008 
(1.54) 
0.0006 
(1.15) 
0.0004 
(0.90) 
R 0.68 0.56 0.53 0.41 0.32 0.29 
Adj. R 0.67      
F  65.29 
(0.000) 
42.69 
(0.000) 
26.00 
(0.000) 
43.03 
(0.000) 
17.96 
(0.000) 
6.97 
(0.000) 
Observations  129 129 129 129 129 129 
Notes: Dependent Variable is corruption perception index from ICRG 
Regressions include 120-122 observations of country level data. 
Quantile regression results are based upon 100 bootstrapping repetitions. 
Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify less corrupt nations. 
All regressions include an intercept term but the results are not reported. 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
 
 
Table 3-7: Corruption and Military in Politics (CS): OLS vs. Quintile Regression: 
Specification 2 
Variables  OLS Q0.1 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.9 
Military in 
Politics 
0.15 
(2.70)* 
0.061 
(0.67) 
0.19 
(2.78)* 
0.20 
(3.83)* 
0.16 
(1.74)*** 
0.04 
(0.40) 
PCY -0.000 
(-6.40)* 
-0.000 
(-4.63)* 
-0.000 
(-5.00)* 
-0.000 
(-5.78)* 
-0.000 
(-2.48)* 
-0.000 
(-2.52)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.39 
(-4.18) 
-0.24 
(-2.65) 
-0.12 
(-2.36) 
-0.15 
(-2.71) 
-0.19 
(-2.13) 
-0.29 
(-2.86) 
R 0.65 0.54 0.50 0.39 0.29 0.27 
Adj. R 0.64      
F  80.06 48.69 
(0.000) 
38.28 
(0.000) 
77.81 
(0.000) 
15.97 
(0.000) 
1014 
(0.000) 
Observations  132 132 132 132 132 132 
Notes: Dependent Variable is corruption perception index from ICRG 
Regressions include 120-122 observations of country level data. 
Quantile regression results are based upon 100 bootstrapping repetitions. 
Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify less corrupt nations. 
All regressions include an intercept term but the results are not reported. 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 3-8: Corruption and Military in Politics (CS): OLS vs. Quintile Regression: 
Specification 3 
Variables  OLS Q0.1 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.9 
Military in 
Politics 
0.12 
(2.09)* 
0.11 
(1.09) 
0.14 
(2.17)** 
0.20 
(2.71)** 
0.13 
(1.26) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
PCY -0.000 
(-6.20)* 
-0.000 
(-2.97)* 
-0.000 
(-5.88)* 
-0.000 
(-4.41)* 
-0.000 
(-3.05)* 
-0.000 
(-2.00)** 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.18 
(-3.97)* 
-0.21 
(-2.58)* 
-0.21 
(-1.71)*** 
-0.14 
(-1.83)*** 
-0.14 
(-2.15)** 
-0.27 
(-2.59)** 
Inflation 0.0007 
(2.18)** 
0.0009 
(3.07)* 
0.0008 
(2.48)* 
0.0008 
(1.39) 
0.0005 
(0.91) 
0.0002 
(0.43) 
Government 
Spending 
-0.022 
(-1.88)*** 
-0.025 
(-0.58) 
-0.023 
(-1.60) 
-0.01 
(-0.89) 
-0.023 
(-1.26) 
-0.04 
(-1.72)*** 
R 0.68 0.60 0.54 0.52 0.32 0.31 
Adj. R 0.67      
F  52.88 
(0.000) 
42.05 
(0.000) 
45.50 
(0.000) 
30.32 
(0.000) 
13.83 
(0.000) 
6.91 
(0.000) 
Observations  128 128 128 128 128 128 
Notes: Dependent Variable is corruption perception index from ICRG 
Regressions include 120-122 observations of country level data. 
Quantile regression results are based upon 100 bootstrapping repetitions. 
Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify less corrupt nations. 
All regressions include an intercept term but the results are not reported. 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 3-9: Corruption and Military in Politics: CS Estimation (IV): Regional Effects 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.12 
(2.09)** 
0.12 
(2.03)** 
0.163 
(2.69)* 
0.148 
(2.50)* 
0.156 
(2.62)* 
0.143 
(2.41)* 
0.131 
(2.17)** 
PCY -0.000 
(-6.20)* 
-0.000 
(-6.11)* 
-0.000 
(-5.43)* 
-0.000 
(-4.79)* 
-0.000 
(-4.93)* 
-0.000 
(-4.81)* 
-0.000 
(-4.49)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.18 
(-3.97)* 
-0.19 
(-3.94)* 
-0.17 
(-3.62)* 
-0.22 
(-4.40)* 
-0.18 
(-3.28)* 
-0.20 
(-3.62)* 
-0.20 
(-3.27)* 
Government 
Spending 
-0.02 
(-1.88)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.90)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.68)*** 
-0.014 
(-1.28) 
-0.017 
(-1.42) 
-0.019 
(-1.6)*** 
-0.019 
(-1.6)*** 
Inflation 0.000 
(2.18)** 
0.000 
(2.13)** 
0.000 
(1.84)*** 
0.000 
(1.62)*** 
0.000 
(1.83)*** 
0.000 
(1.74)*** 
0.000 
(1.65)*** 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
 -0.08 
(-0.035) 
-0.014 
(-0.06) 
0.062 
(0.29) 
0.13 
(0.57) 
  
Europe & 
Central Asia 
  0.438 
(2.13)** 
0.555 
(2.70)** 
0.60 
(2.87)** 
0.59 
(2.91)** 
0.72 
(2.94)** 
Lat America & 
Caribbean 
   0.452 
(2.68)* 
0.451 
(2.68)* 
0.468 
(2.76)* 
0.60 
(2.60)* 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
    0.27 
(1.23) 
0.26 
(1.21) 
0.39 
(1.54) 
South Asia 
 
     0.30 
(0.97) 
0.45 
(1.30) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
      0.21 
(1.00) 
Europe        0.083 
(1.37) 
R 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Adj. R 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.70 
F  52.28 
(0.000) 
43.77 
(0.000) 
39.26 
(0.000) 
37.02 
(0.000) 
33.22 
(0.000) 
33.46 
(0.000) 
27.23 
(0.000) 
Observations  128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3-10: Corruption and Military in Politics: CS Estimation (V): Regional Effects in 
Developing Countries  
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.133 
(2.47)* 
0.137 
(2.53)* 
0.171 
(2.91)* 
0.171 
(2.82)* 
0.159 
(2.62)* 
0.160 
(2.70)* 
0.153 
(2.51)* 
Economic 
Prosperity 
-0.108 
(-3.16)* 
-0.119 
(-3.27)* 
-0.105 
(-2.81)* 
-0.105 
 (-2.77)* 
-0.125 
(-3.12)* 
-0.122 
(-3.10)* 
-0.124 
(-3.09)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.104 
(-2.01)** 
-0.101 
(-1.95)** 
-0.092 
(-1.77)*** 
-0.09 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.101 
(-1.6)*** 
-0.105 
(-2.01)** 
-0.142 
(-2.00)** 
Government 
Spending 
0.027 
(2.27)*** 
-0.026 
(-2.15)** 
-0.03 
(-2.00)** 
-0.03 
(-1.97)** 
-0.025 
(-2.06)** 
-0.027 
(-2.19)** 
-0.0228 
(-1.77)*** 
Inflation 0.0005 
(1.73)*** 
0.0005 
(1.73)*** 
0.0005 
(1.7)*** 
0.000 
(1.63)*** 
0.0004 
(1.46) 
0.0004 
(1.5) 
0.0004 
(1.32) 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
 0.204 
(0.89) 
0.223 
(0.98) 
0.221 
(0.94) 
0.27 
(1.02) 
0.28 
(1.22) 
0.87 
(1.57) 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
  0.276 
(1.43) 
0.274 
(1.39) 
0.257 
(1.17) 
0.25 
(1.12) 
0.68 
(1.22) 
Lat America & 
Caribbean 
   0.000 
(0.000) 
  0.68 
(1.22) 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
   -0.009 
(-0.04) 
0.013 
(0.05) 
 0.555 
(1.08) 
South Asia 
 
    0.42 
(1.38) 
0.43 
(1.56) 
1.03 
(1.78)*** 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
    -0.036 
(-0.20) 
 0.552 
(1.08) 
Europe       0.375 
(0.89) 
0.71 
(1.40) 
R 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.42 
Adj. R 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.33 
F  9.34 
(0.000) 
7.90 
(0.000) 
7.15 
(0.000) 
6.18 
(0.000) 
5.21 
(0.000) 
6.00 
(0.000) 
4.55 
(0.000) 
Observations  89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3-11: Corruption and Military in Politics: Panel Estimation 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.44 
(19.08)* 
0.27 
(9.93)* 
0.18 
(6.03)* 
0.098 
(3.21)* 
0.074 
(2.34)** 
0.15 
(-4.73)** 
PCY  -0.000 
(-11.00)* 
-0.000 
(-9.92)* 
-0.000 
(-5.11)* 
-0.000 
(-4.95)* 
-0.000 
(-9.21)* 
Democracy    -0.21 
(-6.75)* 
-0.21 
(-4.26)* 
-0.14 
(-4.51)* 
-0.22 
(-6.88)* 
Bureaucracy 
Quality 
   -0.41 
(-7.58)* 
-0.39 
(-6.92)* 
- 
Government 
Spending 
    -0.02 
(-2.94)* 
-0.03 
(-3.78)* 
R 0.35 0.46 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.54 
Adj. R 0.35 0.46 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.53 
F  364.11 
(0.000) 
263.47 
(0.000) 
203.48 
(0.000) 
180.88 
(0.000) 
137.58 
(0.000) 
148.34 
(0.000) 
Observations  675 675 622 622 602 602 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3-12: Corruption and Military in Politics: Panel Estimation: Sensitivity Analysis 
(I) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.26 
(8.93)* 
0.16 
(5.06)* 
0.27 
(9.22)* 
0.21 
(6.23)* 
0.23 
(7.24)* 
0.31 
(10.39)* 
0.16 
(5.18)* 
0.22 
(7.33)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-10.98)* 
-0.000 
(-9.60)* 
-0.000 
(-11.29)* 
-0.000 
(-10.50)* 
-0.000 
(-10.98)* 
-0.000 
(-12.43)* 
-0.000 
(-7.03)* 
-0.000 
(-10.78)* 
Government 
Spending 
-0.03 
(-3.90)* 
-0.03 
(-4.33)* 
-0.03 
(-3.71)* 
-0.03 
(-4.14)* 
-0.03 
(-4.33)* 
-0.02 
(-3.48)* 
-0.02 
(-3.47)* 
-0.03 
(-4.20)* 
Openness 0.004 
(4.36)* 
0.003 
(3.13) 
0.003 
(3.83)* 
0.004 
(4.75)* 
0.004 
(4.52)* 
0.003 
(3.26)* 
0.004 
(4.47)* 
0.004 
(4.35)* 
Democracy   -0.20 
(-6.31)* 
      
Government 
Stability 
  0.06 
(2.58)* 
     
Internal 
Conflict 
   -0.06 
(-2.71)* 
    
External 
Conflict 
    -0.06 
(-2.67)* 
   
Investment 
Profiles 
     0.12 
(5.58)* 
  
Rule of Law        -0.28 
(-7.19)* 
 
Religion in 
Politics 
       -0.13 
(-3.84)* 
R 0.48 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.49 
Adj. R 0.47 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.49 
F  135.45 
(0.000) 
123.41 
(0.000) 
110.72 
(0.000) 
110.98 
(0.000) 
110.90 
(0.000) 
127.98 
(0.000) 
120.07 
(0.000) 
113.82 
(0.000) 
Observations  602 598 598 598 598 598 598 598 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3-13: Corruption and Military in Politics: Panel Estimation: Sensitivity Analysis 
(II) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.26 
(8.93)* 
0.23 
(7.68)* 
0.15 
(3.44)* 
0.26 
(9.03)* 
0.20 
(6.96)* 
0.23 
(7.69)* 
0.37 
(6.50)* 
0.26 
(8.91)* 
0.26 
(9.82)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-10.98)* 
-0.000 
(-10.5)* 
-0.000 
(-10.11)* 
-0.000 
(-11.13)* 
-0.000 
(-11.82)* 
-0.000 
(-9.06)* 
-0.000 
(-6.48)* 
-0.000 
(-11.70)* 
-0.000 
(-12.75)* 
Government 
Spending 
-0.03 
(-3.90)* 
-0.03 
(-4.11)* 
-0.03 
(-3.09)* 
-0.03 
(-3.74)* 
-0.04 
(-5.08)* 
-0.024 
(-3.26)* 
-0.04 
(-3.11)* 
-0.03 
(-3.38)* 
-0.02 
(-2.98)* 
Openness 0.004 
(4.36)* 
0.004 
(4.33)* 
0.003 
(2.32)* 
0.004 
(4.70)* 
0.004 
(4.06)* 
0.004 
(4.08)* 
0.005 
(3.34)* 
0.003 
(3.89)* 
0.002 
(2.44)* 
Ethnic 
Tensions 
 -0.08 
(-2.61)* 
       
Military 
Spending 
  0.012 
(1.94)** 
      
Urbanization     0.000  
(1.86)*** 
     
Remittances     0.021 
(2.45)* 
    
HFI      -0.0004 
(-2.06)** 
   
Arm Trade       0.000 
(1.53) 
  
Inflation        0.0002 
(2.36)* 
 
Yr1993         -0.12 
(-1.04)* 
Yr1998         -0.06 
(-0.48) 
Yr2003         0.60 
(5.18)* 
Yr2007         0.92 
(7.86)* 
R 0.48 0.48 0.54 0.48 0.55 0.41 0.53 0.52 0.58 
Adj. R 0.47 0.48 0.53 0.47 0.54 0.40 0.52 0.52 0.57 
F  135.45 
(0.000) 
110.78 
(0.000) 
63.95 
(0.000) 
109.50 
(0.000) 
120.14 
(0.000) 
70.72 
(0.000) 
50.88 
(0.000) 
121.42 
(0.000) 
99.23 
(0.000) 
Observations  602 598 598 598 501 517 230 566 598 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3-14: Corruption and Military in Politics: Panel Estimation using Random Effects: 
Sensitivity Analysis (I) 
 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.24 
(7.36)* 
0.22 
(6.07)* 
0.26 
(7.83)* 
0.22 
(5.81)* 
0.22 
(6.50)* 
0.30 
(9.41)* 
0.16 
(4.70)* 
0.21 
(6.01)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-5.13)* 
-0.000 
(-5.52)* 
-0.000 
(-5.39)* 
-0.000 
(-5.13)* 
-0.000 
(-5.33)* 
-0.000 
(-7.41)* 
-0.000 
(-3.55)* 
-0.000 
(-4.98)* 
Government 
Spending 
-0.036 
(-4.25)* 
-0.036 
(-4.35)* 
-0.03 
(-3.66)* 
-0.04 
(-4.42)* 
-0.04 
(-4.56)* 
-0.03 
(-2.93)* 
-0.04 
(-4.52)* 
-0.04 
(-4.35)* 
Openness 0.006 
(5.36)* 
0.006 
(5.06) 
0.005 
(4.49)* 
0.007 
(5.54)* 
0.006 
(5.55)* 
0.004 
(3.24)* 
0.006 
(5.50)* 
0.006 
(5.43)* 
Democracy   -0.07 
(-2.03)** 
      
Government 
Stability 
  0.063 
(3.58)* 
     
Internal 
Conflict 
   -0.03 
(-1.63)*** 
    
External 
Conflict 
    -0.04 
(-2.02)** 
   
Investment 
Profiles 
     0.155 
(8.93)* 
  
Rule of Law        -0.22 
(-5.65)* 
 
Religion in 
Politics 
       -0.13 
(-3.18)* 
RB 0.53 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.54 
RO 0.45 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.46 
Observations  602 598 598 598 598 598 598 598 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3-15: Corruption and Military in Politics: Panel Estimation using Random Effects: 
Sensitivity Analysis (II) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.24 
(7.36)* 
0.22 
(6.21)* 
0.16 
(3.24)* 
0.24 
(7.38)* 
0.20 
(5.93)* 
0.25 
(7.52)* 
0.20 
(6.11)* 
0.23 
(6.77)* 
0.23 
(7.96)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-5.13)* 
-0.000 
(-4.84)* 
-0.000 
(-6.91)* 
-0.000 
(-5.29)* 
-0.000 
(-6.95)* 
-0.000 
(-5.73)* 
-0.000 
(-5.03)* 
-0.000 
(-3.86)* 
-0.000 
(-7.56)* 
Government 
Spending 
-0.036 
(-4.25)* 
-0.04 
(-4.59)* 
-0.04 
(-3.32)* 
-0.04 
(-4.13)* 
-0.04 
(-4.36)* 
-0.03 
(-3.29)* 
-0.03 
(-3.50)* 
-0.04 
(-4.32)* 
-0.02 
(-2.51)* 
Openness 0.006 
(5.36)* 
0.006 
(5.43)* 
0.004 
(2.93)* 
0.007 
(5.72)* 
0.006 
(4.71)* 
0.006 
(5.23)* 
0.005 
(4.44)* 
0.006 
(5.37)* 
0.002 
(1.65)*** 
Ethnic Tensions  -0.097 
(-2.65)* 
       
Military 
Spending 
  0.003 
(0.37) 
      
Urbanization     0.000  
(2.50)* 
     
Remittances     0.014 
(1.5) 
    
Inflation      0.000 
(1.68)*** 
   
HFI       -0.0002 
(-1.20) 
  
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
       -.05 
(-1.91)*** 
 
Yr1993         -0.15 
(-1.87)* 
Yr1998         -0.09 
(-1.12) 
Yr2003         0.54 
(6.53)* 
Yr2007         0.85 
(9.76)* 
RB 0.53 0.54 0.61 0.52 0.68 0.58 0.47 0.54 0.64 
RO 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.45 0.54 0.49 0.40 0.46 0.57 
Observations  602 598 598 598 501 566 517 598 598 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3-16: Corruption and Military in Politics: Panel Estimation using Alternative 
Techniques  
Variables  2SLS LIML GMM 
Military in 
Politics 
0.11 
(2.15)** 
0.14 
(2.75)* 
0.09 
(1.7)*** 
0.11 
(2.15)** 
0.14 
(2.75)* 
0.09 
(1.7)*** 
0.11 
(2.26)* 
0.14 
(2.93)* 
0.08 
(1.61)*** 
PCY -0.000 
(-7.62)* 
-0.000 
(-7.98)* 
-0.000 
(-5.11)* 
-0.000 
(-7.61)* 
-0.000 
(-7.98)* 
-0.000 
(-5.11)* 
-0.000 
(-7.37)* 
-0.000 
(-7.55)* 
-0.000 
(-5.18)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.19 
(-5.08)* 
-0.16 
(-3.83)* 
-0.13 
(-3.27)* 
-0.19 
(-5.08)* 
-0.16 
(-3.81)* 
-0.13 
(-3.27)* 
-0.20 
(-5.25)* 
-0.17 
(-4.13)* 
-0.13 
(-3.55)* 
Government 
Spending  
-.019 
(-1.7)*** 
-.020 
(-1.7)*** 
-.017 
(-1.6)*** 
-.019 
(-1.7)*** 
-.020 
(-1.7)*** 
-.017 
(-1.6)*** 
-.019 
(-1.8)*** 
-.019 
(-1.7)*** 
-.017 
(-1.7)*** 
Openness 0.001 
(1.66)*** 
0.002 
(1.62)*** 
0.002 
(1.7)*** 
0.001 
(1.66)*** 
0.002 
(1.62)*** 
0.002 
(1.73)*** 
0.002 
(1.48) 
0.002 
(1.40) 
0.002 
(1.61)*** 
Inflation   0.000 
(0.65) 
0.000 
(2.59)* 
 0.000 
(0.64) 
0.000 
(2.59)* 
 0.000 
(0.68) 
0.000 
(3.93)* 
Bureaucracy 
Quality  
  -0.24 
(-2.70) 
  -0.24 
(-2.69) 
  -0.24 
(-2.98) 
Sargan  0.83 
(0.36) 
0.98 
(0.32) 
1.28 
(0.53) 
0.84 
(0.36) 
0.99 
(0.32) 
1.28 
(0.53) 
   
Basmann 0.81 
(0.36) 
0.96 
(0.32) 
1.24 
(0.54) 
0.81 
(0.37) 
0.96 
(0.33) 
0.62 
(0.54) 
   
Hansen        0.66 
(0.42) 
0.85 
(0.36) 
1.44 
(0.49) 
Wald 382.38 
(0.000) 
417.02 
(0.000) 
453.13 
(0.000) 
382.386 
(0.000) 
416.96 
(0.000) 
457.05 
(0.000) 
375.88 
(0.000) 
418.20 
(0.000) 
482.54 
(0.000) 
R 0.53 0.57 0.60 0.53 0.57 0.60 0.53 0.57 0.60 
Observations  340 324 324 340 324 324 340 324 324 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3-17: Corruption and Military in Politics: Panel Estimation: System GMM 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption  
Military in 
Politics 
0.08 
(1.70)*** 
0.08 
(1.62)* 
0.096 
(2.06)** 
0.08 
(1.60)*** 
0.09 
(1.99)** 
.096 
(2.30)* 
0.10 
(2.42)* 
0.11 
(2.87)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-2.83)* 
-0.000 
(-2.70)* 
0.000 
(-4.06)* 
-0.000 
(-2.87)* 
-0.000 
(-3.68)* 
-0.000 
(-5.19)* 
-0.000 
(-5.73)* 
-0.000 
(-5.90)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.14 
(-3.52)* 
-0.04 
(-3.47)* 
-0.14 
(-3.66)* 
-0.15 
(-3.56)* 
-0.14 
(-3.72)* 
-0.11 
(-2.84)* 
-0.12 
(-3.34)* 
-0.11 
(-3.52)* 
Rule of Law -0.33 
(-6.55)* 
-0.006 
(-6.19)* 
-0.31 
(-6.36)* 
-0.31 
(-6.13)* 
-0.34 
(-6.4)* 
-0.29 
(-6.25)* 
-0.26 
(-5.67)* 
-0.29 
(-6.55)* 
Openness   0.001 
(0.89) 
   0.002 
(1.73)*** 
0.001 
(1.25) 
 
Inflation    0.000 
(0.65) 
   0.000 
(1.49) 
0.000 
(2.58)* 
Government 
Stability  
   0.069 
(1.95)** 
    
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
    0.11 
(2.05)** 
   
Government 
Spending 
     -0.019 
(-1.82)*** 
-0.017 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.017 
(-1.62)*** 
Urbanization         0.000 
(0.82) 
Yr1988 -1.14 
(-8.88)* 
-1.12 
(-8.29)* 
-1.19 
(-10.32)* 
-1.31 
(-9.16)* 
-1.19 
(-9.15)* 
-1.02 
(-7.27)* 
-1.05 
(-7.62)* 
-1.16 
(-10.70)* 
Yr1993 -1.24 
(-11.1)* 
-1.22 
(-10.19)* 
-1.25 
(-12.60)* 
-1.41 
(-10.24)* 
-1.26 
(-10.39)* 
-1.11 
(-9.59)* 
-1.12 
(-10.35)* 
-1.17 
(-12.68)* 
Yr1998 -0.86 
(-8.69)* 
-0.84 
(-7.80)* 
-0.88 
(-10.53)* 
-0.93 
(-8.64)* 
-0.84 
(-7.78)* 
-0.79 
(-8.80)* 
-0.84 
(-11.19)* 
-0.87 
(-12.11)* 
Yr2003 -0.31 
(-4.52)* 
-0.29 
(-4.30)* 
-0.32 
(-4.88)* 
-0.26 
(-3.82)* 
-0.29 
(-4.09)* 
-0.24 
(-4.94)* 
-0.29 
(-5.36)* 
-0.33 
(-6.20)* 
No of groups 114 129 127 126 129 130 128 128 
Instruments  63 64 64 64 54 65 75 65 
Wald stat 360.55 
(0.000) 
333.04 
(0.000) 
457.23 
(0.000) 
407.35 
(0.000) 
449.73 
(0.000) 
568.20 
(0.000) 
601.15 
(0.000) 
659.52 
(0.000) 
Hansen Diff 16.19 
(0.57) 
15.74 
(0.61) 
24.27 
(0.14) 
14.89 
(0.67) 
15.84 
(0.39) 
17.50 
(0.49) 
24.50 
(0.26) 
17.60 
(0.48) 
Observations  601 590 567 601 601 591 560 577 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix: 
Table: List of Countries 
1 Albania 41 Ethiopia 81 Mali 121 Sri Lanka 
2 Algeria 42 Finland 82 Malta 122 Sudan 
3 Angola 43 France 83 Mexico 123 Suriname 
4 Argentina 44 Gabon 84 Moldova 124 Sweden 
5 Armenia 45 Gambia 85 Mongolia 125 Switzerland 
6 Australia 46 Germany 86 Morocco 126 Syria 
7 Austria 47 Ghana 87 Mozambique 127 Taiwan 
8 Azerbaijan 48 Greece 88 Myanmar 128 Tanzania 
9 Bahamas 49 Guatemala 89 Namibia 129 Thailand 
10 Bahrain 50 Guinea 90 Netherlands 130 Togo 
11 Bangladesh 51 Guinea-Bissau 91 New Caledonia 131 Trinidad & Tobago 
12 Belarus 52 Guyana 92 New Zealand 132 Tunisia 
13 Belgium 53 Haiti 93 Nicaragua 133 Turkey 
14 Bolivia 54 Honduras 94 Niger 134 UAE 
15 Botswana 55 Hong Kong 95 Nigeria 135 Uganda 
16 Brazil 56 Hungary 96 Norway 136 Ukraine 
17 Brunei 57 Iceland 97 Oman 137 United Kingdom 
18 Bulgaria 58 India 98 Pakistan 138 United States 
19 Burkina Faso 59 Indonesia 99 Panama 139 Uruguay 
20 Cameroon 60 Iran 100 Papua N Guinea 140 USSR 
21 Canada 61 Iraq 101 Paraguay 141 Venezuela 
22 Chile 62 Ireland 102 Peru 142 Vietnam 
23 China 63 Israel 103 Philippines 143 West Germany 
24 Colombia 64 Italy 104 Poland 144 Yemen 
25 Congo 65 Jamaica 105 Portugal 145 Zambia 
26 Congo, DR 66 Japan 106 Qatar 146 Zimbabwe 
27 Costa Rica 67 Jordan 107 Romania 
28 Cote d'Ivoire 68 Kazakstan 108 Russia 
29 Croatia 69 Kenya 109 Saudi Arabia 
30 Cuba 70 Korea, DPR 110 Senegal 
31 Cyprus 71 Kuwait 111 Serbia  
32 Czech Republic 72 Latvia 112 Serbia & Monten 
33 Czechoslovakia 73 Lebanon 113 Sierra Leone 
34 Denmark 74 Liberia 114 Singapore 
35 Dominican Rep 75 Libya 115 Slovakia 
36 East Germany 76 Lithuania 116 Slovenia 
37 Ecuador 77 Luxembourg 117 Somalia 
38 Egypt 78 Madagascar 118 South Africa 
39 El Salvador 79 Malawi 119 South Korea 
40 Estonia 80 Malaysia 120 Spain 
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4. Corruption and Financial Intermediation in a Panel of 
Regions: Cross-Border Effects of Corruption 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Corruption is worse than prostitution. The latter might endanger the 
morals of an individual, the former invariably endangers the morale of 
the entire country- Karl Krauss 
 
In recent years, the wide spread prevalence of corruption across nations, particularly in 
developing countries, has attracted the attention of economists and policy makers. 
Understanding the significant effects of corruption on a country’s development process has 
motivated researchers to investigate why corruption exists and what determines its high degree 
of variation across countries. A number of empirical studies have recently identified a large set 
of causes of corruption such as economic, cultural, political and institutional aspects (see, for 
example, Treisman, 2000; Serra, 2006; Majeed and MacDonald, 2010). However, some of the 
channels of corruption still remain to be fully explored, such as the role of market 
imperfections for rent seeking and corrupt activities.  
 
For example, a lack of competition, in product and financial markets, fosters corruption 
because rent seeking activities increase in the absence of competition and such rent seeking 
activities are closely associated with corruption levels. Theoretical studies predict an 
ambiguous effects of competition on corruption. On the one hand, lack of competition 
generates rents (supra normal profits) for entrepreneurs, thereby motivating bureaucrats to ask 
for bribery (Foellmi and Oechslin (2007). On the other hand, the presence of these rents 
increases the values of monitoring the bureaucracy in a society (Ades and Di Tella (1999). 
 
This study focuses on the lack of competition in financial markets where lower levels of 
financial intermediation are taken to indicate underdeveloped financial systems. Foellmi and 
Oechslin (2007) argue that less developed financial systems strengthen economic elites and 
these economic elites can substantially oppose/hinder anti-corruption reforms if political 
power is concentrated in their hands. Boerner and Hainz (2009) predict an ambiguous 
relationship between financial sector reforms and corruption. Their results are conditional on 
the political weights of different groups and according to their model, financial sector reforms 
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can lower corruption only if the political influence of relatives (other groups) dominates over 
the political influence of corrupt officials.  
 
The motivation for testing the impact of financial intermediation on corruption is three fold. 
First, theoretical studies predict a relationship between financial reforms and corruption but to 
the best of our knowledge this relationship has not been tested. Second, theoretical studies 
predict ambiguous effects of financial reforms on corruption and this can only be clarified in 
an empirical setting. Third, theoretical studies indicate the importance of a threshold in 
shaping the link between corruption and financial reforms and again this can only be clarified 
in an empirical context. 
 
The existing literature on the causes of corruption explicitly or implicitly assumes that 
corruption is determined by country specific factors; in other words, corruption is independent 
of corruption in neighboring countries. However, in practice, neighboring countries share 
common political cultures and adopt similar institutions. These common political cultures are 
very close to corruption (see, for example, Hillman and Swank, 2000). In this study, we 
explicitly control for cross-country interdependence of corruption using a spatially weighted 
matrix.  
 
The motivation for spatial analysis of corruption is two fold. First, cultural reasons of 
corruption are closely related to cross country interdependence of corruption, as norms about 
corruption tolerance are more likely to spread to neighboring countries as compared to distant 
countries. Such interdependence of corruption implies that corruption levels may vary less 
within a region because of similar cultural reasons (for example, Paldam (2002) points out that 
corruption is mainly supported by cultural factors). Second, Becker et al. (2009) provide 
empirical evidence of cross country interdependence of corruption. 
 
In sum, this study has a number of unique and novel elements compared to extant work in this 
area. First, we believe that this is the first study that tests empirically the relationship between 
the financial intermediation and corruption. Second, this is also the first study to test for the 
presence of a threshold in shaping the link between corruption and financial development. 
Third, our study introduces the concept of regional panels in addition to cross sectional or 
cross country panels. Fourth, we introduce the concept of alternative lag lengths to trace out 
  110 
the repercussion effects of policy reforms in neighboring countries. Fifth, we model the role of 
spatially weighted corruption that takes account of the common political, cultural and regional 
factors and, sixth, we use a variety of econometric techniques to account for time dynamics 
and to control for the possible problem of endogeneity.  
 
This paper, specifically, adds to this emerging literature on corruption by addressing the 
following questions: (1) Does high financial intermediation reduce corruption?; (2) Is the 
relationship between high financial intermediation and corruption perhaps non-monotonic?; 
(3) Does spatial corruption matter in shaping the link? (4) Do past levels of corruption in 
neighboring countries matter for current corruption in home countries? (5) Do regional panels 
make difference in shaping the link?  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
relevant literature and Section 3 provides a discussion of the data. In Section 4 we present our 
modeling framework and our estimation methods, while in Section 5 our empirical findings 
are presented. Section 6 is our concluding section.  
 
4.2. Literature Review  
In the first part of this section we briefly review the relevant theoretical literature on the 
relationship between financial reforms and corruption, while in the second part we review 
empirical studies on contagion and corruption and then summarize our discussion in a flow 
chart.  
4.2.1. Review of theoretical studies on financial markets and corruption  
Mckinnon (1973) argues that the development of a capital market is “necessary and sufficient” 
to foster the “adoption of best-practice technologies and learning by doing.” In other words, 
limited access to credit markets restricts entrepreneurial development, thereby leaving more 
space for rent seeking and corrupt activities. In this study we extend this view and argue that 
the absence of well functioning local financial markets can limit the availability of funds 
through formal recourses and incite an individual to seek other viable options for finance, 
from, say, the informal economy where the margin for bribes and rent seeking activities is 
likely to be significant. 
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Ades and Di Tella (1999), provide further insights into the corruption-rent seeking 
mechanism. They present evidence that the level of rents in general, and market structure in 
particular, determine the intensity of corruption in an economy. They argue that variation in 
rent size, as a result of changes in competition, causes ambiguous effects on corruption: on the 
one hand, lower levels of competition provide opportunities to bureaucrats to extract more 
rents from the firms they control, while on the other hand, this situation also implies that it is 
more valuable for a society to avoid corruption and increase the accountability and monitoring 
of its bureaucracy. Thus, theoretically, the net impact of competition on corruption is 
ambiguous.  
 
Recently, Foellmi and Oechslin (2007) focus on the lack of competition in financial markets in 
shaping the theoretical relationship between rent and corruption. They build a general 
equilibrium model with credit market imperfections and heterogeneous agents to explain the 
causes and consequences of non-collusive corruption26. The model features two types of 
individuals: potential entrepreneurs and the officials and where the potential entrepreneurs are 
heterogeneous in terms of ex ante wealth, while officials do not have any ex ante wealth 
endowment. This model predicts that credit market imperfections generate rents for the 
incumbent entrepreneur and the availability of these rents leaves the margin for an official 
with discretionary power to ask for a bribe because he knows that the alternative viable 
investment options to the incumbent yield much lower returns. If sanctions against bribes are 
also imperfect then the rents may be partially extracted by corrupt officials. However, in the 
case of a well developed financial system (i.e. countries with (nearly) perfect markets) returns 
inequalities across investment projects are eroded and there is a disincentive for the incumbent 
to consider a bribe and therefore, a corrupt official will not seek bribes in such a situation, 
even though the probability of being detected and punished is low. Foellmi and Oechslin 
predict that financially developed economies tend to be less corrupt because rents are lower in 
these economies.  
 
Foellmi and Oechslin (2007) also derive the income distributional consequences from their 
model and predict that non-collusive corruption redistributes income from the entrepreneur 
(non officials) towards corrupt officials and also income is redistributed within the 
entrepreneurial group. The middle class losses (suffers) from more corruption while the 
                                                 
26
 Non-collusive corruption means additional cost on private business activity. 
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wealthy entrepreneurs are less affected or they even win. Paying bribes adversely affects the 
size of collateral and thus borrowing decreases and the individuals who lack collateral and rely 
on borrowing to finance investment projects of minimal size suffer, specifically when credit 
restrictions are more severe. Some of the members of the middle class will not consider 
becoming an entrepreneur as a viable option and may quit the market causing a decline in 
aggregate demand for capital, thereby decreasing the cost of capital. Larger borrowers benefit 
more from the lower cost of capital, because this benefit (i.e. the general equilibrium effect) is 
strong enough to outweigh the costs of bribes. The largest borrowers are more affluent 
because their ex ante wealth plays the role of collateral. Another implication of the crowding 
out effect is that it may reduce competition on the product market as well, thereby amplifying 
the distribution consequences among the entrepreneurs (non-officials). The distributional 
consequences of the model suggest that less developed financial systems (credit market 
imperfections) strengthen economic elites, thereby anti-corruption reforms can be substantially 
opposed/hindered if political power is concentrated in the hands of economic elites. 
 
Foellmi and Oechslin (2007) further argue that improving financial market conditions does not 
necessarily imply that the level of corruption will decline. If contract enforcement starts 
improving from a low level then initially corruption may rise and after reaching a certain 
threshold level of the contract enforcement it will fall. This happens because improving 
enforcement initially softens the borrowing constraints for entrepreneurs since higher capital 
demand does not affect the interest rate as the supply of capital is perfectly elastic. Other 
things equal, therefore, corrupt officials face bribe margins from an entrepreneur and therefore 
ask for higher bribes. Thereafter, improving contract enforcement no longer creates new 
entrepreneurs since the borrowing constraints have already been softened and the better 
enforcement increases the interest rate. These two effects work in opposite directions 
offsetting each other and the amount of bribes remains unchanged. Thereafter, further 
improvements in contract enforcement reduce optimal bribes because now entrepreneurship is 
not a viable option and becoming a lender is more attractive. In this situation, individuals have 
an incentive to take advantage of investing opportunities with higher returns outside their own 
firms.  
 
Recently, Boerner and Hainz (2009) also provide a theoretical link between financial reforms 
and persistent corruption using a probabilistic voting model. The basic proposition of their 
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model is that corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to get lucrative positions in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy. In the presence of imperfect credit market, the corrupt officials arrange 
part of their finances from the informal market using personal connections, such as relatives. 
In doing so, they in fact give a stake in corruption to their relatives. This unproductive 
investment is viable for the relatives because economic opportunities are scarce and it implies 
that the stake-holders (the creditors) are likely to oppose anti-corruption reforms because they 
finance corrupt incumbent officials in view of a share in prospective rents.  
 
If credit market imperfections are lower and the financial sector is liberalized then all citizens 
have access to loans. In the presence of wider opportunities for loans, corrupt officials can 
finance their entry fee through financial market instead of relatives and in the presence of a 
developed financial system, support for anti-corruption policies is the likely outcome. 
 
The analysis of Boerner and Hainz shows that economic and financial reforms generate 
investment opportunities in productive sectors. These opportunities play an important role in 
shaping the political preferences of agents that, in turn, support the fight against corruption. 
While in the absence of these reforms, and thus the absence of productive investment 
opportunities, the rational agents tend to invest in unproductive corrupt activities by financing 
entry fees. Consequently, both corrupt officials and their financers do not support socially 
beneficial political initiatives to abolish unproductive activities. Thus, the political success of 
anti-corruption policies depends on economic and financial liberalization. The Boerner and 
Hainz study predicts unambiguous results in the case of reforms of the real sector because 
these reforms promote entrepreneurship in productive sectors. However, in the case of reforms 
of the financial sector the study provides ambiguous results since the results are conditional on 
the political weights of different groups. If the political influence of relatives dominates over 
the political influence of corrupt officials then financial sector reforms unambiguously help to 
fight against corruption. 
 
The ambiguous theoretical predictions of the link between financial sector reforms and 
corruption in the above studies, and the possible presence of a threshold level, can only be 
confirmed or rejected by an empirical test. That is what we attempt to do in this study.  
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4.2.2 Corruption and contagion  
The existing literature on the causes of corruption is mainly based on the assumption that 
corruption is a country specific phenomenon and the prevalence of corruption in a country is 
independent of the prevalence of corruption in adjacent countries. However, some recent 
studies have pointed out that institutions in neighboring countries are similar and the similarity 
of these institutions breeds a similar pattern of political culture and this political culture is 
closely associated with levels of corruption (Becker et al (2009); Hillman and Swank, 2000) 
 
In order to support the argument of so-called contagion corruption, a number of justifications 
are noted here. First, interdependence of cross country business has increased in recent years 
and norms about corruption are more likely to shift from one country to another due to 
learning and peer-group behaviour (see, for example, Fisman and Miguel, 2007, 2008). 
Second, corruption also spreads due to a demonstration effect; for example, existing levels of 
corruption in a country induce foreigners to get involved in corruption as well (see, for 
example, Goel and Nelson, 2007, for evidence of contagion corruption across US states). 
Third, recently curbing global corruption has been put on the agenda of international 
organizations such as the UNO, World Bank, IMF and WTO and they are now attempting to 
propagating corruption free societies. Fourth, corruption norms are spreading across borders 
because the awareness of individuals about corruption is increasing due to increased 
corruption surveys and its portrayal in the media. This can also propagate (non-) corrupt 
behaviour across countries. A flow chart, given below, summarizes the above discussion.  
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4.2.3 Description of channels through which corruption becomes contagion                                                                                
Contagion Effects of Corruption 
Fisman and Miguel (2007, 2008); Goel and Nelson (2007); 
Becker et al. (2009) 
                      
                                                                                                                                                                                      
                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
       
                                                                                                               
                                                        
            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
4.3. Data Description  
 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index and corruption perception 
index (CPI) by Transparency International are both used in corruption studies. We prefer to 
use the ICRG, since most previous studies use it and the index covers a large number of 
countries and a long period of time. The ICRG also has a high correlation with other indices 
that have been used in the literature, such as the Transparency International and Business 
International (see Treisman, 2000; Majeed and Macdonald (2010) for more details) indices27. 
We also use alternative corruption indices as a robustness check. The other variables used in 
this study are reported in Table 1. We average the data over a 5-year non-overlapping period, 
1984-2007. In this way we have five observations, in most instances, for all of the countries in 
our sample. The 5 year average periods are: 1984-88, 1989-93, 1994-98, 1999-03, 2004-07.  
 
                                                 
27
 Recently, Majeed and Macdonald (2010) show a correlation between these alternative corruption indices over 
the period 1996-2007. They show that the correlation between ICRG and TI corruption indices is 0.87, while the 
correlation between ICRG and World Bank (WB)’s corruption indices is 0.88. Finally, their study shows a very 
high correlation, 0.98, between TI and WB. These high correlations indicate that these alternative corruption 
indices are consistent, even though they are based on a subjective rating. 
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We introduce the concept of regional panels in the following way. We calculate the average of 
a variable of interest for all countries in a specific region, such as East Asia and Pacific (EAP), 
for a specific year, such as the initial year of data, 1984. In this way we average all of the 
variables for all regions. In order to account for time dynamics within a region, we repeat our 
averaging exercise for each year until 2007. We have nine regions in total: East Asia & 
Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa, 
South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Australia-Oceania, and North America. To the best 
of our knowledge this is the first study using panel data that introduces an entirely different 
method of data analysis. This innovative exercise of regional panels has several advantages. 
First, it serves as a robustness check. Second, it does not assume that cross country corruption 
(within a region) is independent. Third, it takes account of the time element in the data. 
Fourth, cultural, political and institutional similarities within a region are better captured by 
using regional panels. 
 
4.4. Model  
The theoretical formation of a model for this study relies on Becker (1968)’s seminal work 
where individuals make rational choices by giving weights to relative costs and benefits of an 
illegal (corrupt) activity. These costs and benefits depend on exogenous factors that, in turn, 
depend on the role of market structure and the socio-cultural environment. The socio-cultural 
environment is developed by historical, legal, political, regional and country-specific factors. 
This study takes into account all of these factors for an empirical analysis. The specified 
standard corruption equation is given as follows: 
ittitititititit XFIPCYC ενµβββα ++++++= 321 ,     (1) 
where (i= 1… N; t=1…     T), Cit is a perceived corruption index, PCYit is per capita income to 
measure the level of economic development, FIit represents the degree of financial 
intermediation, Xit represents a set of control variables based on the existing corruption 
literature, ui is a country specific unobservable effect, vt is a time specific factor and εit is an 
i.i.d. disturbance term. The expected sign for the key parameter of interest, β2, is negative. 
In addition to the other terms contained in equation 1, equation 2 includes a non-linear term 
for financial intermediation (FI2) to facilitate an assessment of the possible presence of a 
threshold level of financial intermediation. Now the expected sign for β2 is positive while it is 
negative for β3. 
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ittititititititit XFIFIPCYC ενµββββα +++++++= 42321 …..….………..…….…. (2) 
 
 
 
Equation 3 includes another key determinant of corruption, the military in politics (MP), that 
has recently been introduced by Majeed and MacDonald (2010). The authors suggest that the 
explanatory power of the military in politics is at least as important as the conventionally 
accepted causes of corruption, such as economic development. The expected sign of the 
parameter on MP, β4, is negative. 
 
ittitititititititit XMPFIFIPCYC ενµβββββα ++++++++= 542321 ……………..... (3) 
 
In a very recent paper Becker et al. (2009) estimate cross country interdependence of 
corruption as a key variable of concern for 123 economies and provide significant evidence of 
contagious corruption. Our study evaluates financial liberalization and the contagion nature of 
corruption by using standard corruption equations and following an econometric model set out 
in Becker at el. (2009). While taking account of the contagion nature of corruption we differ 
from Becker at el. (2009) by considering alternative lag lengths of contagious corruption. We 
introduce 5, 10, 15 and 20 year lags in order to assess the lag nature of spatial corruption so 
that policy makers can effectively devise anti-corruption polices by taking account of beggar 
thy neighbor polices affecting the optimality of domestic policy initiatives. Becker et al. 
(2009) use conventional control variables of corruption while we use new measures of 
corruption, such as the military in politics. In addition, we also consider contagious corruption 
as a robustness check for our main variable of concern, financial intermediation. 
 
Controlling for cross-country interdependence requires a suitable econometric model. One 
class of models that supports such interdependence is a spatial econometric model. The term 
has its origins in geographical statistics which in the past was the main application for such 
methods. However, in recent years, economists have discovered potential merits of such 
methods to analyze interdependence brought about by general equilibrium effects. Put 
differently, spatial econometrics involves the development of methods and statistical tools for 
the analysis of spatial interactions (spatial auto correlation), learning effects, externalities, 
spillovers and spatial structure (especially heterogeneity).  
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The key difference between spatial econometrics and traditional econometrics is that the 
former addresses a locational component. Two issues arise from such a component: the first is 
the existence of spatial dependence between observations and the second is the occurrence of 
spatial heterogeneity in the relationship. Traditional econometrics largely ignores such issues 
but they violate the traditional Gauss-Markov assumptions used in regression modeling. For 
example, one assumption in the Gauss-Markov framework is that the explanatory variables 
remain fixed in repeated sampling but spatial dependence violates this assumption, as does the 
assumption that a single line relationship exists across the sample data observations (Lesage, 
1998).  
 
In order to analyze the notion of interdependence across countries, spatial econometric models 
need an assumption regarding the nature of the interdependence. In applied research, 
researchers normally assume that interdependence is associated with space and geography and 
that interdependence is positively related to adjacency and negatively related to distance. 
Although there are many ways to model adjacency interdependence econometrically, here we 
consider two forms (following Becker et al., 2009), and these are spatial lags and spatially 
autoregressive residuals. The exclusion of significant spatial dependence in the residuals 
produces inefficient parameter estimates. Similarly the exclusion of related spatial lags yields 
inconsistent parameter estimates. In the context of our analysis, taking account of spatial lags 
implies that corruption in some country i depends on the corruption in j countries. Put 
differently, the level of corruption in country i is an adjacency (or inverse-distance-related) 
function of corruption in other countries. Similarly, another implication in our context is that 
the disturbance term of country i depends on the disturbance terms of other economies. In 
other words, country i’s disturbance term is an adjacency (or inverse-distance-related) function 
of other countries, disturbances. The model can be specified as follows:  
 
j
N
j ijiij
N
j iji wpXcwc µµµβλα ∑∑ == =+++= 11 ;  ,……….. (4)                                                          
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where ci stands for corruption in country i, and wij is an adjacency-related weight. The wij has 
two properties that are, ∑
=
=
N
j ijw1 1 and wii =0,
28
 and xi is a 1× K vector of covariates. The 
greek letters α, λ, and β refer to unknown parameters that require to be estimated. α is an 
intercept while β is a K ×1 parameter vector for the covariates collected in xi. Two parameter, 
λ and ρ, measure the intensity (strength) of interdependence, where λ denotes the spatial lag 
and ρ represents the spatial correlation in the residuals. In our analysis, we focus mainly on the 
spatial lag parameter λ since interdependence in terms of observable characteristics appears of 
more concern to economists and policy makers than interdependence in the disturbances. 
Finally, µ i is the overall (spatially correlated) disturbance term and vi is the remaining 
disturbance term which is independently (but not necessarily identically) distributed across all 
countries i. 
 
4.5. Results and Interpretation  
 
Table 4-1 provides our base line results for the effect of financial liberalization on corruption 
for a cross section of 120 economies. All columns of the table indicate that the impact of high 
financial intermediation (FI) on corruption is negative and significant. The estimated 
coefficient on financial Intermediation is remarkably robust and its size remains 0.001 in all 
the regressions. This finding implies that a one standard deviation increase in FI is associated 
with a decrease in corruption of 0.20 points, or 16 percent of a standard deviation in the 
corruption index. All other variables in the regressions turn out to be significant with the 
expected signs and the overall fit of the model is good. 
 
The effect of economic development is consistently negative and significant in all regressions 
in this table, and in subsequent tables, which implies that countries at the bottom of the ladder 
of economic development tend to be more corrupt. This happens because poor countries 
generate minimal wealth effects for average citizens and lower incomes create structural 
incentives for corrupt behaviour. Conversely, countries at the upper end of the ladder of 
economic development tend to be less corrupt because the discount rates (differential levels of 
                                                 
28
 For adjacency weights, we develop a country-by-country matrix using unitary values for countries share 
common land borders and zero otherwise. According to this rule islands do not have neighbors and also country-
pairs with a common border that is not on land do not have a border, accordingly. The normalization divides all 
unitary entries by the sum of all neighbors for each country (Becker et al., 2009).  
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impatience across economic agents) of potential bribe takers and givers are lower in rich 
nations, thereby making them less eager to jump the queue via illegal ways. In addition, 
opportunity cost of punishment is also higher for wealthy individuals. Economic freedom and 
rule of law are negatively and significantly associated with corruption levels. A greater degree 
of economic freedom and a strong hold of law discourage corruption prone activities because 
economic freedom promotes productive business activities and similarly a strong rule of law 
discourages bureaucrats to ask for bribes. Furthermore, greater economic freedom implies a 
free flow of market forces and lesser government controls thereby less opportunities for rent 
seeking by government officials.  
 
Table 4-2 replicates the results of Table 4-1 using alternative corruption indices and, again, the 
estimated coefficients for FI are significant in all columns and of the expected signs. This 
means the relationship between financial intermediation and corruption levels is negative, 
irrespective of which corruption index is being used for estimation. Columns 2-5 show 
parameter estimates using the Transparency International corruption index, while column 6-8 
represents parameter estimates drawn using World Bank corruption index. Parameter 
estimates for other control variables are similar to the results of Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-3 replicates the benchmark findings using additional control variables and the 
benchmark findings turn out to be consistent to the addition of these control variables. The 
coefficient on FI remains robustly negative and significant at -0.001. Among the additional 
control variables - democracy, military in politics and military spending – all are significant 
with the correct signs. This analysis shows that democracy turns out to be most significant 
additional control variable, followed by military related variables. We believe that it is now 
widely accepted that corruption is rooted in various forms of political deficiencies. An 
established democracy promotes political competition, transparency and accountability (to the 
voter), thereby reducing corruption. To address this we can either control for military 
expenditures or for the role of the military in politics and both turn out to be negative and 
significant, and this finding is consistent with Majeed and MacDonald, 2010. The involvement 
of military in politics engenders corruption because military is not elected by any one and 
accountability of the military elites is limited (see for further details Majeed and MacDonald, 
2010).   
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Table 4-4 replicates the findings of Table 4-1 while controlling for regional dummies. The 
coefficient on FI, 0.001, remains robustly negative and the level of significance slightly 
improves. The last column of the table indicates that all of the regional dummies are positive 
and significant, implying that regional factors are important in explaining corruption. 
 
Table 4-5 provides the results for the benchmark model using a panel of nine regions: East 
Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Lat America & Caribbean, Middle East & North 
Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Australia-Oceania, and North America. In 
absolute terms, the estimated coefficient on FI improves from 0.001 to 0.002 and the level of 
significance also improves as well. This finding implies that a one standard deviation increase 
in FI is associated with a decrease in corruption of 0.40 points.  
 
Table 4-6 replicates the results of Table 4-5, using alternative econometric techniques and 
controlling for the issue of endogeneity. The estimated coefficients for FI are again significant 
in all columns and of the expected signs. In this study we develop regional panels that differ in 
two ways from cross country panels. First, each region comprises an annual observation to 
take account of time dynamics. Second, countries within a region share borders that capture 
the contagious nature of corruption (meaning that cross country corruption is not 
independent). Following the theory of contagion effects of corruption, the identification of a 
country is not of such importance as the identity of a region and the time element. It is 
noteworthy that the quality of the results improves in a regional panel in terms of the level of 
significance, the size of coefficients and direction of effects compared to all other ways of data 
analysis. 
 
Table 4-7 contains estimates of the benchmark model using a panel of 146 economies. This 
shows that our benchmark findings are robust and the size of the estimated coefficient on FI is 
0.0004 implying that a one standard deviation increase in FI reduces corruption by 0.08 points. 
Findings for other control variables remain unaffected and the overall results seem to improve 
in a panel setting. The effect of government spending is significant with negative signs, 
implying that a larger government may spend more money to strengthen check and balances 
on corrupt activities. 
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Table 4-8 contains a sensitivity analysis for FI and corruption in a panel setting. Here we 
employ eleven additional control variables and find that FI is robustly significant in explaining 
corruption: the coefficient on FI fluctuates between 0.0004 and 0.0005 in all of the 
regressions. In the table the most significant additional control variables turn out to be 
inflation, openness, democracy and the military in politics. The effect of inflation is positive 
because inflation is an indicator of macroeconomic instability. Our results here are consistent 
with Paldam, 2002; Majeed and MacDonald, 2010.  
 
Table 4-9 contains further results for the benchmark model using a panel of 146 countries with 
additional control variables. The results indicate that investment profile is the most significant 
factor in this sensitivity analysis. We also control for time dummies and our results remain 
robust. In sum, we infer two points from the results displayed in Table 4-8 and Table 4-9: (1) 
our benchmark finding remains robust; (2) the parameter estimates drawn from additional 
control variables are similar to the prediction of the existing literature on the causes of 
corruption. 
 
In Table 4-10 and Table 4-11 we re-estimate our benchmark model using a random effects 
estimator. Our main variable of interest, FI, is still significant with a negative sign, although 
the size of coefficient drops slightly. Our main control variables - economic development, 
economic freedom, rule of law and government spending - are the same in terms of the level 
of significance and direction of effect. In our sensitivity analysis we include thirteen additional 
control variables, other than four time dummies and six regional dummies. Among the 
additional control variables military in politics is consistently positive and significant in 
increasing corruption. All other control variables are robust in terms of signs; however, some 
of them decrease or increase in terms of the level of significance. For example, inflation drops 
in significance, while investment profile increases in significance. 
 
Table 4-12 contains estimates of the benchmark model using a systems GMM estimator. 
Using this technique our results improve in terms of the level of significance and remain the 
same in terms of the direction of effect. The coefficient on FI is 0.0004 in all of the regression 
and this implies that a one standard deviation increase in FI reduces corruption by 0.08 points. 
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Table 4-13 reports results for a sub sample of developing counties and our benchmark findings 
turn out to be confirmed in this sample as well. The estimated coefficient on FI is consistently 
0.001 in all columns of the table which implies that a one standard deviation increase in FI is 
associated with a decrease in corruption of 0.20 points, or 16 percent of a standard deviation in 
the corruption index. 
 
We also test for the presence of a threshold in the relationship between FI and corruption for a 
cross section of 116 countries using alternative corruption indices. The parameter estimates for 
FI and FI2 indicate the presence of a threshold (Table 4-14). This implies that high financial 
intermediation is beneficial only up to a threshold level and after the threshold is reached 
corruption increases. This finding contradicts that of Foellmi and Oechslin (2007) who predict 
the opposite, that initially high financial liberalization increases corruption and after a certain 
threshold level is reached it decreases corruption. There argument is that at an initial phase of 
financial liberalization interest rate remains the same due to an elastic supply of capital and 
this leaves a margin for bribe paying. However, over time the interest rate rises and the margin 
for bribe paying vanishes. 
 
The following arguments can help in understanding the empirical finding of a U-shaped 
relationship between financial development and corruption. First, this might explain the fact 
that more competition (high financial development) reduces the value of accountability and 
monitoring of bureaucracy by the citizens as suggested by Ades and Di Tella (1999), thereby 
increasing corruption levels. Second, support for anti-corruption policies is likely to decrease, 
if political influence of corrupt bureaucrats dominates at higher levels of financial 
development as suggested by Boerner and Hainz (2009). Third, financial development may 
create opportunities for corruption in the absence of check and balances on excessive 
liberalising financial markets. For instance, in European economies a recent spike in 
corruption perceptions is partially blamed to excessive financial liberalisation. According to 
Euro barometer (2009), “What could be causing the overall increase in the perceptions about 
corruption that we have seen? Another factor that may be influencing opinion is the continuing 
economic impact of the global financial crisis.” 
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Ours is the first study that attempts to provide an empirical understanding of threshold in view 
of conflicting predictions of threshold theoretical studies. A comprehensive understanding of 
the threshold effects of financial reforms on corruption requires further theoretical and 
empirical work. One possible reason for this non-monotonic relationship between FI and 
corruption could be that financial reforms with out regulation may become negative for the 
economy after a certain point.  
 
Table 4-15 provides a set of results in which the most/least corrupt nations have been 
excluded. Specifically, in columns 3-4 we exclude the most clean countries, while in columns 
5-6 we exclude the most corrupt nations. The results of Table 4-15 demonstrate that our 
benchmark findings remain consistent. 
 
Finally, in Table 4-16 and Table 4-17 we provide a set of results that take account of the 
contagion effects of corruption. The purpose of incorporating contagion effects is threefold. 
First, to test whether spatial affects matter. Second, to check whether our bench-mark findings 
are consistent and, third, to test the lag length of contagion effects. Our results show that 
contagion effects persist and affect corruption levels significantly and our benchmark findings 
prove to be consistent and robust. The estimated coefficient on FI is consistently 0.001 in all 
the regressions. The estimated coefficient on the spatial index is about 0.2, which implies that 
a policy that reduces corruption by one standard deviation in the home country will reduce 
corruption by 0.114 in the neighboring country. 
 
In order to assess the lag nature of the spatial corruption phenomenon, we introduce 5, 10 
year, 15 year and 20 year lags of spatially weighted corruption, respectively. Although each 
lag length is significant in explaining corruption but we infer that the most effective lag length 
is 5 to 10 years because models with other lag lengths do not perform well as the level of 
economic development becomes insignificant. First column of the table shows that estimated 
coefficient on contagion effects is 0.21 which implies that a policy in neighboring country that 
reduces corruption one standard deviation in past five to ten years will reduce corruption in the 
home country by 0.12 points. 
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4.6. Conclusion  
 
In recent years, international organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the UNO 
have set the elimination of corruption as their prime goal. Additionally, regional organizations 
and domestic governments have advocated and devised anti corruption policies. According to 
the Global Corruption Barometer (2010) “corruption has increased over the last three years 
say six out of 10 people around the world, and one in four people report paying bribes in the 
last year”29. The literature has identified a large number of factors that cause corruption, such 
as economic, political, cultural and institutional aspects. Although some of the determinants of 
corruption are inconclusive, a consensus is slowly emerging on the key causes of corruption. 
For instance Serra (2006) identifies economic development, democracy, and political stability 
as important causes of corruption. Our study differs from existing studies on the causes of 
corruption by empirically analyzing the importance of financial market imperfections for cross 
country variations of corruption levels. 
 
The importance of financial market liberalization in combating corruption has been 
highlighted in the theoretical literature but no one has tested this relationship in an empirical 
settings. This study contributes to the existing literature on the causes of corruption by 
introducing the linear and non-monotonic relationship of corruption and financial 
liberalization. By drawing on a large cross sectional, country panels and regional panel data 
sets over a long period of time (1984-2007), our analysis finds substantial support for a 
negative relationship between financial intermediation and corruption. The results imply that a 
one standard deviation increase in financial liberalization is associated with a decrease in 
corruption of 0.20 points, or 16 percent of a standard deviation in the corruption index. Our 
findings are consistent with respect to a number of robustness checks, including incorporating 
contagion effects alternative corruption indices and regional dynamics. 
 
Finally, the existing literature on corruption assumes that the prevalence of corruption is 
determined by country specific factors. Nonetheless, some studies point to corruption as being 
interdependent across bordering countries and it is a common characteristic of low income 
countries. For example, Rowley (2000) argues that a common political culture in Africa 
caused corruption to be the norm in these countries. We also contribute to this part of the 
                                                 
29
 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2010 
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literature by evaluating the different lag lengths of contagious corruption. Our results show 
that a policy in a neighboring country that reduces corruption by one standard deviation in the 
past five to ten years will reduce corruption in the home country by 0.12 points. 
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Table 4-1: Corruption and Financial Intermediation (FI): Cross Section (CS) Estimation 
Variables Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.004 
(-4.38)* 
-0.001 
(-1.75)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.66)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.78)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.72)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.68)*** 
PCY  -0.000 
(-8.18)* 
-0.000 
(-6.18)* 
-0.000 
(-5.25)* 
-0.000 
(-2.62)* 
-0.000 
(-2.73)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
  -0.23 
(-5.33)* 
-0.22 
(-5.41)* 
-0.19 
(-4.58)* 
-0.19 
(-4.55)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
   -0.025 
(-2.18)** 
-0.011 
(-0.95) 
- 
Rule of Law     -0.32 
(-4.32)* 
-0.35 
(-4.90)* 
R 0.14 0.45 0.55 0.57 0.63 0.63 
Adj. R 0.13 0.44 0.54 0.55 0.62 0.62 
F  19.16 
(0.000) 
47.96 
(0.000) 
46.79 
(0.000) 
36.71 
(0.000) 
37.73 
(0.000) 
48.18 
(0.000) 
Observations  120 120 120 120 120 120 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-2: Corruption and FI: CS Estimation: Alternative Corruption Indices 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption Index by 
Transparency International (TI) 
Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Index by World Bank (WB) 
FI -0.02 
(-9.47)* 
-0.004 
(-2.49)* 
-0.004 
(-2.45)* 
-0.002 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.01 
(-9.53)* 
-0.002 
(-2.69)* 
-0.001 
(-1.72)* 
PCY  -0.000 
(-10.55)* 
-0.000 
(-9.86)* 
-0.000 
(-8.22)* 
 -0.000 
(-9.70)* 
-0.000 
(-7.15)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
 -0.3 
(-4.88)* 
-0.27 
(-2.38)* 
-0.28 
(-4.87)* 
 -0.18 
(-6.64)* 
-0.18 
(-7.18)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
  -.05 
(-2.62)* 
-.02 
(-1.18) 
  -.01 
(-1.09) 
Rule of Law    -0.4 
(-4.22)* 
  -0.21 
(-5.03)* 
R 0.44 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.43 0.78 0.83 
F  89.66 
(0.000) 
129.12 
(0.000) 
100.47 
 (0.000) 
96.44 
(0.000) 
90.91 
(0.000) 
134.55 
(0.000) 
108.09 
(0.000) 
Observations  118 115 113 113 121 118 116 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-3: Corruption and FI: CS Estimation: Sensitivity Analysis 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.001 
(1.72)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.57)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.73)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.73)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.77)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.87)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.6)*** 
PCY -0.000 
(-2.62)* 
-0.000 
(-3.09)* 
-0.000 
(-2.66)* 
-0.000 
(-2.72)* 
-0.000 
(-3.36)* 
-0.000 
(-3.21)* 
-0.000 
(-4.62)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.19 
(-4.58)* 
-0.18 
(-4.39)* 
-0.18 
(-4.49)* 
-0.18 
(-4.50)* 
- - - 
Rule of Law -0.32 
(-4.32)* 
-0.31 
(-4.39) 
-0.36 
(-4.95)* 
-0.34 
(-4.90)* 
-0.29 
(-4.22)* 
-0.32 
(-3.56)* 
-0.37 
(-5.20)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
-0.011 
(-0.95)* 
      
Inflation   0.0004 
(1.19) 
     
Trade 
Openness 
  0.001 
(0.83) 
    
Urbanization     0.000 
(0.42) 
   
Democracy      -0.28 
(-5.61)* 
  
Military in 
Politics 
     0.117 
(1.95)** 
 
Military 
Expenditures 
      0.05 
(2.03)** 
R 0.14 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.58 0.62 
Adj. R 0.13 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.57 0.61 
F  19.16 
(0.000) 
40.67 
(0.000) 
38.58 
(0.000) 
38.58 
(0.000) 
56.27 
(0.000) 
40.21 
(0.000) 
43.96 
(0.000) 
Observations  120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-4: Corruption and FI: CS Estimation: Regional effects 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.001 
(-2.99)* 
-0.001 
(-2.21)* 
-0.001 
(-1.96)** 
-0.001 
(-2.46)* 
-0.001 
(-2.41)* 
-0.001 
(-2.32)* 
-0.001 
(-2.16)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-2.13)* 
-0.000 
(-1.47) 
-0.000 
(-1.49) 
-0.000 
(-
1.73)*** 
-0.000 
(-
1.73)*** 
-0.000 
(-
1.61)*** 
-0.000 
(-1.5) 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.18 
(-4.41)* 
-0.18 
(-4.49)* 
-0.21 
(-4.41)* 
-0.18 
(-3.69)* 
-0.18 
(-3.71)* 
-0.17 
(-3.20)* 
-0.18 
(-3.54)* 
Rule of Law -0.35 
(-4.56)* 
-0.42 
(-5.84)* 
-0.38 
(-4.60)* 
-0.40 
(-4.69)* 
-0.40 
(-4.57)* 
-0.37 
(-4.31)* 
-0.37 
(-4.32)* 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
0.024 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.55) 
0.12 
(0.63) 
0.20 
(1.07) 
0.21 
(1.10) 
0.35 
(1.30) 
0.69 
(2.41)* 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
 0.62 
(3.21)* 
0.65 
(3.25)* 
0.70 
(3.51)* 
0.72 
(3.52)* 
0.86 
(2.97)* 
1.17 
(4.32)* 
Lat America 
& Caribbean 
  0.24 
(1.25) 
0.23 
(1.23) 
0.25 
(1.30) 
0.41 
(1.49) 
0.78 
(2.56)* 
Middle East 
& North 
Africa 
   0.28 
(1.52) 
0.28 
(1.55) 
0.44 
(1.62)*** 
0.76 
(2.80)* 
South Asia 
 
    0.13 
(0.40) 
0.32 
(0.80) 
0.68 
(1.64)*** 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
     0.22 
(0.80) 
0.56 
(2.02)* 
Europe        0.51 
(1.94)** 
R 0.63 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 
F  34.52 
(0.000) 
34.28 
 (0.000) 
30.61 
(0.000) 
27.68 
(0.000) 
24.69 
(0.000) 
22.45 
(0.000) 
19.83 
(0.000) 
Observations  118 118 118 118 118 118 118 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-5: Corruption and FI: Regional Panel Estimation  
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.004 
(-9.92)* 
-0.001 
(-3.71)* 
-0.002 
(-7.15)* 
-0.002 
(-7.16)* 
-0.002 
(-7.00)* 
-0.002 
(-6.77)* 
-0.002 
(-6.70)* 
-0.002 
(-7.31)* 
PCY  -0.000 
(-4.22)* 
-0.000 
(-3.40)* 
-0.000 
(-2.72)* 
-0.000 
(-3.51)* 
-0.000 
(-6.79)* 
-0.000 
(-2.35)* 
-0.000 
(-3.77)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
 -.04 
(-3.13)* 
-.05 
(-4.97)* 
-.04 
(-3.57)* 
-.03 
(-3.5)* 
-.04 
(-3.97)* 
-.05 
(-5.59)* 
-.05 
(-5.28)* 
Rule of Law  0.4 
(7.15)* 
-0.44 
(-10.12)* 
-0.27 
(-4.97)* 
-0.63 
(-15.25)* 
-0.49 
(-
12.53)* 
-0.35 
(-6.90)* 
-0.3 
(-3.30)* 
Trade 
Openness  
  0.01 
(12.29)* 
0.01 
(11.43)* 
0.01 
(10.01)* 
0.01 
(10.49)* 
0.01 
(8.89)* 
0.02 
(11.29)* 
Military in 
Politics 
   0.26 
(4.67)* 
    
Govt. 
Stability  
    0.17 
(9.64)* 
   
Investment 
Profile 
     0.115 
(7.72)* 
  
Democracy        0.17 
(3.56)* 
 
Internal 
conflict 
       -0.08 
(1.7)*** 
R 0.32 0.75 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.86 0.86 
F  98.40 
(0.000) 
159.96 
(0.000) 
249.58 
(0.000) 
232.28 
(0.000) 
314.99 
(0.000) 
276.19 
(0.000) 
221.70 
(0.000) 
210.43 
(0.000) 
Observations  216 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-6: Corruption and FI: Regional Panel: Alternative Econometrics Techniques 
Variables Dependent Variable: Corruption 
 2SLS LIML GMM 
FI -0.002 
(-6.93)* 
-0.002 
(-7.00)* 
-0.002 
(-6.42)* 
-0.002 
(-6.31)* 
-0.002 
(-6.42)* 
-0.002 
(-6.31)* 
-0.002 
(-10.63)* 
-0.002 
(-11.74)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-3.55)** 
-0.000 
(-2.90)* 
-0.000 
(-2.50)* 
-0.000 
(-6.72)* 
-0.000 
(-2.50)* 
-0.000 
(-6.71)* 
-0.000 
(-2.22)** 
-0.000 
(-6.81)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
-.05 
(-4.31)* 
-.03 
(-2.81)* 
-.06 
(-5.03)* 
-.03 
(-3.04)* 
-.06 
(-5.03)* 
-.03 
(-3.03)* 
-.06 
(-5.71)* 
-.03 
(-3.32)* 
Rule of Law -0.39 
(-7.67)* 
-0.20 
(-3.31)* 
-0.28 
(-4.91)* 
-0.46 
(-10.6)* 
-0.28 
(-4.89)* 
-0.46 
(-10.6)* 
-0.28 
(-5.60)* 
-0.46 
(-12.80)* 
Open  0.02 
(12.00)* 
0.01 
(11.22)* 
0.01 
(8.32)* 
0.01 
(9.65)* 
0.01 
(8.32)* 
0.01 
(9.65)* 
0.01 
(7.72)* 
0.01 
(9.33)* 
Military in 
Politics 
 0.29 
(4.87)* 
      
Democracy   -0.19 
(-3.82)* 
 -0.20 
(-3.83)* 
 -0.20 
(-3.41)* 
 
Investment 
Profile 
   0.15 
(7.37)* 
 0.15 
(7.35)* 
 0.15 
(6.32)* 
R 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.89 0.86 0.89 
Wald 1079.88 
(0.000) 
1238.24 
(0.000) 
1164.03 
(0.000) 
1534.0 
(0.000) 
1163.58 
(0.000) 
1533.53 
(0.000) 
2037.60 
(0.000) 
1915.26 
(0.000) 
Sargan  3.49 
(.06) 
3.08 
(.08) 
2.62 
(0.11) 
2.61 
(0.11) 
2.66 
(0.10) 
2.65 
(0.10) 
  
Basmann 3.42 
(.06) 
2.00 
 (.08) 
2.55 
(0.11) 
2.54 
(0.11) 
2.56 
(0.11) 
2.55 
(0.11) 
  
Hansen       3.53 
(0.06) 
1.67 
(0.20) 
Observations  197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-7: Corruption and FI: Panel Estimation 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.001 
(-4.23)* 
-0.0004 
(-1.68)*** 
-0.0004 
(-2.08)** 
-0.0005 
(-2.22)** 
-0.0004 
(-1.94)*** 
PCY  -0.000 
(-14.77)* 
-0.000 
(-10.64)* 
-0.000 
(-9.19)* 
-0.000 
(-4.69)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
  -0.20 
(-7.79)* 
-0.19 
(-7.53)* 
-0.17 
(-6.72)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
   -0.033 
(-4.29)* 
-0.02 
(-3.20)* 
Rule of Law     -0.29 
(-7.69)* 
R 0.03 0.32 0.38 0.40 0.46 
Adj. R 0.01 0.31 0.37 0.39 0.45 
F  17.90 
(0.000) 
121.25 
(0.000) 
107.79 
(0.000) 
84.02 
(0.000) 
86.71 
(0.000) 
Observations  545 534 529 515 515 
 *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-8: Corruption and FI: Panel Estimation: Sensitivity Analysis (I) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.0004 
(-2.42)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.35)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.05)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.34)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.41)* 
-0.0003 
(-2.04)* 
-0.0005 
(-2.52)* 
-0.0005 
(-2.39)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.000 
(-2.84)* 
-0.000 
(-2.69)* 
-0.000 
(-1.81)** 
-0.000 
(-2.86)** 
-0.000 
(-5.24)** 
-0.000 
(-3.34)* 
-0.000 
(-2.31)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.19 
(-8..02)* 
-0.19 
(-8.28)* 
-0.12 
(-2.93)* 
-0.17 
(-6.49)* 
-0.19 
(-8.19)* 
-0.11 
(-3.89)* 
-0.18 
(-7.73)* 
-0.20 
(-8.14)* 
Rule of Law -0.34 
(-9.13)* 
-0.36 
(-10.03)* 
-0.33 
(-8.71)* 
-0.32 
(-8.09)* 
-0.37 
(-9.70)* 
-0.29 
(-7.51)* 
-0.36 
(-9.63)* 
-0.37 
(-9.89)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
-0.025 
(-3.51)* 
       
Trade 
Openness 
 0.003 
(3.68)* 
      
Democracy   -0.144 
(-3.19)* 
     
Military in 
Politics 
   0.08 
(2.41)* 
    
Education     0.004 
(2.27)* 
   
Remittances       0.018 
(2.14)** 
  
Inflation        0.002 
(4.87)* 
 
Urbanization        0.000 
(1.16) 
R 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.49 0.50 0.45 
Adj. R 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.44 
F  82.16 
(0.000) 
85.66 
(0.000) 
86.52 
(0.000) 
84.93 
(0.000) 
77.51 
(0.000) 
81.52 
(0.000) 
96.46 
(0.000) 
83.32 
(0.000) 
Observations  545 510 510 519 489 439 495 519 
 *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-9: Corruption and FI: Panel Estimation: Sensitivity Analysis (II) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.0004 
(-2.42)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.09)* 
-0.0004 
(-1.94)** 
-0.0004 
(-1.98)** 
-0.0005 
(-2.40)* 
-0.0005 
(-2.31)* 
-0.0005 
(-2.33)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.17)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.000 
(-2.67)* 
-0.000 
(-2.29)* 
-0.000 
(-2.21)* 
-0.000 
(-4.47)* 
-0.000 
(-2.54)* 
-0.000 
(-2.37)* 
-0.000 
(-2.93)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.19 
(-8.02)* 
-0.18 
(-7.70)* 
-0.22 
(-8.88)* 
-0.21 
(-8.45)* 
-0.24 
(-10.35)* 
-0.18 
(-7.04)* 
-0.20 
(-8.17)* 
-0.21 
(-10.26)* 
Rule of Law -0.34 
(-9.13)* 
-0.46 
(-11.78)* 
-0.47 
(-9.89)* 
-0.39 
(-9.94)* 
-0.43 
(-11.84)* 
-0.35 
(-9.26)* 
-0.37 
(-9.12)* 
-0.42 
(-12.34)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
-0.025 
(-3.51)* 
       
Government 
Stability 
 0.13 
(6.15)* 
      
Internal 
Conflict 
  0.085 
(3.52)* 
     
External 
Conflict 
   0.045 
(1.97)** 
    
Investment 
Profile 
    0.168 
(7.66)* 
   
Religion in 
Politics 
     -0.065 
(-1.98)** 
  
Ethno 
linguistic 
      0.002 
(4.87)* 
 
yr1994        -0.07 
(-0.61) 
yr1999        0.323 
(2.74)* 
yr2004        0.84 
(7.46)* 
yr2007        1.16 
(10.42)* 
R 0.45 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.60 
Adj. R 0.42 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.44 0.59 
F  82.16 
(0.000) 
96.52 
(0.000) 
87.31 
(0.000) 
84.93 
(0.000) 
77.51 
(0.000) 
84.25 
(0.000) 
82.87 
(0.000) 
95.01 
(0.000) 
Observations  505 519 519 519 519 519 519 519 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-10: Corruption and FI: Panel Estimation: Random Effects (I) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.0002 
(-1.89)** 
-0.0002 
(-1.91)** 
-0.0002 
(-1.71)*** 
-0.0002 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.0003 
(-3.24)* 
-0.0002 
(-1.70)*** 
-0.0003 
(-2.40)* 
-0.0002 
(-2.03)** 
PCY -0.000 
(-3.15)* 
-0.000 
(-3.92)* 
-0.000 
(-4.21)* 
-0.000 
(-3.58)* 
-0.000 
(-5.06)* 
-0.000 
(-4.62)** 
-0.000 
(-3.99)* 
-0.000 
(-4.02)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.10 
(-2.81)* 
-0.10 
(-2.85)* 
-0.08 
(-1.71)*** 
-0.07 
(-1.85)*** 
-0.15 
(-4.12)*** 
-0.06 
(-1.83)* 
-0.08 
(-2.29)* 
-0.10 
(-2.84)* 
Rule of Law -0.24 
(-6.26)* 
-0.26 
(-6.63)* 
-0.23 
(-5.67)* 
-0.19 
(-4.59)* 
-0.27 
(-6.58)* 
-0.26 
(-6.13)* 
-0.24 
(-6.39)* 
-0.24 
(-6.19)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
-0.033 
(-3.88)* 
       
Trade 
Openness 
 0.005 
(3.12)* 
      
Democracy   -0.05 
(-1.03) 
     
Military in 
Politics 
   0.10 
(2.93)* 
    
Education      0.01 
(4.85)* 
   
Remittances       0.02 
(2.22)** 
  
Inflation        0.0001 
(1.26) 
 
Urbanizatio
n 
       0.000 
(2.66)* 
RB 0.58 0.56 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.66 0.61 0.59 
RO 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.51 0.48 0.45 
Wald 148.99 
(0.000) 
140.81 
(0.000) 
147.68 
(0.000) 
143.65 
(0.000) 
147.72 
(0.000) 
166.15 
(0.000) 
132.94 
(0.000) 
127.07 
(0.000) 
Observation
s  
515 520 529 529 499 439 503 529 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-11: Corruption and FI: Panel Estimation: Random Effects (II) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.0002 
(-2.26)** 
-0.0002 
(-1.93)** 
-0.0002 
(-1.80)** 
-0.0002 
(-2.63)* 
-0.0002 
(-2.64)* 
-0.0003 
(-3.39)* 
-0.0002 
(-2.58)* 
-0.0002 
(-2.56)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-5.91)* 
-0.000 
(-4.08)* 
-0.000 
(-3.99)* 
-0.000 
(-5.35)* 
-0.000 
(-5.39)* 
-0.000 
(-5.19)* 
-0.000 
(-5.34)* 
-0.000 
(-3.02)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.17 
(-5.55)* 
-0.09 
(-2.52)* 
-0.10 
(-3.03)* 
-0.15 
(-5.29)* 
-0.15 
(-5.49)* 
-0.17 
(-5.96)* 
-0.16 
(-5.70)* 
-0.13 
(-4.06)* 
Rule of Law -0.31 
(-8.67)* 
-0.21 
(-5.16)* 
-0.24 
(-5.62)* 
-0.26 
(-5.85)* 
-0.28 
(-7.75)* 
-0.22 
(-5.83)* 
-0.29 
(-8.18)* 
-0.26 
(-6.70)* 
Investment 
Profiles 
0.17 
(9.91* 
       
Religion in 
Politics 
 -0.09 
(-2.48)* 
      
Ethno 
linguistic 
  0.01 
(0.22) 
     
Internal 
Conflict 
   -.02 
(-0.76) 
    
External 
Conflict 
    -.01 
(-0.42) 
   
Government 
Stability 
     -0.14 
(-5.03)* 
  
yr1994    -0.09 
(-0.76) 
-0.08 
(-0.65) 
-0.11 
(-1.07) 
-0.09 
(-0.81) 
-0.10 
(-0.92) 
yr1999    0.15 
(1.42) 
0.15 
(1.20) 
0.33 
(3.38) 
0.13 
(1.22) 
.081 
(0.76) 
yr2004    0.68 
(6.59)* 
0.68 
(6.81)* 
1.14 
(9.63)* 
0.66 
(6.48)* 
0.62 
(6.03)* 
yr2007    1.02 
(9.61)* 
1.01 
(8.79)* 
1.38 
(12.55)
* 
0.99 
(9.79)* 
0.94 
(9.07)* 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
       0.77 
(2.59)* 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
       0.95 
(3.32)* 
Lat America & 
Caribbean 
       0.83 
(2.63)* 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
       0.79 
(2.75)* 
South Asia 
 
       0.96 
(2.56)* 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
       0.68 
(2.28)** 
Europe         0.05 
(0.19) 
RB 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.71 
RO 0.49 0.45 0.45 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.61 
F  271.48 
(0.000) 
136.63 
(0.000) 
130.78 
(0.000) 
473.78 
(0.000) 
474.86 
(0.000) 
569.36 
(0.000) 
474.65 
(0.000) 
761.47 
(0.000) 
Observations  529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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Table 4-12: Corruption and FI: Panel Estimation (System GMM) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.0004 
(-4.78)* 
-0.0004 
(-5.37)* 
-0.0004 
(-5.37)* 
-0.0004 
(-4.96)* 
-0.0004 
(-5.27)* 
-0.0004 
(-5.52)* 
-0.0004 
(-5.36)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-4.26)* 
-0.000 
(-4.07)* 
-0.000 
(-4.41)* 
-0.000 
(-4.22)* 
-0.000 
(-4.87)* 
-0.000 
(-4.28)* 
-0.000 
(-3.99)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.15 
(-5.41)* 
-0.16 
(-5.25)* 
-0.16 
(-5.43)* 
-0.13 
(-3.63)* 
-0.14 
(-4.72)* 
-0.15 
(-5.04)* 
-0.17 
(-5.45)* 
Rule of Law -0.34 
(-6.83)* 
-0.32 
(-6.17)* 
-0.31 
(-6.44)* 
-0.29 
(-5.50)* 
-0.29 
(-4.85)* 
-0.32 
(-6.31)* 
-0.29 
(-5.81)* 
Inflation  0.0001 
(3.15)* 
0.0001 
(3.04)* 
0.0001 
(3.54)* 
0.0001 
(3.24)* 
0.0001 
(1.83)*** 
0.0001 
(3.28)* 
0.0001 
(3.38)* 
Trade 
Openness  
 0.001 
(0.60) 
     
Government 
Spending  
  -0.012 
(-1.12) 
    
Military in 
Politics  
   0.08 
(2.08)** 
   
Internal 
Conflict 
    -.03 
(-1.22) 
  
External 
Conflict 
     -.03 
(-1.12) 
 
Government 
Stability 
      -.09 
(-2.79)* 
Yr1994 -0.11 
(-1.75)*** 
-0.18 
(-2.89)* 
-0.16 
(-2.42)* 
-0.11 
(-1.80)*** 
-0.12 
(-1.82)*** 
-0.08 
(-1.12)*** 
-0.13 
(-1.85)*** 
Yr1999 0.15 
(1.36) 
0.07 
(0.58) 
0.09 
(0.74) 
0.13 
(1.11) 
0.18 
(1.60)*** 
0.21 
(1.61)*** 
0.29 
(2.87)* 
Yr2004 0.67 
(5.14)* 
0.62 
(4.57)* 
0.61 
(4.54)* 
0.67 
(5.01)* 
0.71 
(5.21)* 
0.70 
(4.89)* 
0.97 
(6.74)* 
Yr2007 1.03 
(7.98)* 
0.95 
(6.95)* 
0.97 
(7.25)* 
1.02 
(8.11)* 
1.07 
(7.86)* 
1.04 
(7.29)* 
1.26 
(9.23)* 
Over id 70.42 
(0.07) 
80.45 
 (0.07) 
79.08 
(0.08) 
80.12 
(0.07) 
76.58  
(0.12) 
79.69  
(0.08) 
79.94 
(0.11) 
Hansen dif 18.52 
(0.42) 
20.27 
(0.50) 
18.05 
(0.65) 
23.27 
(0.33) 
23.47 
(0.32) 
24.46 
(0.27) 
20.40 
(0.50) 
No of 
groups 
116 116 116 116 116 116 116 
No of 
Instruments 
64 74 74 74 74 74 74 
Wald 403.02 
(0.000) 
381.87 
(0.000) 
458.78 
 (0.000) 
415.32 
 (0.000) 
408.26 
(0.000) 
402.76 
(0.000) 
404.95 
(0.000) 
AR1 0.36 0.31 0.24 0.46 0.31 0.38 0.83 
AR2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Observation
s  
503 494 490 503 503 503 503 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-13: Corruption and FI: CS Estimation: Developing Countries 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.001 
(-2.31)* 
-0.001 
(-2.67)* 
-0.001 
(-2.88)* 
-0.001 
(-2.99)* 
-0.001 
(-2.90)* 
-0.001 
(-3.06)* 
PCY  -0.000 
(-3.05)* 
-0.000 
(-1.65)*** 
-0.000 
(-0.86) 
-0.000 
(-0.94) 
-0.000 
(-0.65) 
Economic 
Freedom 
  -0.13 
(-2.47)* 
-0.12 
(-2.53)* 
-0.12 
(-2.67)* 
-0.14 
(-3.02)* 
Govt. Spending    -0.03 
(2.39)* 
-0.01 
(-1.71)*** 
-0.03 
(-2.22)** 
-.04 
(-2.59)* 
Rule of Law    -0.21 
(-2.47)* 
-0.17 
(-2.00)** 
-0.20 
(-2.44)* 
Inflation     0.001 
(2.62)* 
0.001 
(3.18)* 
Trade 
Openness 
     0.001 
(2.00)** 
R 0.03 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.32 0.36 
F  5.36 
(0.023) 
6.40 
(0.003) 
4.95 
(0.001) 
5.50 
(0.000) 
8.34 
(0.000) 
10.21 
(0.000) 
Observations  93 92 90 90 89 89 
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Table 4-14: Corruption and FI: CS Estimation: Non-linearity  
Variables  Dependent Variable: 
Corruption Index by TI 
Dependent Variable: 
Corruption Index by WB 
Dependent Variable: 
Corruption Index by 
ICRG 
FI -0.018 
(-4.91)* 
-0.014 
(-4.04)* 
-0.008 
(-4.93)* 
-0.006 
(-4.00)* 
-0.006 
(-2.30)** 
-0.004 
(-1.41) 
PCY -0.000 
(-10.77)* 
-0.000 
(-9.04)* 
-0.000 
(-9.64)* 
-0.000 
(-7.84)* 
-0.000 
(-5.20)* 
-0.000 
(-3.63)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.26 
(-4.42)* 
-0.26 
(-4.86)* 
-0.16 
(-6.40)* 
-0.17 
(-7.25)* 
-0.25 
(-6.29)* 
-0.26 
(-6.85)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
-.03 
(-1.60)*** 
-.009 
(-0.52) 
-.015 
(-1.86)*** 
-.003 
(-0.45) 
-.001 
(-0.07) 
-.015 
(-1.22) 
Rule of 
Law 
 -0.34 
(-3.66)* 
 -0.19 
(-4.53)* 
 -0.24 
(-3.56)* 
FI Square 0.000 
(4.22)* 
0.000 
(3.67)* 
0.000 
(4.16)* 
0.000 
(3.58)* 
0.000 
(2.20)** 
0.000 
(1.60) 
R 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.85 0.61 0.66 
F  96.47 
 (0.000) 
91.96  
0.000) 
100.37 
(0.000) 
101.87 
(0.000) 
35.30 
 (0.000) 
34.66 
 (0.000) 
Observatio
ns  
113 113 116 116 116 116 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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  Table 4-15: Corruption and FI: Panel Estimation: Excluding Outliers  
Variables  Full 
Sample 
Corruption Index > 1 Corruption Index < 5 
FI -0.0004 
(-2.42)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.49)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.18)* 
-0.0004 
(-1.86)*** 
-0.0004 
(-1.92)** 
PCY -0.000 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.000 
(-1.01) 
-0.000 
(-3.00)* 
-0.000 
(-6.04)** 
-0.000 
(-5.61)** 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.19 
(-8..02)* 
-0.11 
(-4.92)* 
-0.07 
(-2.43)* 
-0.14 
(-5.95)* 
-0.13 
(-5.20)* 
Rule of Law -0.34 
(-9.13)* 
-0.24 
(-7.15)* 
-0.21 
(-5.40)* 
-0.23 
(-6.32)* 
-0.22 
(-5.60)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
-0.025 
(-3.51)* 
-.013 
(-2.06)** 
-.02 
(-2.21)** 
-.02 
(-2.80)* 
-.02 
(-3.56)* 
Trade 
Openness 
  0.001 
(1.05) 
 0.004 
(4.39)* 
Military in 
Politics 
  0.07 
(2.11)** 
 0.05 
(1.6)*** 
Education   0.005 
(2.70)** 
  
Remittances    0.01 
(1.74)*** 
  
R 0.45 0.25 0.29 0.45 0.47 
Adj. R 0.42 0.24 0.27 0.44 0.46 
F  82.16 
(0.000) 
30.76 
(0.000) 
16.60 
(0.000) 
77.84 
(0.000) 
60.43 
(0.000) 
Observations  545 467 368 487 484 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-16: Corruption and FI: A Spatial Analysis 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
SWC2  0.56 
(3.43)* 
0.30 
(1.91)** 
0.20 
(1.67)*** 
0.19 
(1.60)*** 
0.25 
(2.04)** 
0.2 
(1.70)*** 
FI  -.001 
(-2.20)** 
-.001 
(-2.94)* 
-.001 
(-2.96)* 
-.001 
(-2.06)** 
-.001 
(-2.87)* 
PCY  -0.000 
(-5.35)* 
-0.000 
(-2.13)** 
-0.000 
(-2.06)** 
-0.000 
(-1.20) 
-0.000 
(-1.95)** 
Economic 
Freedom 
  -0.18 
(-4.35)* 
-0.18 
(-4.38)* 
-0.11 
(-2.76)* 
-0.17 
(-4.28)* 
Rule of law   -0.34 
(-4.52)* 
-0.32 
(-4.04)* 
-0.23 
(-3.00)* 
-0.37 
(-5.50)* 
Government 
spending  
   -0.009 
(-0.84) 
  
Bureaucracy 
quality  
    -0.37 
(-3.77)* 
 
British 
Colony  
     -0.15 
(-1.19) 
R 0.08 0.47 0.64 0.64 0.68 0.66 
F  12.08 
(0.000) 
25.78 
(0.000) 
38.35 
(0.000) 
32.10 
(0.000) 
37.67 
(0.000) 
31.61 
(0.000) 
Observations  140 120 118 117 118 115 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  143 
 
Table 4-17: Corruption and Contagion: A spatial analysis with different lag lengths 
Variables  SWC(99-03) SWC(94-98) SWC(89-93) SWC(84-88) 
SWC  0.21 
(2.31)* 
0.19 
(2.41)* 
0.19 
(2.43)* 
0.19 
(2.42)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-2.33)* 
-0.000 
(-1.26) 
-0.000 
(-1.26) 
-0.000 
(-0.25) 
Democracy  -0.21 
(-3.89) 
-0.25 
(-4.77)* 
-0.16 
(-2.43)* 
-0.27 
(-5.26)* 
Bureaucracy 
Quality 
-0.30 
(-3.18)* 
-0.24 
(-2.72)* 
-0.26 
(-5.0)* 
-0.21 
(-2.35)* 
Rule of Law -0.24 
(-3.69)* 
-0.35 
(-5.36)* 
-0.36 
(-5.41)* 
-0.41 
(-6.15)* 
R 0.76 0.80 0.80 0.81 
Adj. R 0.75 0.79 0.79 0.80 
F  79.40 
(0.000) 
94.56 
 (0.000) 
95.78 
(0.000) 
96.91 
(0.000) 
Observations  134 125 123 117 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Spatially Weighted Corruption Index (SWC) 
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Appendix  
Table 1: Description of Variables 
Variables  Definitions Sources 
Per capita real GDP GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$).  World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Credit as % of GDP Credit as % of GDP represents claims on the non-
financial private sector. 
World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
M2 as % of GDP It represents Broad money (money and quasi money). World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Financial 
Intermediation (FI) 
The level of Financial Intermediation is determined by 
adding M2 as a % of GDP and credit to private sector as 
% of GDP. 
World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Trade Openness It is the sum of exports and imports as a share of real 
GDP.  
World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Corruption  ICRG index 0-6 scale; where 6 indicate high degree of 
corruption and 0 indicate no corruption. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Corruption  Transparency International corruption index rescaled 
from 0 (absence of corruption) to 10 (highest corruption). 
Transparency International.  
Corruption  World Bank corruption index rescaled from -2.5 (absence 
of corruption) to 2.5 (highest corruption). 
World Bank.  
Democracy  ICRG index 0-6 scale; where 6 indicate high degree of 
democracy. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Military in Politics ICRG index 0-6 scale; higher risk ratings (6) indicate a 
greater degree of military participation in politics and a 
higher level of political risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Religion in Politics ICRG index 0-6 scale: higher ratings are given to 
countries where religious tensions are minimal. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Ethnic Tensions ICRG index 0-6 scale; higher ratings are given to 
countries where tensions are minimal. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Rule of Law ICRG index 0-6 scale; where 6 indicate high degree of 
law and order. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Bureaucracy Quality ICRG index 0-4 scale; where 4 indicate high degree of 
law and order. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Government 
Stability 
ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk 
and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk 
and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Investment Profiles ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk 
and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Internal Conflict ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk 
and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
External Conflict ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk 
and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Economic Freedom Freedom House data. index rescaled 0 (low economic 
freedom)-7 (high economic freedom) 
Fraser Institute. 
Inflation  Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Government 
Spending  
General government final consumption expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Remittances  Workers' remittances and compensation of employees, 
received (% of GDP) 
World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Military Spending  Military expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Arm Trade Arms exports plus arms imports (constant 1990 US$) World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Education The secondary school enrollment as % of age group is at 
the beginning of the period.  
World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Urbanization  Urban Population  World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
British Colony A dummy variable that is 1 for British Colony  http://flagspot.net/flags/gb-colon.html 
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5. Distributional and Poverty Consequences of 
Globalisation: A Dynamic Comparative Analysis for 
Developing Countries 
 
5.1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted by economists and policy makers that over a long period of time open 
economies generate more gains compared to closed ones, and policies which promote 
openness contribute significantly to economic growth, employment enhancement and poverty 
eradication. In the short run, however, a move towards openness-trade liberalization can have 
a deleterious effect on the poorer members of society. Indeed, it is quite possible that 
successful open regimes, even in the long run, may leave a number of people behind in 
poverty. Since trade liberalization by its nature implies adjustment, it is likely to have 
distributional impacts that normally harm poorer actors in the economy. 
 
Trade liberalization, or openness to trade, is now generally considered as economically 
beneficial because it increases the size of the overall pie available to all members of society. 
However, recently anti-globalisation critics have suggested that openness to trade is in fact 
socially harmful on several dimensions, among them the issues of poverty, income inequality 
and unemployment. The nub of this argument is that free trade accentuates, rather than 
ameliorates, and it intensifies, rather than diminishes, poverty and income inequality in poor 
countries. In order to understand the impact of trade liberalization on the above-noted 
development process the literature emphasises two different strands of argumentation: the 
static and dynamic. First, according to the static argument, the central effect of trade 
liberalisation on poverty is assumed to come from the effects on real wages of unskilled 
workers endowed with labour but with no human or financial capital. The natural conjecture 
following the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) proposition would be that freer trade should help in the 
reduction of poverty to poorer countries which use their comparative advantage to export 
labour-intensive goods. A rise in exports based on labour intensive production techniques 
leads to a rise in the real wage rate of the unskilled worker and this is instrumental in reducing 
poverty and income inequality. This, in fact, is the central message of Anne Krueger's (1983) 
findings from a multi-country project on the effects of trade on wages and employment in 
developing countries. Another approach also suggests that trade is beneficial for poverty 
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reduction in developing countries because the consumer surplus increases in the wake of more 
competitive prices in an open economy.  
 
According to the dynamic argument, free trade reduces poverty in two ways: trade increases 
growth and growth reduces poverty. In regard to the trade promotes growth hypotheses, there 
are ample precedents. For instance, Dennis Robertson (1940) characterized trade as an "engine 
of growth." With regard to the growth reduces poverty argument, Adam Smith (1776) 
suggested that when society is "advancing to the further acquisition . . . the condition of the 
laboring poor, of the great body of the people, seems to be the happiest."  
 
According to the well-known Kuznets (1955) inverted-U hypothesis, income inequality 
increases during the early stages of economic development and, after reaching a turning point, 
declines. Although, the Kuznets curve exhibits a negative relationship between economic 
growth and inequality in the long run, poverty is still a long standing problem in the world 
despite many growth episodes. However, the literature is not conclusive in establishing a 
relationship between economic growth and income inequality and so it is difficult to say 
whether growth is good or bad for the poor and whether, in fact, the Kuznets curve holds? For 
this reason, the relationship between economic growth and income inequality is a key concern 
in discussions of development policy. 
 
Theoretically speaking, the impact of globalisation on inequality, both within and across 
countries, is ambiguous and depends on the circumstances of individual countries as well as 
on the aspect of globalisation involved (O’Rourke, 2001). Different theories have been put 
forward to analyse the effect of globalisation on inequality, which can be grouped into three 
categories (Wade, 2001): neoclassical growth theory, endogenous growth theory, and the 
dependency theory of sociologists. Neo-classical growth theory expects income convergence 
across countries in the long run due to increased international mobility of capital. In contrast, 
endogenous growth theory predicts less convergence and, more likely, divergence, as 
increasing returns to technological innovation offset the diminishing returns to capital. Finally, 
the dependency theory suggests that developing countries reap lesser rewards from economic 
integration as they have relatively limited access to international markets and a narrow export 
base; hence, globalisation does not lead to absolute convergence. 
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In the presence of such diversified theoretical predictions, estimating the actual impact of 
globalisation on inequality and poverty remains largely an empirical issue. The available 
evidence, however, does not produce a consensus and the effect of globalisation on inequality 
and poverty remains ambiguous. Also, no previous study has tried to quantify the relative 
contributions of globalisation and other fundamental variables on inequality and poverty in 
developing countries. Clearly, from the national and international policy perspectives, it is 
imperative to explore both the nature and the importance of various factors in generating the 
inequality and poverty.  
 
In a recent study, (Foellmi and Oechslin (2010) predict a potential link between globalisation 
and financial development using a general equilibrium model. Their model shows that 
economies where financial market imperfections prevail, globalisation (economic integration) 
tends to increase inequality by amplifying the income differences within the entrepreneurial 
class. Economic integration favours the richest entrepreneurs by providing them new 
investment opportunities and relieving them from lending to poorer entrepreneurs through 
underdeveloped financial system. This process increases the domestic borrowing rate which 
hurts the small firms as they mainly depend on external finance. To best of our knowledge, 
this predicted theoretical link between globalisation and inequality has not been empirically 
tested. 
 
In this study we attempt to fill the gaps in the existing literature and lend a fresh perspective to 
the globalisation, inequality and poverty debate. We address five key issues: (1) Does 
economic growth benefit different economic actors equally or does it comes at the cost of 
increased inequality leaving some in society poorer?; (2) Is the effect perhaps different over 
the path of development in the long run?; (3) Does high financial intermediation reduce 
poverty and inequality?; (4) Does openness have spillover benefits which are shared equally?; 
(5) What is the role of government in the process - does government spending reduce 
potentially existing inequalities and poverty? 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of related 
literature and theory on the predictors of inequality and poverty. Section 3 presents an 
analytical frame work for our empirical study and section 4 provides a discussion of data and 
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estimation procedures, while in section 5 we present our empirical findings. Section 6 is our 
concluding section. 
 
5.2. Literature Review 
 
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model, a greater degree of openness to trade leads to 
high relative demand of those factors of production where a country has comparative 
advantage. In the case of developing countries, low skilled labour abundant countries, demand 
for unskilled labour increases, thereby the wage differential decreases. However, both the HO 
model and the SS theorem assume that technologies are identical across countries. If this 
assumption is dropped then the final effect of openness to trade on wage differentials also 
depends on the technology diffusion from the developed world to the developing world. This 
technology transfer is normally skill biased and generates a skill premium, thereby leading to 
more unequal distribution of wages (see, for example, Berman et. al., 1994; Autor et. al., 
1998). 
  
In the literature, it is argued that when developing countries embark on trade liberalisation 
policies, a substantial up-grading of technology also occurs through the two main channels of 
exports and imports. A rise in imports allows a developing country to implement embodied 
technological change through the imports of mature machines, including second hand capital 
goods (see, for example, Barba et. al., 2002). Furthermore, Perkins and Neumayer (2005) 
point out that a developing country that is regarded as a laggard enjoys the benefit of last 
comer by directly accessing relatively new technology.  
 
Trade openness leads to technical up-grading by allowing a rise in the international flows of 
capital goods (Acemoglu, 2003). Technological up-grading is defined as “skill enhancing 
trade hypotheses” by (Robbins, 1996, 2003). These authors point out that when the south 
rapidly adopted the modern skill intensive technologies, resulting high demand for labour 
widened the existing wage income dispersion in developing countries. 
 
Similarly, a rise in exports induces/forces a developing country to replace outdated 
technologies for better access in the markets of developed countries. Yeaple (2005) shows that 
the adoption of new technologies by exporting guarantees more profits and thereby a firms 
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demand for skilled labour. Hanson and Harrison (1999) also provide evidence on the 
inequality enhancing role of exports by documenting a case study of Mexico where firms in 
the exporting sector employ a higher share of white-collar workers as compared to non 
exporting plants. Furthermore, Berman and Machine (2000, 2004) find evidence for an 
increased demand for skill in developing countries. Conte and Vivarelli (2007) also provide 
similar evidence for developing countries. These models provide evidence for skilled labour 
demand in the wake of increased imports of capital goods but do not link it directly to income 
inequality and poverty. This is a gap which we attempt to address in this study.  
 
The effects of globalisation on poverty in developing countries has recently become a key 
concern and a policy issue for economists and practitioners. More than one sixth of the worlds 
population live under the poverty line of $1 a day, half of the developing countries live on less 
than $2 a day (Harrison et al.,). These poverty facts in the developing world occur at the same 
time as most of the developing countries have embarked on liberalized trade policy and are 
becoming integrated into the world economy. For example, Greenway et al., (2002) 
demonstrate that during 1980-2000 more than 100 developing countries have undertaken trade 
liberalization reforms. Keeping in view these facts, it is easy to understand why critics of 
globalisation blame most of the woes of globalisation on trade liberalization. 
 
Carneiro and Arbache (2003) use a computable general equilibrium model to simulate 
different trade liberalization policy scenarios and counterfactual micro simulations to assess 
the impacts of greater trade openness on household income distribution and the poverty ratio. 
They conclude for Brazil that trade liberalization alone may not be sufficient to significantly 
reduce poverty and inequality. Gibson (2000) analyses the changes in poverty in Papua New 
Guinea during the 1990s adjustment programme. Data from urban household surveys in 1986 
and 1996 are used to calculate the change in the incidence, depth and severity of poverty. They 
find that there was a rise in both the depth and severity of poverty in the 1990s, with the major 
contributor being growth in inequality. 
 
How does globalisation impact on poverty? Does globalisation benefit poor people in the 
developing world? Will on going efforts to eliminate further trade barriers improve the welfare 
of the poor people in the world? Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to these important 
questions. Winters et al (2004), Goldberg and Povcnick (2004, 2006), and Ravallion (2004) 
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review the recent evidence. All of these studies acknowledge that one can only review the 
indirect evidence on the theme of globalisation and poverty linkages and there is hardly any 
study which tests for the direct linkage between globalisation and poverty.30 According to the 
“orthodox” perspective on openness to trade and poverty, with reference to writings of Anne 
Krueger and David Dollar and others, trade liberalization is good for growth and growth is 
good for the poor. Globalisation critics point out that openness to trade is associated with 
increasing income inequalities that push poor people further behind. David Dollar and Anne 
Krueger argue that globalisation is inversely associated with income inequalities in poor 
countries because these countries specialize in the production of those goods that use unskilled 
labour. However, the recent literature has provided evidence that orthodox views on the 
linkages between globalisation and poverty are not valid. 
 
5.2.1: Theory of inequality and poverty determinants 
In this section we analyze the factors that explain variations in cross country income 
inequalities and poverty. The most important factor that explains cross country income 
inequality is economic growth. The Kuznets Curve suggests an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between economic development and income inequality that implies at an early stage of 
economic development economic growth increase inequalities and eventually decrease them at 
a later stage of development due to the trickle down effects of economic growth. However, 
this relationship does not appear to be stable and it varies with a change in methodology, 
sample size and conditioning variables. Paukerit (1973) and Ahluwalia (1976) support the 
Kuznet’s point of view. But some later studies (Deininger and Squire, 1998; Ravallian, 1995) 
do not find economic growth affecting income distribution.  
 
The theoretical literature provides different hypotheses concerning financial development and 
income inequality. For example, some studies (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 
1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997) claim that financial intermediary development is pro-poor, 
thereby decreasing inequality. Lamoreaux (1986), Haber (1991), Maurer and Haber (2003), on 
the other hand, argued that at an early stage of financial deepening access to financial services 
is limited to incumbents and will thus raise their income relevant to the income of the poor. 
                                                 
30
 Winters et al (2004) point out in their comprehensive and significant survey that “there are no direct studies of 
the poverty effects of trade and trade liberalization”. Goldberg and Povcnick (2004, 2006) write in their excellent 
review “while the literature on trade and inequality is voluminous, there is no work to date on the relationship 
between trade liberalization and poverty”. 
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Other models (Greenwood and Jovnovie, 1990), posit a non-linear inverted U-shaped 
relationship between financial development and income distribution.  
 
Inflation may have a strong redistributive effect which could be positive (through its effects on 
individual income wealth) or negative (through a progressive tax system). Inflation hurts the 
poorest segment of society because it causes the worsening of existing income inequalities in 
the economy as money transfers from the poor to the rich and it becomes harder to meet life’s 
necessities and people are trapped in a vicious circle of poverty. The negative effects of 
inflation on the poor are intensified when wages fail to chase increasing price levels. In 
developing countries, trade unions are weak and minimum wage laws do not work properly, 
due to weak institutions, and workers are left with less or no rise in wages, while firms enjoy 
the benefits of rising prices and get richer.  
 
Government spending is also one of the factors that affects income inequality; income 
inequality may increase or decrease with government consumption. For example, if most of 
the redistribution through the tax and transfer system is towards the poor, government 
consumption might result in greater equality. However, it could have the opposite effects if 
government consumption is not developmental (i.e. not pro-poor). Cross country studies 
(Stock, 1978; Boyd, 1988), find the size of the public sector to be significant in reducing 
income inequality.  
 
Differences in population growth across countries is another factor explaining inter-country 
variation in income inequality. Although population growth generally declines as per capita 
income rises, there is considerable variation in the population growth rate among countries at a 
similar income level. Generally, it is believed that faster population growth is associated with 
higher income inequality. One of the reasons for this is that the dependency burden may be 
higher for the poorer group.  
 
One of the most important factors underlying income inequality is the level of access to 
education. There is a two-way link here; on the one hand an unequal educational opportunity 
leads to greater inequality in income distribution by widening the skilled and productivity gaps 
in the working population, while on the other, unequal income distribution tends to prevent the 
poor investing in education and acquiring skills.  
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Trade liberalization by its nature implies adjustment and so is likely to have distributional 
impacts. As far as trade liberalization is concerned, its effect on income distribution can go 
either way in the sense that it may worsen or alleviate the distribution of income in developing 
countries. A number of studies have attempted to relate trade policy variables to economic 
growth (Dollar, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Edwards, 1992). These studies found that 
trade openness is associated with more rapid growth.  
 
Having discussed inequality factors, we now provide a brief discussion on poverty predictors. 
One of the most widely promoted hypothesis in the social sciences is that economic growth 
reduces poverty. While growth without distribution is not merely a theoretical possibility, but 
is being experienced in certain countries or regions, most researchers consider that the 
widespread poverty in developing countries results from slow economic accumulation. The 
notion of a “trickle down” effect proposes a downwards-spread of the benefits of economic 
growth, although this growth sequencing does not indicate the time lag that the poor must wait 
after the rich get richer first (see, for example, Ravallion, 1995, 1997). 
 
There is a theoretical consensus that rapid population growth aggravates poverty. Rapid 
population growth necessarily redistributes the population structure in favour of the young and 
increases the size of families in the poor stratum, thus increasing poverty (Deaton and Paxon, 
1997). This Malthusian process is more likely to affect developing countries, where a 
combination of poor agricultural economies, limited human capital and rudimentary 
technology mean that the increment of population does not translate to increasing labour 
forces and consequently upgrading income levels. (Becker, Glaeser and Murphy, 1999).  
 
5.3. Methodology 
In this section we introduce a methodological frame work for inequality and poverty. 
Following the conventional wisdom in the literature on inequality, the Kuznets curve has been 
modelled (see, for example, Randolph and Lot, 1993; Ram, 1995; MacDonald and Majeed, 
2010) using the following kind of regression equation: 
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5.3.1: Inequality model 
)(......................................................................logloglog 221 IYYGini ititititit εγγα +++=
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where log Giniit is the natural logarithm of the Gini Index, log Yit is the natural logarithm of 
income per capita, adjusted using PPP weights, log Y2it controls for nonlinear conditional 
convergence across countries and εit is a disturbance term. The expected signs for γ1 and γ2 in 
equation (1) are positive and negative, respectively. As we have seen, cross country inequality 
variation depends on other factors such as government size, education and population growth 
and therefore equation (1) should be modified accordingly. For example, higher targeted 
government spending could reduce inequalities given that rent seeking activities are avoided 
and government spending enhances the possibilities and opportunities for the poor. A rise in 
human capital, HK, can be expected to narrow the gap between poor and rich as people with 
high investment in HK are less likely to fall into poverty. Additionally, taking on board these 
extra variables, equation (I) can be rewritten as: 
 
)...(..........logloglogloglog 543221 IIPopHKGYYGini itititititititit εγγγγγα +∆+++++=
 
where Git is the natural log of government spending, as a proxy for government spending on 
the social sector, HKit,is measured as the secondary school enrolment rate, ∆Popit is the 
percentage change in total population, and εit is a disturbance term We also propose estimating 
a variant of (II) which, following the suggestions of Barro (2000) and Aisbett (2005), includes 
globalisation variables:  
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where Trade and FDI denote and respectively. According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
the expected sign for γ6 depends on the comparative advantage of an economy relative to its 
trading partners. Similarly, the expected sign, γ7, could be either positive or negative.  
 
5.3.2: Poverty model  
 In order to build a poverty model this study follows a basic poverty-growth model suggested 
by Ravallion (1997). In the first step, we estimate the elasticity of poverty with respect to 
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economic growth for developing countries in separate regressions. In the next step we 
introduce measures for inequality and the level of economic development in order to estimate 
their effects on existing poverty incidence. Due to data constraints we measure the incidence 
of poverty using the headcount index, defined as the population living below one dollar a day 
per capita (PPP adjusted), which is a standard measure used in literature). The relationship for 
growth-poverty elasticity can be written as  
 
)1........(.............................................................................................................log 1 ititit gP εβα ++=
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where Pit indicates poverty in country i at time t and git measures the annual growth rate. The 
coefficient β1 measures elasticity of poverty with respect to growth given by g, and e is an 
error term. An estimated value of β1 gives the average growth elasticity of poverty in 
developing countries. However, this average measure could be misleading because β1 differs 
across countries and over time depending upon other poverty determinants that explain 
poverty variation. For example, Bourguignon (2003) points out the importance of income 
distribution and the initial level of development as additional controls of poverty. The 
modified version of equation (1) that includes an inequality elasticity of poverty and economic 
development can be written as: 
 
)2....(......................................................................)()log(log 321 itititit XineqgP εβββα ++++=
 
where Pit refers to the natural logarithm of the head count ratio, git is the annual growth rate of 
GDP between two survey years, Ineqit is the natural logarithm of the gini index Xit is a vector 
of control variables for poverty other than economic growth and income distribution. In 
addition to the initial distribution of income and the level of economic development, poverty 
results from complex economic and social processes. For these reasons we extend this model 
to include other factors. Recent studies suggest that households with better profiles of human 
capital are less prone to poverty incidence as compared to those with a lower acquisition of 
human capital. In this study we proxy human capital with the average year of schooling. 
Finally, we include measures of globalisation in our model. Conventionally, in the literature 
two measures of globalisation are used, namely trade and capital flows. Winter et al. (2004) 
finds that trade liberalization reduces poverty in the long run, while Carneiro and Arbache 
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(2003) do not find a significant affect of openness to trade on inequality and poverty using 
CGE model. 
 
)3.......(..........)/()/()()log(log 54321 itititit YFDIYTradeXineqgP εβββββα ++++++=
  
where tradeit is the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP and FDIit is the ratio of FDI inflow to 
GDP. 
5.4. Data and Estimation Procedure 
 
In this study we measure income inequality using the Gini coefficient, which is one of the 
most popular representations of income inequality. It is based on the Lorenz Curve, which 
plots the share of population against the share of income received and has a minimum value of 
0 (the case of perfect equality) and a maximum value of 1 (perfect inequality). The Income 
inequality variable is unlikely to be comparable across countries due to differences in 
definitions and methodologies. Missing values in Income inequality data are the major 
problem in cross country analysis since many of the developing countries have only one or 
two observations. Therefore, we expanded the existing database by including comparable data 
on inequality from recent household surveys contained in World Bank (2008), UNU-WIDER 
(2008), Garbis (2005) and IMF Staff reports.  
 
To make the data more comparable across countries we take data on variables in the form of 
averages between two survey years. For example, per capita real GDP growth rates are annual 
averages between two survey years. We then construct a panel data set for 65 developing 
countries for the period 1970-2008 have been assembled with the data averaged over periods 
of three to seven years (which is the minimum and maximum gap between two survey years), 
depending on the availability of the inequality data. The minimum number of observations for 
each country is three and the maximum nine. That is, only countries with observations for at 
least three consecutive periods are included. In order to conduct a comparative analysis 
developing countries have been split into two groups: countries with high financial 
intermediation and those with low financial intermediation. The countries above the median 
value of HFI are ranked as HFI countries. 
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To measure trade liberalization, we sum exports and imports and then divide this term by 
gross domestic product. Data on imports and exports are the annual averages between two 
survey years. Data on exports and imports are derived from the IFS database. Population 
growth rates are taken from the World Bank development reports. The secondary school 
enrolment is at the beginning of the period and derived from the World Bank database. Data 
on the ratio of government expenditure and investment as shares of GDP are averages for the 
period between two survey years and come from the IFS.  
 
Figure 1 shows that Kuznets curve holds in developing countries. The relationship between 
economic development and income inequalities is non-monotonic which implies that initially 
both variables move in the same direction and after reaching a certain threshold level of the 
economic development, where trickle down effects begin, income inequalities tend to fall in 
response to higher level of the economic development. Figure 2 has been drawn to view the 
relationship between income inequalities and economic development only in the HFI 
economies. This set of countries provides a clear existence of non-monotonic relationship 
between the income inequalities and the economic development. However, Figure 3 which 
captures the same relationship in the LFI economies does not provide a solid picture of the 
Kuznets curve. Though, in this sample the Kuznets curve holds but comparatively the Kuznets 
curve is stronger for the HFI countries, which may imply that financial sector liberalization 
could be a way for a country to attain the threshold level of economic development sooner 
than in the absence of such liberalisation, with the consequent spillover effects to the poorest 
segment of the society.  
 
Tables 3 and 4 provide descriptive statistics for the HFI and the LFI economies, respectively. 
The major facts from the descriptive statistics are as follows. First, economic growth, PCY, 
human capital, government spending are, on average, higher in the HFI economies while 
income inequality, poverty and inflations are higher in the LFI economies. This simple finding 
from descriptive statistics implies that economic indicators in the HFI economies are better as 
compared to the LFI countries. Second, a noticeable difference has been observed for poverty 
and inflation describing variables. The inflation in the LFI economies is 30% as compared to 
16% in the HFI economies, almost double. Similarly, the poverty index in the LFI economies 
is 36% as compared to 20% in the HFI economies. This significant difference for the inflation 
and the poverty indicators in these two set of countries indicates that the inflation could be a 
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key variable that hits poor people hard. Finally, our key variables of concern, openness to 
trade and FDI, provide mixed exposure to globalisation. In the case of openness to trade, the 
HFI economies are on average more open to trade while in the case of FDI, the LFI economies 
receive more FDI. 
 
5.4.1: Estimation technique 
We now discuss the estimation procedure used for inequality and poverty models. The use of 
pooled time-series and cross-section data provides a large sample that is expected to yield 
efficient parameter estimates. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) does not address the issue of 
omitted variable bias. If a region, country, or some group specific factors affect inequality and 
poverty, explanatory variables would capture the effects of these factors and estimates would 
not represent the true effect of the explanatory variables. Baltagi (2001) proposes fixed effect 
econometric techniques to estimate panel data, which could avoid the problem of omitted 
variable bias. However, in the presence of a lagged independent variable this technique gives 
biased parameter estimates and in this case we use a Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) 
estimator. This technique addresses the issue of endogeneity and also addresses the problem of 
omitted variables bias. We also use alternative econometric techniques such as Limited 
Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML), Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) and 
System-GMM. 
 
In this study, we mainly focus on the generalized method of Moments (GMM) estimation 
technique that has been developed for dynamic panel data analysis. This technique has been 
introduced by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1990), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover 
(1995), and Blundell and Bond (1997). GMM controls for endogeneity of all the explanatory 
variables, allows for the inclusion of lagged dependent variables as regressors and accounts for 
unobserved country-specific effects. For GMM estimation sufficient instruments are required. 
Following the standard convention in the literature, the equations are estimated using lagged 
first differences as instrument. 
 
5.5. Results and Discussion  
The estimation procedure in this study proceeds in the following way. First, parameter 
estimates are drawn for all selected developing countries and then for sub samples of high 
financial intermediation (HFI) and low financial intermediation (LFI) countries for 
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comparative purposes. Second, we initially focus on the distributional consequences of 
globalisation and before moving on to the poverty consequences. Third, and following the 
approach in other studies, we initially present results obtained using OLS econometric 
methods, before moving on to different econometrics techniques which address the possible 
problem of endogeneity. 
 
Table 5-6 presents our results on income distribution for developing countries. Column (2) of 
the Table indicates that the relationship between income distribution and the level of economic 
development is non-monotonic implying that at lower levels of economic development income 
inequalities are high then after reaching a threshold level of high economic development, 
income inequalities tend to fall. The estimated coefficient for Yit and Y2it are of the expected 
signs and highly significant. This relationship is robust to the inclusion of additional controls. 
The parameter estimates for Yit and Y2it remain positive and significant in all columns. 
 
Columns (3-6) provide significant evidence of a negative relationship between high financial 
intermediation and income distribution which means that financial liberalization could bridge 
the gap between rich and poor by providing private credit facilities. Inflation turns out to be 
positive and significant, indicating higher inflation rates widen the gap between rich and poor, 
hurting the poor relatively more. The role of government appears significant in reducing 
income inequalities. 
 
Table 5-7 replicates the results of Table 5-6, using alternative econometric techniques and 
controlling for the issue of endogeneity. The estimated coefficients for Yit and Y2it are 
significant in all columns and of the expected signs. This implies that the relationship between 
economic development and income inequalities changes over time. The estimated coefficient 
on the linear term is about 1.9 and -0.11 on the nonlinear (squared) term. Here an argument 
can be made that economic development leaves behind poorer members of an economy in the 
short run, but once a threshold level of economic development is achieved in the long term 
then the poor also benefit from the development process. 
 
Financial liberalization again appears to be negatively associated with income inequalities and 
its coefficient is around 0.001. The government seems to play an important role in reducing 
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income inequalities as the estimated coefficients on government spending in all the regressions 
are significant. 
 
Table 5-8 provides the results for the benchmark model with the addition of the control 
variable for openness to trade proxying globalisation. The estimated coefficient on openness to 
trade is insignificant in all regressions, implying that globalisation does not play any 
significant role in impacting on inequalities. Other parameter estimates remain the same in 
terms of signs and significance, although overall the level of significance is slightly improved 
when openness to trade is controlled for. 
 
Table 5-9 reports empirical estimates for the benchmark model including FDI inflows (a 
measure of globalisation), but excluding openness to trade. A simple correlation matrix shows 
that openness to trade and FDI are positively correlated. The correlation between the two is 
around 28 % and this may create a problem of multicolinearity. In order to avoid 
multicolinearity, and to assess the exclusive contribution of both measures of globalisation, we 
examine the influence of these terms individually. The results reveal that the estimated 
coefficient on FDI is about 0.02 and highly significant in the first 4 columns of Table 5-9. 
However, the level of significance drops slightly in the 6th column of the Table but the overall 
size of the coefficient, the direction of causality and the level of significance all are robust.  
 
The coefficient on inflation turns out to be positive and significant. The magnitude of the 
estimated value of the coefficient on inflation is a robust 0.002, while the level of significance 
is 1% in all regressions. In all of our estimations from Table 5-6 through to Table 5-9 the 
standard statistical tests such as F stat, Wald Test, Sargan Test and J stat support the estimated 
model. 
 
We can draw the following key findings for our group of developing countries. First, the 
Kuznets curve holds in developing countries and this reinforces the importance of policies that 
built a threshold level of economic development to pull the poor out of the poverty trap. 
Second, we find that openness to trade does not play any significant role in impacting on 
income inequalities, while FDI exerts a positive influence on existing inequalities and this 
implies that globalisation does not have a favourable impact on income distribution. Third, 
financial liberalization exerts a negative influence on income distribution while inflation 
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exerts a positive influence. Fourth, government appears to play an important role in reducing 
income inequalities in developing countries. 
 
Inequality in countries with a high level of financial intermediation. 
In Table 5-10 through to 5-12 we present the results for those economies which have a high 
level of financial intermediation. Table 5-10 contains the benchmark results without 
globalisation and it is evident from all columns of the Table that benchmark findings that we 
reported for all developing countries are not affected in this specific sample of countries. 
However, we find that openness to trade here is statistically insignificant, although it enters 
with a consistently negative sign. The impact of FDI is insignificant in all regressions, except 
column (3) of Table 5-12 where its effect is positive and significant at the 10% level of 
significance. Overall then globalisation does not have a favourable effect for the high financial 
intermediation countries, as in the developing country sample. However, globalisation as 
represented by openness to trade is significant at the 10% level in two cases, which implies 
that globalisation may have some limited effect for HFI economies. 
 
 
 
Inequality in countries with a low level of financial intermediation. 
In Tables 5-13 and 5-14 we present the results for low financial intermediation countries. In 
this sample the Kuznets curve holds but comparatively the Kuznets curve is stronger for the 
HFI countries, which may imply that financial sector liberalization could be a way for a 
country to attain the threshold level of economic development sooner than in the absence of 
such liberalisation, with the consequent spillover effects to the poorest segment of the society. 
As in the case of the HFI countries, openness to trade is insignificant although less so. The 
FDI term is insignificant in the LFI economies and the results for government spending and 
inflation are similar to the HFI economies, although inflation makes a comparatively more 
significant contribution to inequalities in HFI countries. Overall the results indicate that the 
degree of openness of a developing country does not have a favourable effect on poverty and, 
specifically, it does not contribute favourably to LFI economies in terms of income 
distribution.  
 
Table 5-15 provides results for the poverty model for all developing countries. All columns of 
the table indicate that economic growth is robustly and negatively associated with poverty. It 
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is the key indicator of economic performance of a country that promises multiple opportunities 
for economic agents, including the poor. Higher income inequalities are positively and 
significantly associated with poverty incidence. Higher unequal distribution of wealth is good 
for the rich as it provides them with a wider set of opportunities. For example, a rich family 
have better access to human and capital investment, while the poor remain poor due to 
restricted opportunities. The effects of inflation are disproportional and normally hurt the poor. 
The panel regression results in Table 5-15 provide robust and positive effects of inflation on 
poor people. This is interesting to note since the government sector once again appears a major 
factor in fighting against poverty. 
 
Table 5-16 provides results for the poverty model for HFI countries. It is interesting to note 
that both trade and FDI turn out to be negative and significant, implying that strong domestic 
financial institutions could be a source of enhancing the capacity of an economy to take 
advantage of a globalizing world. This finding also implies that an economy needs to achieve 
a certain level of financial depth before it can derive the benefits of globalisation and reduce 
the risks of the globalisation. In other words, reforms of domestic financial institutions are 
important before an economy embarks on globalisation. 
 
Table 5-17 provides results for the poverty model for LFI countries. This sample of countries 
provides a sharp contrast for our key variables of interest. In the LFI economies, both 
openness to trade and FDI are bad for the poor, as the estimated coefficients on both openness 
to trade and FDI are highly significant with positive signs. In addition, the effect of 
government spending is not robust and it appears that government is not playing a significant 
role in the LFI economies. This finding suggests that the poor in the LFI economies are more 
prone to vagaries of globalisation. Hence, globalisation, in LFI economies, accentuates rather 
than ameliorates poverty. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study has been to assess the consequences of globalisation for developing 
countries in general and comparatively for high financial intermediation (HFI) countries over a 
long period 1970 to 2008. The study is unique in the way that it disaggregates consequences of 
globalisation for two sets of developing countries and uses more comparable statistics for 
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inequality and poverty. Furthermore, it explicitly controls for high financial intermediation 
and endogeneity issues. 
 
With reference to the research question posed for developing countries, we summarise the 
following major findings. First, the Kuznets curve holds in developing countries and this 
necessitates the importance of policies that build a threshold level of economic development to 
pick up the poor from poverty traps. Second, openness to trade does not play any significant 
role in impacting on income inequalities, while FDI exerts a positive influence on existing 
inequalities that implies globalisation does not have a favourable impact on income 
distribution. Third, financial liberalization exerts a negative influence on income distribution 
while inflation exerts positive influence. Fourth, government appears to be an important factor 
in reducing income inequality gaps. 
 
The main findings of the study for the distributional consequences of globalisation in HFI 
countries are: First, the evidence on the existence of the Kuznets curve are relatively strong in 
HFI countries and this implies financial sector liberalization could be a source of achieving the 
threshold level of economic development earlier, and this has a beneficial spillover effect for 
the poorer segment of society. Second, openness to trade is insignificant with a negative sign 
however compared to the LFI countries level of insignificance is not high. Third, the impact of 
FDI is significant with a positive sign but this result is not robust. Overall, we do not find that 
globalisation has a favourable effect on distribution in the HFI sample of countries. However, 
globalisation as measured by trade openness to trade is close to the 10% significance level 
which suggests that globalisation may have a favourable effect on openness to trade in HFI 
economies. Fourth, inflation exerts a positive influence while government appears an 
important factor in improving income distribution. 
 
In our modelling of the poverty consequences of globalisation for the developing world we 
found the following. First, the estimated coefficient on economic growth is robustly significant 
with a negative sign that implies economic growth is good for the poor. Second, the role of 
government is significant in reducing poverty as the estimated coefficient on government 
expenditures is robustly significant with a negative sign. The effects of inflation are 
disproportional and normally hurt the poor. The panel regression results provide robust and 
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positive effects of inflation on poor people. It is interesting to note that the government sector 
once again appears a major factor in the fight against poverty. 
 
In sum, globalisation as represented by openness to trade and FDI accentuates rather than 
ameliorates poverty and amongst domestic factors we find that economic growth is good for 
the poor while high income inequality hurts poor people and increases their suffering. 
However, we find that a sharp contrast arises in our comparative analysis of HFI and LFI 
countries. In the HFI economies both openness to trade and FDI are good for the poor, as the 
estimated coefficients on both are highly significant with negative signs. In contrast our results 
show that globalisation hurts the poor in LFI countries as the coefficient on both openness to 
trade and FDI are highly significant, with positive signs. 
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Figure 5-1: Inequality and Level of Development in Developing Countries 
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Figure 5-2: Inequality and Level of Development in HFI Countries 
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Figure 5-3: Inequality and Level of Development in LFI Countries 
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Table 5-1: Description of Variables 
Variable name Definitions and Sources 
Per capita real 
GDP 
Per capita real GDP growth rates are annual averages between two survey years 
and are derived from the IMF, WDI and International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
databases. 
Gini coefficient This is a measure of income inequality based on the Lorenz curve, which plots 
the share of population against the share of income received and has a 
minimum value of zero (reflecting perfect equality) and a maximum value of 
one (reflecting complete inequality). The inequality data (Gini coefficient) are 
derived from World Bank data, UNDP and the IMF staff reports. 
Secondary 
school 
enrolment 
The secondary school enrolment as % of age group at the beginning of the 
period. It is used as a proxy of investment in human capital and derived from 
World Bank database. 
Inflation  Inflation rates, annual averages between two survey years, are calculated using 
the IFS’s CPI data. 
Credit as % of 
GDP 
Credit as a % of GDP represents claims on the non-financial private 
sector/GDP and is derived from the 32d line of the IFS. 
M2 as % of 
GDP 
This represents Broad money/GDP, and is derived from lines 34 plus 35 of the 
IFS. 
Trade 
liberalization 
This is the sum of exports and imports as a share of real GDP. Data on exports, 
imports and real GDP are in the form of annual averages between survey years. 
HFI This is the level of Financial Intermediation and is determined by adding M2 as 
a % of GDP and credit to private sector as % of GDP. 
FDI It is measured as net inflow of foreign direct investment as % of GDP and 
series have been derived form WDI. 
Poverty Measured as head count ratio and the data has been derived from World Bank. 
 
Table 5-2: Descriptive Statistics in Developing Countries 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Economic Growth  2.52 3.80 -10.00 13.19 
Income Inequality 41.06 9.86 19.40 62.50 
Log (Income Inequality) 3.68 0.25 2.97 4.14 
Human Capital  60.23 23.42 16.00 105.83 
Population 1.46 1.14 -1.00 4.20 
Government Spending  21.26 8.98 5.18 56.00 
Investment  22.48 6.03 7.00 45.00 
Inflation  22.87 38.73 -1.00 310.00 
GDP Per Capita 8.12 0.93 5.56 10.13 
Poverty  28.01 19.65 0.00 74.00 
High Financial Intermediation  64.96 38.55 10.00 250.37 
Openness to Trade 71.35 38.70 10.80 228.88 
FDI 2.91 5.66 -1.33 81.35 
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Table 5-3: Descriptive Statistics in HFI Countries 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Economic Growth  3.08 3.23 -6.80 9.68 
Income Inequality 40.19 10.25 19.40 62.50 
Log (Income Inequality) 3.66 0.26 2.97 4.14 
Human Capital  63.38 21.05 20.00 105.83 
Population 1.46 1.05 -1.00 4.20 
Government Spending  22.11 9.55 6.29 56.00 
Investment  24.56 5.79 12.94 40.78 
Inflation  16.40 30.28 0.47 200.00 
GDP Per Capita 8.33 0.86 5.83 10.13 
Poverty  20.29 14.59 0.00 63.80 
High Financial Intermediation  88.98 39.13 26.00 250.37 
Openness to Trade 77.23 43.20 13.05 228.88 
FDI 2.73 3.44 -1.33 26.83 
 
Table 5-4: Descriptive Statistics in LFI Countries 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Economic Growth  1.94 4.25 -10.00 13.19 
Income Inequality 42.03 9.32 23.30 62.30 
Log (Income Inequality) 3.71 0.23 3.15 4.13 
Human Capital  56.92 25.33 16.00 101.69 
Population 1.46 1.24 -1.00 3.30 
Government Spending  20.37 8.29 5.18 45.90 
Investment  20.30 5.50 7.00 45.00 
Inflation  29.63 45.07 -1.00 310.00 
GDP Per Capita 7.91 0.94 5.56 9.67 
Poverty  36.17 21.03 1.00 74.00 
High Financial Intermediation  40.15 15.20 10.00 83.00 
Openness to Trade 64.93 31.87 10.80 172.90 
FDI 3.10 7.24 -0.19 81.35 
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Table 5-5: Simple Correlation Matrix for Developing Countries 
 Gro Ineq HK Pop G Inv Inf PCY Pov HFI Open FDI 
Growth 1.00            
Inequality 0.01 1.00           
HK -0.05 -0.16 1.00          
Population 0.14 0.34 -0.66 1.00         
Govt -0.32 -0.28 0.40 -0.44 1.00        
Investment 0.41 0.08 0.22 -0.08 -0.07 1.00       
Inflation -0.51 0.13 0.21 -0.32 0.13 -0.19 1.00      
PCY -0.08 0.14 0.54 -0.40 0.40 0.19 0.07 1.00     
Poverty -0.14 -0.13 -0.43 0.21 -0.29 -0.31 0.09 -0.72 1.00    
HFI 0.27 0.04 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.57 -0.30 0.36 -0.50 1.00   
Openness -0.07 0.08 0.22 -0.08 0.23 0.33 -0.14 0.18 -0.13 0.30 1.00  
FDI -0.02 0.09 0.22 -0.25 0.16 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.06 -0.01 0.37 1.00 
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Table 5-6: Inequality in Developing Countries  
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution 
Per Capita GDP 1.38 
(6.86)* 
1.46 
(6.73)* 
1.54 
(7.24)* 
1.40 
(6.65)* 
1.42 
(6.71)* 
Per capita GDP 
squared 
-.09 
(-6.81)* 
-0.085 
(-6.30)* 
-0.09 
(-6.78)* 
-0.08 
(-6.22)* 
-0.081 
(-6.24)* 
Human Capital   -0.0004 
(-0.46) 
-0.001 
(-1.29) 
 -0.001 
(-1.29) 
High Financial 
Intermediation 
 -.001 
(-2.81)* 
-.001 
(-2.85)* 
-.001 
(-1.94)** 
-.001 
(-1.93)** 
Population   0.13 
(7.97)* 
0.12 
(6.54)* 
0.12 
(9.73)* 
0.11 
(7.04)* 
Government 
Expenditure 
  -0.005 
(-4.05)* 
-0.006 
(-4.58)* 
-0.006 
(-4.72)* 
Inflation    0.001 
(3.49)* 
0.001 
(3.44)* 
Constant  -1.65 
-(2.02) 
-2.65 
(-2.03)* 
-2.79 
(-3.28)* 
-2.33 
(-2.76)* 
-2.35 
(-2.78)* 
F Stat 24.74 29.49 
(0.000) 
31.14 
(0.000) 
34.14 
(0.000) 
29.49 
(0.000) 
R Square 0.13 0.38 0.42 0.44 0.45 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively  
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Table 5-7: Inequality in Developing Countries using Alternative Econometric 
Techniques 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution 
 2SLS 2SLS LIML LIML GMM GMM 
Per Capita GDP 1.99 
(6.83)* 
1.87 
(6.35)* 
1.99 
(6.81)* 
1.88 
(6.35)* 
2.02 
(6.01)* 
1.82 
(5.43)* 
Per capita GDP 
squared 
-0.114 
(-6.42)* 
-0.12 
(-5.99)* 
-0.114 
(-6.40)* 
-0.11 
(-5.98)* 
-0.11 
(-5.67)* 
-0.10 
(-5.10)* 
Human Capital  -.002 
(-1.90)** 
-.0001 
(-1.30) 
-.002 
(-1.92)** 
-.0001 
(-1.27) 
-.002 
(-2.16)* 
-.001 
(1.40) 
High Financial 
Intermediation 
-.002 
(-3.15)* 
-.001 
(-2.48)* 
-.001 
(-3.17)* 
-.001 
(-2.50)* 
-.001 
(-3.12)* 
-.001 
(-2.66)* 
Population  .111 
(5.65)* 
.12 
(5.93)* 
.111 
(5.63)* 
.12 
(5.93)* 
0.12 
(6.88)* 
0.12 
(6.86)* 
Government 
Expenditure 
-0.007 
(-3.13)* 
-0.006 
(-2.75)* 
-0.007 
(-3.15)* 
-0.006 
(-2.73)* 
-0.006 
(-2.93) 
-0.007 
(-2.88) 
Inflation  0.001 
(2.06)** 
 0.001 
(2.05)** 
 0.001 
(2.56)* 
Constant  -4.77 
(-4.00)* 
-4.36 
(-3.61)* 
-4.77 
(-3.99)* 
-4.37 
(-3.61)* 
-4.90 
(-3.57) 
-4.13 
(-3.01) 
Wald  144.51 
(0.000) 
159.55 
(0.000) 
144.56 
(0.000) 
159.72 
(0.000) 
199.67 
(0.000) 
215.41 
(0.000) 
Sargan  5.56 
(0.06) 
4.66 
 (0.10) 
5.71 
(0.06) 
4.77 
 (0.10) 
  
Basmann 5.46 
(0.07) 
4.53 
 (0.10) 
2.74 
(0.07) 
2.27(0.1
0) 
  
Hansen                                      
J 
    7.12 
(0.03) 
4.46  
(0.10) 
R Square  0.40 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.42 
Countries  65 65 65 65 65 65 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 5-8: Inequality and Globalisation (Openness to trade) in Developing Countries 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution 
 2SLS 2SLS LIML LIML GMM GMM System-
GMM 
Sys-GMM 
Collapse 
Per Capita 
GDP 
1.97 
(6.73)* 
1.87 
(6.34)* 
1.97 
(6.73)* 
1.87 
(6.34)* 
2.00 
(5.98)* 
1.83 
(5.44)* 
1.40 
(4.93)* 
1.16 
(2.90)* 
Per capita GDP 
squared 
-0.11 
(-6.32)* 
-0.106 
(-5.97)* 
-0.112 
(-6.33)* 
-0.106 
(-5.96)* 
-0.11 
(-5.63)* 
-0.10 
(-5.11)* 
-0.076 
(-4.35)* 
-0.058 
(-2.36)* 
Openness -0.0003 
(-0.80) 
-0.0002 
(-0.49) 
-0.0003 
(-0.77) 
-0.0002 
(-0.47) 
-0.0004 
(-0.85) 
-0.000 
(-0.32) 
0.000 
(0.31) 
0.001 
(1.44) 
High Financial 
Intermediation 
-.001 
(-2.70)* 
-.001 
(-2.26)* 
-.001 
(-2.72)* 
-.001 
(-2.29)* 
-.001 
(-2.56)* 
-.001 
(-2.36)* 
-.001 
(-1.22) 
-.001 
(-1.77)*** 
Population  .11 
(5.60)* 
.12 
(5.90)* 
.11 
(5.58)* 
.12 
(5.90)* 
.13 
(6.76)* 
.12 
(6.83)* 
.16 
(4.75)* 
.13 
(2.03)* 
Inflation  0.001 
(1.91)**
* 
 0.001 
(1.91)**
* 
0.001 
(2.33)* 
0.001 
(2.33)* 
0.002 
(4.31)* 
0.002 
(2.00)** 
Human Capital  -0.001 
(-
1.75)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.19) 
-0.002 
(-
1.77)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.19) 
-0.002 
(-2.01) 
-0.001 
(-1.37) 
-0.003 
(-
1.60)*** 
-0.008 
(-2.42)* 
Government 
Expenditure 
-0.006 
(-2.91)* 
-0.006 
(-2.55)* 
-0.006 
(-2.92)* 
-0.006 
(-2.53)* 
-0.006 
(-2.76)* 
-0.006 
(-2.75)* 
-0.009 
(-3.90)* 
-0.018 
(-5.89)* 
Wald  147.59 
(0.000) 
160.93 
(0.000) 
147.60 
(0.000) 
161.06 
(0.000) 
204.98 
(0.000) 
218.60 
(0.000) 
153.56 
(0.000) 
78.37 
(0.000) 
Sargan  5.28 
(0.07) 
4.58 
(0.10) 
5.41 
(0.06) 
4.58 
(0.10) 
    
Basmann 5.15 
(0.08) 
4.43 
(0.10) 
2.59 
(0.08) 
4.43 
(0.10) 
    
Hansen                                      
J 
  6.72 
 (0.04) 
4.52 
(0.10) 
58.06 
 (1.0) 
34.51 
 (0.39) 
AR (2)       (0.33) (0.88) 
Hansen dif       56.63 
(0.86) 
56.63 
(0.50) 
R square 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.43   
Country  65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 5-9: Inequality and Globalisation (FDI) in Developing Countries  
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution 
 2SLS 2SLS LIML LIML GMM GMM System-
GMM 
Per Capita GDP 2.07 
(6.81)* 
1.94 
(6.25)* 
2.10 
(6.71)* 
1.94 
(6.22)* 
2.12 
(6.13)* 
1.90 
(5.26)* 
1.33 
(3.60)* 
Per capita GDP 
squared 
-0.12 
(-6.42)* 
-0.11 
(-5.92)* 
-0.12 
(-6.34)* 
-0.11 
(-5.89)* 
-0.12 
(-5.76)* 
-0.11 
(-4.92)* 
-0.073 
(-3.17)* 
FDI 0.018 
(2.26)* 
0.025 
(3.04)* 
0.021 
(2.36)* 
0.025 
(3.07)* 
0.012 
(1.50) 
0.022 
(2.34)* 
0.011 
(2.44)* 
High Financial 
Intermediation 
-0.001 
(-3.03)* 
-0.001 
(-2.16)* 
-0.001 
(-3.04)* 
-0.001 
(-2.16)* 
-0.001 
(-2.89) 
-0.001 
(-2.18) 
-0.001 
(-1.36) 
Population  0.12 
(5.36)* 
0.15 
(6.53)* 
0.13 
(5.77)* 
0.15 
(6.52)* 
0.13 
(6.57)* 
0.15 
(7.06)* 
0.18 
(5.44)* 
Inflation  0.002 
(2.67)* 
 0.002 
(2.67)* 
0.002 
(3.46)* 
0.002 
(3.46)* 
0.002 
(4.55)* 
Human Capital  -0.002 
(-1.75)*** 
-0.001 
(-0.81) 
-0.002 
(-1.73)*** 
-0.001 
(-0.79) 
-0.002 
(-1.86) 
-0.001 
(-0.71) 
-0.002 
(-0.94) 
Government 
Expenditure 
-0.006 
(-2.76) 
-0.005 
(-2.13) 
-0.006 
(-2.61) 
-0.005 
(-2.09) 
-0.006 
(-2.33)** 
-0.005 
(-1.94)** 
-0.009 
(-4.13)** 
Wald 142.18 
(0.000) 
156.07 
(0.000) 
138.04 
(0.000) 
154.80 
(0.000) 
192.46 
(0.000) 
202.75 
(0.000) 
175.75 
(0.000) 
Sargan  9.99 
(0.01) 
1.91 
(0.38) 
10.32 
(0.01) 
1.912 
(0.38) 
   
Basman  9.99 
(0.01) 
1.83 
(0.40) 
4.93 
(0.01) 
0.92 
(0.40) 
   
Hansen                                      
J 
   10.72 
(0.01) 
1.19 
(0.55) 
1.19 
(0.55) 
AR (2)       (0.49) 
Hansen dif       59.30 
(0.79) 
R 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.39 
Country  65 65 65 65 22 22 22 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively  
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Table 5-10: Inequality in High Financial Intermediation (HFI) Countries using 
Alternative Econometrics Techniques 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution 
 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM 
Per Capita GDP 3.85 
(6.66)* 
3.52 
 (6.25)* 
3.42 
(5.95)* 
1.82 
(5.43)* 
Per capita GDP 
squared 
-0.22 
(-6.47)* 
-0.20 
(-6.06)* 
-0.20 
(-5.79)* 
-0.10 
(-5.10)* 
Human Capital  -.003 
(-1.85)** 
-.002 
(-1.46) 
-.002 
(-1.39) 
-.001 
(1.40) 
HFI -.001 
(-1.60)* 
-.0002 
(-0.53)* 
-.0002 
(-0.42) 
-.001 
(-2.66)* 
Population  .084 
(2.93)* 
.097 
(3.38)* 
0.092 
(3.56)* 
0.12 
(6.86)* 
government 
expenditure 
-0.009 
(-2.88)* 
-0.006 
(-2.75)* 
-0.008 
(-2.65) 
-0.007 
(-2.88) 
Inflation  0.002 
(3.05)** 
.002 
(4.43)* 
0.001 
(2.56)* 
Constant  -12.75 
(-5.27)* 
-11.5 
(-4.90)* 
-11.03 
(-4.62) 
-4.13 
(-3.01) 
Wald  90.73 
(0.000) 
159.55 
(0.000) 
140.05 
(0.000) 
215.41 
(0.000) 
Sargan  2.32 
(0.31) 
6.96 
 (0.04) 
  
Basmann 2.17 
 (0.34) 
6.76 
 (0.03) 
  
Hansen                                      
J 
  4.09 
(0.12) 
4.46 
(0.10) 
R Square  0.48 0.53 0.53 0.42 
Countries  29 29 29 29 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 5-11: Inequality and Globalisation (Openness to trade) in High Financial 
Intermediation (HFI) Countries 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution 
 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM 
Per Capita GDP 2.67 
(7.00)* 
2.52 
(6.91)* 
2.70 
(7.90)* 
2.54 
(7.57)* 
Per capita GDP 
squared 
-0.15 
(-6.69)* 
-0.145 
(-6.62)* 
-0.16 
(-7.60)* 
-0.146 
(-7.26)* 
Openness -0.0007 
(-1.52) 
-0.0002 
(-0.35) 
-0.0007 
(-1.54) 
-0.0002 
(-0.47) 
Population  0.082 
(3.73)* 
.082 
(3.97)* 
0.082 
(3.84)* 
.082 
(4.00)* 
Inflation  0.002 
(3.78)* 
 0.002 
(5.91)* 
Human Capital  -0.002 
(-1.47) 
-0.002 
(-1.41) 
-0.002 
(-1.73)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.37) 
Government 
Expenditure 
-0.005 
(-2.92)* 
-0.007 
(-3.74)* 
-0.005 
(-3.00)* 
-0.002 
(-1.65)* 
Wald  110.02 
(0.000) 
136.78 
(0.000) 
121.77 
(0.000) 
236.76 
(0.000) 
Sargan  0.95 
(0.33) 
0.72 
 (0.39) 
  
Basmann 0.91 
(0.34) 
0.69 
(0.41) 
  
Hansen                                      
J 
 1.42 
(0.23) 
1.05 
(0.10) 
R square 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50 
Country  29 29 29 29 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 5-12: Inequality and Globalisation (FDI) in High Financial Intermediation (HFI) 
Countries 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution 
 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM 
Per Capita GDP 2.71 
(6.83)* 
2.53 
(6.68)* 
2.74 
(7.42)* 
2.54 
(7.11)* 
Per capita GDP 
squared 
-0.16 
(-6.59)* 
-0.15 
(-6.45)* 
-0.16 
(-7.24)* 
-0.147 
(-6.87)* 
FDI 0.008 
(0.93) 
0.014 
(1.61)*** 
0.007 
(0.73) 
0.012 
(1.31) 
Population  0.0825 
(3.53)* 
.096 
(4.15)* 
0.084 
(3.14)* 
.095 
(3.62)* 
Inflation  0.002 
(4.28)* 
 0.002 
(7.14)* 
Human Capital  -0.003 
(-1.94)*** 
-0.002 
(-1.64)*** 
-0.003 
(-2.19)* 
-0.002 
(-1.80)*** 
Government 
Expenditure 
-0.005 
(-2.42)* 
-0.005 
(-3.15)* 
-0.005 
(-2.59)* 
-0.006 
(-3.15)* 
Wald  103.28 
(0.000) 
132.49 
(0.000) 
111.38 
(0.000) 
207.22 
(0.000) 
Sargan  0.85 
(0.35) 
0.58 
 (0.45) 
  
Basmann 0.81 
(0.37) 
0.54 
(0.46) 
  
Hansen                                      
J 
 1018 
(0.28) 
0.71 
(0.39) 
R square 0.43 0.49 0.44 0.50 
Country  29 29 29 29 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 5-13: Inequality and Globalisation (Openness to trade) in Low Financial 
Intermediation (LFI) Countries 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution 
 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM 
Per Capita GDP 0.98 
(3.45)* 
0.90 
(3.19)* 
0.90 
(3.30)* 
0.86 
(3.15)* 
Per capita GDP 
squared 
-0.056 
(-3.10)* 
-0.050 
(-2.84)* 
-0.05 
(-2.99)* 
-0.048 
(-2.84)* 
Openness -0.000 
(-0.15) 
0.000 
(0.15) 
0.000 
(-0.19) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
Population  0.123 
(5.14)* 
.132 
(5.46)* 
.13 
(4.95* 
.13 
(5.40)* 
Inflation  0.0006 
(1.92)*** 
 0.0006 
(2.25)** 
Human Capital  0.000 
(0.49) 
0.0007 
(0.66) 
0.0005 
(0.50) 
0.0007 
(0.66) 
Government 
Expenditure 
-0.006 
(-3.23)* 
-0.007 
(-3.65)* 
-0.006 
(-3.41)* 
-0.007 
(-3.82)* 
Wald  127.27 
(0.000) 
134.67 
(0.000) 
165.49 
(0.000) 
187.36 
(0.000) 
Sargan  1.89 
 (0.16) 
0.73 
 (0.39) 
  
Basmann 1.80 
 (0.18) 
0.68 
(0.40) 
  
Hansen                                      
J 
 1.85 
 (0.17) 
0.86 
(0.35) 
R square 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.51 
Country  36 36 36 36 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 5-14: Inequality and Globalisation (FDI) in Low Financial Intermediation (LFI) 
Countries 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution 
 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM 
Per Capita GDP 0.80 
(2.65)* 
0.66 
(2.18)** 
0.67 
(2.32)* 
0.58 
(1.96)*** 
Per capita GDP 
squared 
-0.043 
(-2.29)* 
-0.034 
(-1.80)*** 
-0.035 
(-1.94)*** 
-0.030 
(-
1.60)*** 
FDI 0.012 
(1.00) 
0.016 
(1.47) 
0.014 
(1.14) 
0.019 
(2.30) 
Population  0.13 
(5.08)* 
0.14 
(5.57)* 
.14 
(5.12)* 
.14 
(6.23)* 
Inflation  0.000 
(2.88)* 
 0.000 
(3.58)* 
Human Capital  0.000 
(0.11) 
0.000 
(0.31) 
0.000 
(0.16) 
0.000 
(0.30) 
Government 
Expenditure 
-0.005 
(-2.57)* 
-0.005 
(-2.90)* 
-0.004 
(-2.66)* 
-0.006 
(-3.08)* 
Wald  112.23 
(0.000) 
121.83 
(0.000) 
144.03 
(0.000) 
167.74 
(0.000) 
Sargan  6.41 
(0.01) 
3.28 
 (0.07) 
  
Basmann 6.33 
(0.01) 
3.16 
(0.08) 
  
Hansen                                      
J 
 5.26 
 (0.02) 
3.55 
(0.06) 
R square 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.45 
Country  36 36 36 36 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 5-15: Poverty and Globalisation (Openness to Trade and FDI) in Developing 
Countries  
Independent 
Variables  
Dependent Variable: Poverty 
 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 
Growth   -1.27 
(-7.34)* 
-1.26 
(-6.32)* 
-1.40 
(-7.01)* 
-1.39 
(-6.40)* 
Inequality  0.51 
(3.64)* 
0.50 
(2.59)* 
0.50 
(3.13)* 
0.53 
(2.37)* 
Inflation   0.06 
(3.76)* 
0.06 
(3.75)* 
0.053 
(2.79)* 
0.051 
(2.37)* 
Government 
Expenditure 
-0.13 
(-1.76)*** 
-0.135 
(-2.22)** 
-.15 
(-1.69)*** 
-0.15 
(-1.99)*** 
Openness   .038 
(2.07)* 
.038 
(2.06)** 
  
FDI   1.25 
(2.89)* 
1.14 
(2.18)* 
Wald 197.46 
(0.000) 
144.59 
(0.000) 
158.41 
 (0.000) 
126.53 
(0.000) 
Sargan  0.37 
(0.54) 
 0.85  
(0.65) 
 
Basman  0.36 
(0.55) 
 0.81 
(0.67) 
 
J  0.40 
(0.53) 
 0.77 
(0.68) 
R 0.56 0.56 0.45 0.47 
Country  65 65 65 65 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 5-16: Poverty and Globalisation (Openness to Trade and FDI) in High Financial 
Intermediation (HFI) Countries 
Independent 
Variables  
Dependent Variable: Poverty 
 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 
Growth   -1.17 
(-2.95)* 
-1.35 
(-2.98)* 
-1.12 
(-2.73)* 
-1.27 
(-2.69)* 
Inequality  0.65 
(1.65)*** 
0.52 
(1.28)* 
1.12 
(2.64)* 
1.002 
(2.01)* 
Human 
Capital 
0.23 
(3.55)* 
0.20 
(-3.76)* 
-0.22 
(-3.11) 
-0.24 
(-2.69)* 
Inflation   -0.04 
(-1.08)* 
-0.05 
(-2.99)* 
-0.02 
(-0.59)* 
-0.02 
(-1.69)*** 
Government 
Expenditure 
-0.56 
(-3.98)*** 
-0.61 
(-4.33)** 
-.56 
(-3.64)* 
-0.64 
(-3.84)* 
Openness   -.09 
(-2.98)* 
-.096 
(-3.43)** 
  
FDI   -1.82 
(-2.09)* 
-1.84 
(-2.12)* 
Wald 65.67 
(0.000) 
76.48 
(0.000) 
57.80 
(0.000) 
44.86 
(0.000) 
Sargan  11.68 
 (0.00) 
 9.45 
 (0.00) 
 
Basman  12.51 
 (0.00) 
 9.72 
(0.00) 
 
J Stat  11.96 
(0.00) 
 13.26 
(0.00) 
R 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.47 
Country  29 29 29 29 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 5-17: Poverty and Globalisation (Openness to Trade and FDI) in Low Financial 
Intermediation (LFI) Countries 
Independent 
Variables  
Dependent Variable: Poverty 
 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 
Growth   -1.75 
(-5.31)* 
-1.63 
(-4.25)* 
-1.78 
(-4.42)* 
-1.74 
(-4.58)* 
Inequality  0.57 
(2.85)* 
0.58 
(2.06)* 
0.58 
(2.48)* 
0.58 
(1.76)*** 
Human 
Capital 
0.09 
(1.63) 
0.081 
(1.34) 
0.05 
(0.84) 
0.067 
(1.14) 
Inflation   0.028 
(1.05) 
0.033 
(1.20)* 
0.02 
(0.68)* 
0.01 
(0.27) 
Government 
Expenditure 
-0.35 
(-2.02)* 
-0.35 
(-2.05)** 
-.18 
(-0.92) 
-0.19 
(-1.30) 
Openness   .098 
(2.32)* 
0.10 
(2.10)** 
  
FDI   1.30 
 (2.00)** 
1.36 
(2.20)* 
Wald 132.72 
 (0.000) 
135.23 
(0.000) 
102.98 
 (0.000) 
135.00  
(0.000) 
Sargan  1.55 
(0.21) 
 1.16 
(1.28) 
 
Basman  1.41 
(0.23) 
 1.05 
(0.31) 
 
J Stat  2.00 (0.16)  1.86 
(0.17) 
R 0.64 0.64 0.53 0.52 
Country  36 36 36 36 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 5-18: A Comparative Summary of Inequality and Poverty Consequences of 
Globalisation 
Dependent Variables 
Income Inequality  Poverty 
Globalisation Measures Globalisation Measures 
Countries  
Trade Openness  FDI Trade Openness  FDI 
All Developing  (-) & insignificant  (+) & significant  (+) & significant  (+) & significant 
 
HFI Countries (-) & insignificant  (+) & insignificant  (-) & significant  (-) & significant 
 
LFI Countries  (+) & highly insig.  (+) & sig, not 
robust  
(+) & significant  (+) & significant 
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Appendix: 
 
Table 5-19: Inequality and Interactive Effect of Trade and Development  
Variables 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS LIML LIML GMM GMM GMM 
Log (per 
capita GDP) 
1.50 
(4.27)* 
2.27 
(7.27)* 
1.41 
(4.23)* 
1.52 
(4.28)* 
1.42 
(4.24)* 
1.52 
(4.12)* 
1.43 
(4.06)* 
2.24 
(6.84)* 
Log (per 
capita GDP) 
squared 
-.07 
(-3.25)* 
-.13 
(-3.92)* 
-.07 
(-3.15)* 
-.07 
(-3.26)* 
-.07 
(-3.16)* 
-.07 
(-3.14)* 
-.07 
(-3.05)* 
-.13 
(-6.53)* 
Trade 
Openness 
0.022 
(4.73)* 
0.0004 
(0.61) 
0.023 
(5.28)* 
0.022 
(4.72)* 
0.023 
(5.27)* 
0.021 
(3.81)* 
0.022 
(4.31)* 
0.0004 
(0.65) 
Trade and 
Dev 
-.003 
(-4.79)* 
 -.003 
(-5.43)* 
-.003 
(-4.77)* 
-.003 
(-5.41)* 
-.003 
(-3.87)* 
-.003 
(-4.46)* 
 
Human 
Capital  
-0.002 
(-2.11)** 
-0.002 
(-1.6)*** 
-0.002 
(-2.31)** 
-0.002 
(-2.11)** 
-0.002 
(-2.32)** 
-0.002 
(-2.50)* 
-0.002 
(-2.74)* 
-0.002 
(-1.8)*** 
HFI -.0003 
(-0.93) 
  -.0003 
(-0.94) 
 -.0003 
(-0.95) 
  
Trade and 
HFI 
 -.000 
(-1.83)*** 
     0.000 
(-2.11)** 
Population  0.092 
(5.20)* 
0.11 
(5.57)* 
0.079 
(4.90)* 
0.092 
(5.20)* 
0.079 
(4.90)* 
0.091 
(5.64)* 
0.080 
(4.78)* 
0.11 
(6.62)* 
government 
expenditure 
-0.006 
(-3.90)* 
-0.006 
(-3.34)* 
-0.006 
(-4.29)* 
-0.006 
(-3.90)* 
-0.006 
(-4.29)* 
-0.006 
(-3.95)* 
-0.007 
(-4.20)* 
-0.006 
(-3.54)* 
Inflation 0.001 
(2.27)* 
0.001 
(2.24)* 
0.001 
(2.70)* 
0.001 
(2.26)* 
0.001 
(2.69)* 
0.001 
(2.89)* 
0.002 
(3.42)* 
0.001 
(2.77)* 
Constant  -3.56 
(-2.62)* 
-6.00 
(-4.69)* 
-3.16 
(-2.46)* 
-3.58 
(-2.64)* 
-3.19 
(-2.48)* 
-3.55 
(-2.54)* 
-3.19 
(-2.35)* 
-5.88 
(-4.36)* 
Wald 227.52 
(0.000) 
165.83 
(0.000) 
227.01 
(0.000) 
227.57 
(0.000) 
227.10 
(0.000) 
269.93 
(0.000) 
241.56 
(0.000) 
241.38 
(0.000) 
Sargan  1.91 
(0.17) 
1.61 
(0.21) 
2.21 
(0.14) 
1.93 
(0.16) 
2.24 
(0.13) 
   
Basmann 1.83 
(0.18) 
1.54 
(0.21) 
2.13 
(0.14) 
1.84 
(0.18) 
2.14 
(0.15) 
   
Hansen      1.35 
(0.25) 
1.62 
(0.20) 
1.06 
(0.30) 
Countries  65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
R Square 0.50 0.41 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.41 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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6. Growth, Inequality, Trade and Credit Market 
Imperfections: A Cross Country Analysis 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The 20th century saw uneven improvement in living standards of people in different parts of 
the world. According to the World Bank (2001b), poverty has declined over the past twenty 
years but the progress has been unequal. The number of people living below poverty line fell 
from 1.5 billion in 1981 to 1.1 billion in 2001. Despite this development, many countries are 
still facing the problem of poverty and suffering from the vicious circle of the poverty trap. 
Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa rose from 41 % to 46% over the period 1981-2001, while in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia poverty increased to 20% in 2001. Hence, reducing poverty 
has become an important challenge for developing countries. 
 
Economic growth is considered to be a powerful, key force which can significantly reduce 
poverty incidence as rapid and sustained growth creates employment opportunities and high 
wage rates. Nevertheless, the extent of poverty reduction in response to growth primarily 
depends on two factors: initial level of income inequality, and response of inequality to 
growth. As mentioned previously, in Chapter Five, economic growth can affect inequality in 
either direction depending upon the levels of economic development. If income inequality 
increases in response to high economic growth then poverty may not fall to a significant level. 
A number of developing countries witnessed high growth levels in various periods but poverty 
still exists since inequalities have also increased. For instance, most South and East Asian 
economies have grown at a high rate since the 1970s, together with moderate level of 
inequality, although this has increased over time. On the other hand, Latin American countries 
growth rates are less than half of the average growth rates of South and East Asian economies 
while high inequality is maintained. The differences in inequality at a given rate of growth 
show that various combinations of polices and institutions across countries have an effect on 
inequality. It can be argued that linking poverty to economic growth will not serve the 
purpose, but poverty reduction requires a combination of high growth rates and policies which 
ensure less inequality. 
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This study attempts to investigate deep predictors of cross-country growth differences with a 
particular focus on the role of inequality and trade. However, the question arises as to why re-
investigation of the relationship between growth, inequality and trade is necessary in the 
presence of a vast body of literature in this particular area. The motivation for this particular 
piece of work is manifold. First, growth, inequality and trade relationships are central to 
macroeconomic policies and, most importantly, these variables are important for poverty 
reduction in low-income developing countries. Second, the available evidence on the growth 
effects of inequality and trade does not provide a definite relationship. Third, relationships 
depend on the availability of long series of data. Fourth, recently, literature has begun to point 
out that growth effects of trade are not necessarily positive. However, most of these studies 
identify various mechanisms to support the adverse growth effects of trade by making a 
distinction between developed and developing countries, where effects are favourable in the 
case of developed countries and detrimental in the case of developing countries. We argue that 
such a differentiation within developing countries will be more useful, as developing countries 
in general, and those within same group of development in particular, share similar 
characteristics. In other words, it will be more useful to assess whether inequality and trade 
effects of growth vary between developing countries. Does it matter if a country belongs to a 
group of low-income developing countries or high-income developing countries? If the answer 
to this question is yes, then it would be interesting to determine those characteristics which 
make possible such a distinction and to formulate policy action for other developing countries 
which lack these characteristics.  
 
Theoretical and empirical research into the effect of economic growth on inequality has 
produced very mixed results. On the one hand, theoretical studies by Kaldor (1957), Saint-
Paul and Verdier (1993) and Galor and Tsiddon (1997a, 1997b) predict a positive growth 
impact of inequality through incentives, physical capital accumulation, saving rates or 
investment indivisibility mechanism. On the other hand, theoretical studies by Galor and Zeira 
(1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and de la Croix and Doepke 
(2003) predict a negative growth impact of inequality. The negative growth impact of 
inequality comes about through socio-political instability, imperfections in credit markets, 
fiscal redistribution and distortion, and fertility differential channels. Thus, extant theoretical 
literature does not provide a definite relationship between inequality and growth.  
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Similarly, on the empirical side, findings on the growth impact of inequality are also mixed, at 
best. On the one hand, Partridge (1997), Li and Zou (1998), Forbes (2000), and Lundberg and 
Squire (2003) provide empirical evidence that the growth impact of inequality is positive, 
while, on the other hand, Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Wan, Lu 
and Chen (2006), and Sukiassyan (2007) provide empirical evidence that the growth effect of 
inequality is negative. However, Barro (2000) shows that the growth impact of inequality is 
insignificant in a large sample of both developed and developing countries. 
 
Growth-inequality nexus might be better characterised using a non-linear relationship. For 
instance, Voitchovsky (2005) finds that the growth effect of inequality is positive at the top 
quantiles of distribution while it is negative at the lower end of the distribution. Fallah and 
Partridge (2007) argue that the growth effect of inequality varies between urban and non-
metro samples. They found that the effect of inequality on growth was positive in the urban 
sample while the effect appeared to be negative in the non-metro sample. Furthermore, 
Bjornskov (2008) claims that inequality is good for economic growth under right-wing 
governments while growth-inequality nexus appears to be negative under left-wing 
governments. 
 
We argue that inequality can be viewed as a “natural phenomenon” or at least we can expect it 
to be natural in the context of a market-based economic system. In a market economy, income 
differentials of individuals depend, at least to some extent, on their marginal productivities and 
comparative advantages. Long ago, Rousseau (1755) declared that inequalities among 
individuals were set when ancient man left the natural state and developed the first society.  
 
In the same century, Adam Smith observed that differences among individuals which are 
responsible for inequalities are intrinsic parts of economic systems. He argued that the division 
of labour, instead of the inherent characteristics of individuals, causes “the very different 
genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions” (Smith, 1776, p. 15-16).  
 
In this way, Schumpeter views incentives that determine economic performance of individuals 
and their rewards. The distribution of economic awards, however, is not random but depends 
on skill, energy and work capacity. Nevertheless, if it is important to measure a personal input 
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or skill that generates a particular success then in fact paid rewards may be viewed as uneven. 
Therefore inequality tends to exist and prevail than a more fair distribution (Schumpeter, 
1942, p.109). 
 
There can be many reasons for the existence of a natural inequality in a society ranging from 
structural conditions (such as land distribution and rural urban conditions) to more endogenous 
conditions (such as characteristics intrinsic to individuals). Intellectual attributes (such as 
intelligence and innate abilities) and physical attributes (such as strengths and skills) are the 
most fundamental characteristics which determine variations in the marginal productivity of 
individuals and their incomes. If we believe that a moderate level of inequality is a natural and 
even necessary phenomenon in a market economy then another question arises as to what is 
the optimal level of inequality or, put in another way, what level of inequality is detrimental to 
economic growth. The answer to this question requires an exclusive control for non-linearity 
in the growth-inequality relationship. This study empirically tests the presence of such an 
optimal level of inequality for a large set of developing countries. 
 
This study argues that the non-linear nature of the growth-inequality relationship is more 
likely to exist in developing countries as the theoretical channels predicting adverse effects of 
inequality (e.g., political instability, social unrest, market imperfections and fertility 
mechanisms) are more common in developing countries. Furthermore, mechanisms predicting 
positive growth effects of inequality are more likely to prevail in low-income developing 
countries. A moderate level of inequality is a natural phenomenon because individuals differ 
naturally in their abilities in terms of work and income. In particular, hard work, consistency 
and commitment are the key factors that derive an individual’s economic performance and 
their incomes. In sum, inequalities are acceptable up to a moderate level and positive 
dynamics of inequality dominate up to a certain level of inequality. However, once this level is 
crossed, negative dynamics of inequality begin to prevail. 
 
 
International trade is another important factor which plays a critical role in determining cross-
country variations in growth. Assessing growth performance in an open economy is an issue 
of considerable debate and interest. However, neither theoretical nor empirical studies have 
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provided a definite conclusion about the growth impact of trade (see, for example, Edwards, 
1993; Lopez, 2005 for further details). 
 
Theoretical research on growth and trade suggests that long-term economic growth may 
benefit from increased international trade. Trade facilitates technological advancement in 
importing countries as imports of high technological goods are potential source of diffusion of 
knowledge and technology (see, for example, Grossman and Helpman 1990, 1991; Rivera-
Batiz and Romer, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997; and Baldwin et al., 2005). Some other 
theoretical studies argue that openness to trade extends market size that allows countries to 
better capture economies of scale (Romer, 1989; Ades and Glaeser, 1999; Alesina et al., 2000; 
and Bond et al., 2005). A high degree of foreign competition exerts pressure on governments 
to commit to reform programs (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
 
Some theoretical studies, on the other hand, suggest a negative impact of increased trade on 
economic growth. If some economies specialise in sectors with comparative disadvantage in 
R&D then improvements in R&D efficiency or increase in global resources need not increase 
the steady-state growth rate (Grossman and Helpman, 1990, 1991). In this respect, Redding 
(1999) points out that trade openness might contribute adversely to long-run growth, if an 
economy specialises in those sectors where dynamic comparative disadvantages hold. 
Similarly, trade might contribute negatively to long-run growth if economies specialise in 
those sectors where learning by doing and innovation opportunities have largely been 
exhausted (Lucas, 1988; Young, 1991). In such a type of economy, protection in selected 
sectors can foster long-term economic growth. 
 
In addition, theoretical models of technological diffusion suggest that the relationship between 
trade and growth is dissimilar for countries at different stages of economic development. 
Although trade facilitates the diffusion of innovations, knowledge and technology, adoption of 
the technology depends on the absorptive capacity of a country which depends on human 
capital (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005), research and development 
(Verspagen, 1991; Fagerberg, 1994), or financial sector development (Aghion et al., 2005). 
Countries with better human capital and mature financial systems are in a better position to 
take full advantage of technology transfer.  
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Among domestic factors, the role and importance of inequality is central in determining 
growth, where as in an open economy the role and importance of trade is critical in 
determining growth. Many theoretical and empirical studies have shown that trade openness is 
beneficial for growth. However, in recent years, the literature has begun to indicate that the 
growth effects of trade are not necessarily positive. Nevertheless, adverse growth effects of 
trade are not directly blamed on the trade; there are domestic conditions such as human 
capital, mature financial systems, and stable policies which determine the growth effects of 
trade. 
 
High inequality in some societies is closely linked to the domestic conditions of the economy. 
In fact, high inequality is a deeper cause of many adverse domestic conditions such as lack of 
investment in human capital, policy instability and fertility differentials. So the natural 
question to ask is whether the growth effects of trade depend on the prevalence of high 
inequalities in developing counties. Such a distinction is necessary because more segregated 
societies find it difficult to manage collective actions and sound macroeconomic polices. To 
best of our knowledge, such a distinction has been virtually ignored in the current literature. 
We assess the role and importance of initial inequality in determining the growth effects of 
trade and find substantial empirical support that the growth effect of trade varies between less 
and more unequal societies.  
 
Theoretical literature suggests that in countries where income inequalities are high, investment 
in human capital remains low because the poor do not have sufficient collateral to finance 
investment in human capital (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Fisherman and Simhon, 2002). Similarly, 
theoretical models suggest that high income inequalities are grounded in social conflicts, 
macroeconomic instability, low investment in human capital, an unskilled labour force and 
weak financial institutions (Persson and Tabellini (1994); Alesina and Perotti (1996); Alesina 
and Rodrigo (1994); Keefer and Knack (2000); Baumol (2007)). These socio-economic 
conditions hamper the absorptive capacity of a country to take a full advantage of 
technological transfer.  
 
Societies which face a high level of income inequalities also face problems in collective 
actions and coordinated macroeconomic polices. Theoretical studies argue that it is difficult to 
manage collective actions in more unequal societies that are possibly characterised by political 
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instability, a tendency towards redistributive policies, or high volatility in policies (Persson 
and Tabellini, 1994; Alsenia and Rodrick, 1994). Since more unequal societies restrict well-
coordinated macroeconomic policies, it is likely that these societies also restrict the ability of a 
country to take full advantage of foreign competition.  
 
Recently, the literature has identified that complementary policy reforms play an important 
role in determining favourable growth effects of trade. Chang et al. (2009) illustrate with a 
simple Harris-Todaro model that labour market flexibility plays an important role in 
determining welfare gains after trade openness. They argue that the effect of trade openness on 
growth depends on complementary policy reforms such as reforms related to financial depth, 
governance, labour market flexibility, and inflation stabilisation. They argue that such 
complementary policy reforms are helpful in taking advantage of foreign competition. Their 
study finds substantial empirical support for their argument from a cross-country analysis.  
 
Inequality is good for growth only in a linear relationship while inequalities are harmful for 
growth after a certain point. This implies that improvement of a high degree of inequality will 
not only have direct benefit in the form of positive growth but may also have indirect benefit, 
by allowing a country to take full advantage of trade openness. 
 
The contribution of this study is to assess whether the trade-growth relationship depends on 
the income distribution differences in developing countries or, more generally, whether this 
relation differs between countries depending on their initial level of income distribution. The 
interactive role of trade and income distribution has been virtually ignored in the current 
literature.  
 
In addition, this study contributes in many ways to the existing literature on growth, inequality 
and trade. First, for this study, a new panel data set was prepared over a long period (1965-
2008) for 65 developing countries using various sources of data and manual calculation. 
Seeking high quality data, an effort has been made to ensure that statistics are comparable 
across countries and over time by the use of similar definitions of variables for each country 
and year. The availability of long data series enabled us to test the very nature of long- term 
growth-inequality relationship that is missing in previous studies.  
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Second, this study also introduces non-linear dimensions of inequality affecting growth. This 
study argues that effect of inequality on economic growth is not uniform across different 
levels of development. Inequality is beneficial for growth in those counties where the level of 
development is high, while it is harmful for those counties that are at on a lower rung of 
development. Third, this study argues that growth benefits of trade vary substantially across 
developing countries and regions. In particular, success stories of East Asian countries that 
appear to show openness as being good for growth cannot be generalised to all developing 
countries (Majeed and Ahmad, 2006). Fourth, this study incorporates the role of corruption in 
determining the growth-inequality relationship, which is missing in existing literature. 
 
Fifth, generally, cross-country studies examine the growth-inequality relationship with a 
combined sample of developing and developed countries, thereby treating them equally. This 
study, however, exclusively tests various hypotheses only for developing countries, keeping in 
view the substantial structural and socio-economic differences between developing and 
developed countries. We replicate the analysis for a sub-sample of countries that are members 
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)31. According to the annual economic 
report on the OIC countries 201032, economic performance in developing OIC countries is 
substantially different from the rest of the developing countries. Separate regression modelling 
for OIC countries is useful in two ways. First, it is helpful for the analysis of robustness for all 
developing countries and, second, it will capture parameter differences in OIC countries.  
 
This study adds to this emerging literature by addressing to the following questions: (1) Is 
inequality harmful for growth? (2) Does the effect of inequality on growth vary over the path 
of development and across regions? (3) Is the relationship between inequality and growth is 
perhaps non-linear? (4) What is the role of financial market imperfection in determining the 
growth-inequality relationship? (5) Does openness to trade promote economic growth equally 
across the developing countries or do the effects of trade liberalisation on economic growth 
depend on income distribution differences?  
Consistent with the objectives of the study, the following hypotheses will be tested: 
                                                 
31
 The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is the second largest inter-governmental organisation after 
the United Nations which has membership of 57 states spread over four continents. 
32
 http://www.sesric.org/publications-detail.php?id=159 
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Hypotheses 1: In the linear specification, inequality is positively correlated with economic 
growth. In the case of non-linear specification, a moderate level of inequality positively affects 
growth, while a high level of inequality is detrimental to growth. 
Hypotheses 2: Other things being equal, inequality tends to be positively related to economic 
growth in the short term but negatively correlated in the long run. 
Hypotheses 3: The independent effect of inequality and high financial intermediation tends to 
be positively correlated with economic growth while their combined effects are harmful for 
growth  
Hypotheses 4: Inequality tends to be negatively related to economic growth in countries with 
a lower level of development but positively correlated in countries with a higher level of 
development, other things being equal. 
Hypotheses 5: Trade is good for growth; however, its effect is substantially influenced by the 
domestic context in terms of prevalence of high income inequalities. Trade adversely affects 
growth in economies where inequalities are comparatively high. 
 
The rest of the discussion is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the related 
literature on growth, inequality, openness and credit market imperfection while section 3 
provides a discussion of data. Section 4 presents an analytical framework for the study. 
Section 5 put forwards the results derived from the hypotheses and a discussion of these 
results. Finally, section 6 provides a conclusion. 
 
6.2.     Inequality and economic growth: theory and evidence 
In this section, we discuss various theories of the growth-inequality relationship with a 
particular focus on the controversial nature of the relationship. A summary of the relation has 
been provided using flow chart. Some selected empirical studies have been summarised in 
Table 1. This section also includes a brief discussion on the role of credit market imperfections 
and trade in relationship to economic growth.  
 
6.2.1: Channels through which inequality can affect economic growth 
The literature is not yet conclusive as to whether inequality exerts a positive or negative 
influence on economic growth. There are different mechanisms through which inequality can 
affect growth. On the one hand, Kaldor (1957) predicts a positive effect of inequality on 
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growth. Since the marginal propensity of the rich to save is higher than that of the poor, a 
higher intensity of inequality increases aggregate savings which, in turn, increase capital 
accumulation and economic growth. 
 
On the other hand, Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alsenia and Rodrick (1994) predict 
negative growth effects of inequality using the four main channels. First, a higher degree of 
inequality encourages rent-seeking activities that reduce the security of property rights; 
second, it is difficult to manage collective actions in more unequal societies, which may be 
seen in political instability, a tendency towards redistributive policies, or high volatility in 
policies, all of which can be detrimental to growth; third, median voters in more unequal 
societies are relatively poor and support redistributive policies through high tax burdens; 
fourth, if inequality coexists with credit market imperfections then poor people may not be 
able to invest in human and physical capital, thereby reducing long-term growth. 
 
Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) examined the importance of median voters in relation to 
economic growth. They argue that median voters favour high taxation to finance public 
expenditure. Investment in public education increases human capital and economic growth. 
Benabou (1996) builds a theoretical model with the assumption of heterogeneous individuals 
to show a positive impact of inequality on growth. He demonstrates that segregated and more 
unequal societies, at least in the short run, can have higher rates of growth as the degree of 
complementarity between individuals’ human capital is stronger in local interactions than in 
global ones. Galor and Tsiddon (1997a, b) provide two theories to support the positive 
relationship between growth and inequality. First, an individual’s level of human capital 
depends on a home environment externality. In other words, an individual’s human capital 
depends on the parents’ level of education or it is an increasing function of the parents’ level 
of education. Their model predicts that if a home environment externality is strong enough 
then a high degree of inequality may be a necessary condition for growth to “take off” in a less 
developed country. In the second model, they show that inequality increases during periods of 
major technological inventions which, by enhancing and the concentration of highly skilled 
workers in technologically advanced sectors, will generate higher rates of technological 
progress and growth. These aforementioned theoretical papers have received little attention in 
the literature on establishing a relationship between growth and inequality as the majority of 
studies present a negative relationship between inequality and growth.  
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                       Galor and Zeira (1993) and Fisherman and Simhon (2002) show that high inequality in the 
presence of imperfect capital markets means individuals face credit constraints as they lack 
collateral. As a result, they are not able to make an investment in human and physical capital. 
High inequality also causes a rise in the fertility rates and less investment in human capital. 
  
De la Croix and Doepke (2003) argue that poor parents prefer to have more children and make 
less investment in their education. Such a preference leads to a lower average education in a 
society if the fertility differential between the rich and the poor is high. They further argue that 
the fertility differential, in turn, depends on income inequality. If high inequalities increase the 
fertility differential then societies with higher inequalities tend to accumulate less human 
capital, and thus grow more slowly. 
 
Forbes (2000) found a positive relationship between inequality and growth. She argues that 
most likely reasons for the contradiction of results are country specific, omitted variable bias, 
data quality issues and length of period under consideration. In order to overcome such 
problems, Forbes (2000) used fixed effects and random effects models, with a sample of 45 
countries whose income inequality data was deemed to be of high quality. She concluded that 
in the short or medium run the relationship is positive, while in the long run it is negative. 
 
Alesina and Rodrick (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Clarke (1995) found a negative 
relationship between growth and inequality. These studies were mainly based on the 
estimation of convergence equation in which the income inequality variable was added to the 
set of explanatory variables to explain differences in growth rates across countries. However, 
due to the scarcity of data on income inequality, most of these studies examined the effect of 
income inequality in 1960 on the average growth rate of per capita income over the period 
1960-90.  
 
Galor and Moav (1999) argue that inequality positively affects physical capital, while 
negatively affecting human capital accumulation in the presence of credit market constraints. 
In the early stages of development, returns on physical capital are high as it is scarce and the 
development process is driven by physical capital. The positive effect is sufficiently strong to 
offset the negative effect of human capital because savings are an increasing function of 
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wealth - higher savings increase capital accumulation and growth process. However, at later 
stages of the economic development, the positive effect is offset by negative effects.  
 
Similarly, Galor (2000) argues that the classical approach to the growth-inequality relationship 
is valid at the early stages of economic development where physical capital is the prime 
engine of economic growth. Since capital is scarce in the early stages of economic 
development, higher savings are important in order to accumulate capital. However, at later 
stages of economic development, human capital becomes the main engine of growth as returns 
to human capital increases. Here the negative effect of inequality on human capital decreases 
because credit constraints are less binding to higher wages. Therefore, the effect of inequality 
on the growth process turns out to be insignificant. 
.  
 
1.       Description of channels through which inequality can affect growth 
   Classical Approach 
Keynes (1920), Kaldor (1956), Bourguignon (1981) 
                                                                      
 
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
High initial income inequality  
High capital accumulation 
Higher aggregate saving (marginal propensity to save of the rich higher 
High economic growth 
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Modern Approaches: Inequality is Harmful 
Persson and Tabellini (1994); Alesina and Perotti (1996); Alesina and Rodrigo (1994); 
 Keefer and Knack (2000); Baumol (2007); Majeed (2010) 
 
 
 
                      
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
       
                                                                                                               
                                                        
                                                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
Modern Approaches: Inequality is Beneficial 
Gilles Saint-Paul and Thierry Verdier (1993; Benabou (1996); 
Oded Galor and Daniel Tsidddon (1997a, b); Baumol (2007) 
             
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
         
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
       
                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                          
                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                           
The Unified Approach: Galor (2000); Galor and Moav (2004) 
  
                                                                                                                                                         
       
 
                                          
                                                                                      ↓                                                                                                                    
       
                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                  
High rent 
seeking 
activities 
Social 
tension and 
political 
instability 
Poor median 
voter 
Coexisting 
with imperfect 
credit market 
Reduce 
security 
property 
right 
Increased 
uncertainty  
Demand for 
redistribution Unlikely to 
invest in 
human and 
physical 
capital Lower 
investment  
Higher 
taxation  
Lower economic growth 
Early stage of development Physical 
capital is prime engine of economic 
growth 
Later stage of development Human 
capital accumulation is prime 
engine of economic growth  
 High initial income inequality                       
Positive effect of inequality on                                                                     
saving is offset or dominated by the 
negative effect on                                                                 
investment in human capital                                          
accumulation. 
 
High saving rates                                   
High physical capital accumulation               
High economic growth 
    High initial inequality               
Impoverished 
labour force 
Low 
productivity 
of labour 
force 
Technological inventions Poor median voter 
Mobility and concentrations of 
high-ability in technological 
advanced sectors 
Elect a higher rate of 
taxation to finance 
public education 
 
Increase aggregate human capital 
Higher economic growth 
Large financial rewards as 
incentives for vigorous 
productive efforts 
High productivity of labour 
force 
High initial income inequality 
Greater distortion 
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6.2.2. Role of credit market imperfections 
 
In the literature, many studies point to credit market imperfections as a likely reason for the 
inverse relationship between inequality and growth in the long run (Galor and Zeira, 1993; 
Banerjee and Newman (1993); Aghion and Bolton, 1997). In the presence of credit market 
imperfections, the poor are not able to borrow because of a shortage of collateral. Hence, the 
poor do not have same chances of financing the education of their children as do the rich. 
Thus, countries with high inequalities underutilise their potential for productivity and growth. 
Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) argue that income inequality may 
be perpetuated in the long run in the presence of credit market imperfections and technological 
indivisibility. Credit market imperfections in the presence of unequal distribution of income 
also imply unequal opportunities of investment in the short run. This causes polarisation and 
polarisation is perpetuated in the long run because of assumed invisibility in investment 
technology. Such polarisation adversely affects long-run growth as production technology 
shows non-decreasing returns to scale. 
 
Barro (2000) considers credit market imperfection as a likely reason for the positive 
relationship between inequality and economic growth in the short run. The exploitation of 
investment opportunities depends to some extent on individuals’ level of income and assets 
when access to credit is limited. Investment in human capital, which offers relatively higher 
returns, is forgone by the poor. As the negative effect of decline in human capital investment 
on economic growth emerges over a long period of time, so it might be possible that in the 
short run, economic growth increases because of the dominant positive effect of investment in 
physical capital. However, in long run, growth rates may become negative when the negative 
consequences of a decline in human capital investment are sufficient to outweigh the positive 
growth effects of investment in physical capital.  
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Table 1: Summary Review of the Empirical Literature  
Authors Estimation 
method 
Specification/
Model 
Inequality effect 
on growth  
Accounting 
for 
nonlinearities  
Sample  Study 
period  
Persson and 
Tabellini 
(1994) 
OLS  Political 
Economy 
Model 
Negative  No 67 1960-85 
Perotti 
(1996) 
OLS  Perotti  Negative  No 67 1960-85 
Alesina and 
Perotti 
(1996) 
2SLS, 3SLS Sociopolitical 
Stability 
Model 
Negative  No 70 1960-85 
Li and Zou 
(1998) 
Panel, fixed 
effects 
Lee and Zou  Positive  No 46 1960-94 
Barro 
(2000) 
3SLS  Barro  Whole Sample: 
Insignificant; 
poor; Negative; 
Rich: Positive 
Yes 100 1965-95 
Forbes 
(2000) 
Panel, fixed 
effects 
Perotti  
(lag 1) 
Positive  No 45 1966-95 
Banerjee 
and Duflo 
(2003)  
Fixed, 
Random 
Panel; First 
Difference; 
Arellano and 
Bond 
Perotti, Barro Inconclusive: 
Positive for 
Perotti, Mixed 
for Barro 
Specifications 
Yes 45 - 
Bjornskov 
(2008) 
Fixed, 
Random 
Panel 
Perotti, Barro Negative for 
leftwing 
governments; 
positive for 
rightwing 
governments 
Yes  178 1975-
2000 
Herzer and 
Vollmer 
(2011) 
OLS, Panel 
cointegration 
Techniques  
Galor and 
Moav 
Negative  No 46 1970-96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.3. Trade, growth and inequality  
The idea that trade has an impact on economic growth goes back at least to Adam Smith. The 
standard models of trade predict that lower trade barriers generate static gains for a country. 
Recently, many studies have shown a positive impact of increased trade on the economic 
growth of a country (Dollar, 1992; Edwards, 1993; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Dollar and 
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Kraay, (2001a). Grossman and Helpman (1990) argue that gains from trade are dynamic and 
helpful for sustained growth rates. Frankel and Romer (1999) in a cross-country study, found 
that trade openness has a positive and significant effect on economic growth. 
 
There are a number of mechanisms through which trade allows a country to improve its 
growth rates. Trade allows economies to exploit the sectors where they have a comparative 
advantage in production. Trade expands the market size, which is helpful for production on a 
larger and efficient scale. Trade diffuses new technologies and thus improves the productivity 
and performance of local workers and managers. Technology transfer is particularly helpful 
for developing countries which have little capacity to develop new technologies. Consumers 
also benefit from trade as lower trade barriers provide them with a variety of cheap products, 
thereby increasing their purchasing power and living standards. Similarly, producers also 
benefit from buying cheap inputs from international markets.  
 
Although it is widely accepted among economists and policy makers that trade is an engine of 
economic growth, the literature on the growth effects of trade also suggests that trade-led 
growth may not be an appropriate strategy for sustained and rapid growth in the presence of 
distortions such as credit market imperfections, political instability, weak institutions and poor 
infrastructure.  
 
 
2.       Description of channels through which trade can affect growth 
Trade is beneficial for long-run growth 
Grossman and Helpman (1990, 1991); Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991); Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997); Baldwin 
et al., (2005): Romer (1989), Ades and Glaeser (1999), Alesina et al. (2000), and Bond et al. (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
         
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
       
                                      Trade is not beneficial for long-run growth 
 
Facilitates technological 
advancement 
Extends market size 
Diffusion of knowledge 
and technology through 
imports 
Allows countries to 
better capture 
economies of scale  
Higher ec nomic growth 
Provides cheap inputs 
Cost of production 
falls 
Increased trade 
Neoclassical 
Comparative Advantage 
Resource 
endowment 
(HO model) 
Differences in 
technology 
(Ricardian model) 
Endogenous growth literature 
  198 
Trade is harmful for long-run growth 
 
Grossman and Helpman (1990, 1991); Redding (1999); Lucas (1988); Young (1991) 
 
 
 
 
 
             
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
         
                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Growth effects of trade are conditional 
 
Cohen and Levinthal, (1989); Benhabib and Spiegel (2005); Verspagen, (1991); Fagerberg; (1994); Aghion et al., 
(2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
       
                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                       
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
Problems related to high degree of inequality 
Persson and Tabellini (1994); Alesina and Perotti (1996); Alesina and Rodrigo (1994); Keefer and Knack (2000); 
Baumol (2007) 
 
 
 
 
                      
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
             
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
       
                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Human capital 
development  
Research and 
development  
Financial 
development  
Technological spill over effects are conditional 
Adoption of technology depends on  
Absorptive capacity which depends on  
Lack of 
compliment
ary policy 
reforms 
Political 
instability 
and social 
tensions  
Poor 
median 
voter 
Credit market 
imperfections 
Growth effects of 
trade depend on 
complimentary 
policy reforms 
Increased 
uncertainty  
Tendency 
towards 
redistributive 
polices 
Lower 
investment in 
human capital 
Trade may lower economic growth under these conditions 
Impoverished 
labour force 
Low 
productivity 
of labour 
force 
High initial income inequality 
Growth effects of trade vary between developed and developing countries 
Growth effects of 
trade depend on 
complimentary 
policy reforms such 
as governance, labor 
market flexibility, 
and inflation 
stabilization. 
Difficult to manage collective policy actions 
If specialization in sectors 
where comparatives 
disadvantage holds 
If specialization in sectors 
where dynamic comparatives 
disadvantage holds 
Lower economic growth 
If specialization in those sectors where 
learning by doing and innovation 
opportunities have largely exhausted 
Increased trade 
Specialization increases 
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6.3. Data  
We use the Gini coefficient, one of the most popular representations of income inequality, to 
measure income inequality. It is based on the Lorenz Curve, which plots the share of 
population against the share of income received and has a minimum value of 0 (perfect 
equality) and maximum value of 1 (perfect inequality). Missing values in income inequality 
data are the major problem in cross-country analysis. Many developing countries have only 
one or two observations. Therefore, we expanded the existing database by including 
comparable data on poverty and inequality from recent household surveys included in World 
Bank, UNDP, IMF Staff reports and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Similarly, we 
encounter another problem with inequality data that is, the availability of different 
observations for a given survey year. We chose those values that are considered to be high 
quality in the empirical literature on inequality. 
 
To make the data more comparable, we take data on variables in the form of averages between 
two survey years. Per capita real GDP growth rates are annual averages between two survey 
years. To find per capita real GDP growth rates, we subtract the value in the current year from 
the value in the previous year and then divide it by the value in the previous year. We use the 
same formula to find the previous year’s growth rate and then take the average of the growth 
rates of two consecutive periods. The data on real GDP are derived from the IMF and the 
International Financial Statistics databases.  
 
Panel data for 65 developing countries for the period 1965-2008 has been assembled with the 
data averaged over periods of three to seven years, depending on the availability of inequality 
and poverty data. The minimum number of observations for each country is three and the 
maximum, nine. That is, only countries with observations for at least three consecutive periods 
are included. In the dataset, two household surveys per country define what is called an 
interval, of three to seven years in length. The entire sample includes 337 observations and 
272 intervals. 
 
To measure credit market imperfection, we construct a dummy variable HFI equal to one for 
countries with a high level of financial intermediation that is above the median in the sample. 
Following King and Levine (1993), financial market development and credit market 
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imperfections are represented by taking the summation of the share of broad money (M2) in 
GDP, and the share of credit to the economy in GDP. M2 as a percentage of GDP shows broad 
money and is taken from line 34 plus 35 of the IFS. Credit as percentage of GDP represents 
the claims on the non-private sector and is taken from line 32d line of the IFS. This study 
identifies credit market imperfections in low income developing countries as the likely reason 
for a strong negative relationship between inequality and economic growth. While in the short 
run the relationship between growth and income inequality might be positive, over time more 
inequality hampers economic growth. 
 
The terms financial development, developed financial markets, high financial intermediation, 
and financial liberalization have been used alternatively. The term of low credit market 
imperfections represents developed financial markets. However, this term has been used in the 
form of a dummy variable and three continues variables (credit to private sector, money 
supply and average of both). This study mainly focuses two indicators of financial 
development namely credit to private sector and money supply following King and Levine 
(1993). Theses two indicators are widely used in the literature on financial development for 
following reasons. First, data series for above mentioned indicators are available over a long 
period of time and for a large number of developing countries. Second, theses indicators are 
highly correlated with other measures of financial liberalisation such as number of banks. 
 
Financial intermediation can be measured with different indicators such as number of banks 
(private and state owned), financial advisors or brokers, building societies, credit unions and 
insurance companies. The present study does not use indicators of financial intermediation for 
following reasons. First, financial intermediation is not a primary focus of this study. Second, 
data series on different indicators of financial intermediation are difficult to obtain, 
particularly from low-income developing countries. Second, panel data over a long period is 
difficult to obtain, particularly, comparable panel data series meaning that data set in relation 
to available household survey years is rather difficult to obtain and manage. 
 
To measure trade openness, we add exports and imports and then divide it by gross domestic 
product. It is to clarify that trade share (trade openness) does not capture trade liberalisation as 
it measures structure not policy. Trade liberalisation can be better captured with policy 
measures such as reduction in tariff rates. Using trade share as a proxy for globalisation our 
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main concern is to assess the distributive and poverty effects of economic integration into 
global market. 
 
Edwards (1993) conducts a survey of the literature on openness and growth through the late 
1980s. He notes that most of the empirical research is based on the relationship between trade 
and growth instead of trade policy and growth. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) mainly focus on 
trade policy variables and provide an extensive debate on different policy variables such as 
quotas and tariffs. Their study acknowledges that many cross-country studies have used trade 
openness (trade share) as trade policy variable.  
 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) provide extensive critical analysis on different measures of trade 
policy. Their study evaluates shortcomings of trade policy measure for most influential papers, 
in the area of trade and growth, such as a study on trade policy’s index by Sachs and Warner 
(1995). Frankel and Romer (1999) analyse the relationship between trade volumes and income 
levels and caution that their results are not directly applicable to the impacts of trade policies. 
Our focus is also on trade volume (trade structure) and our results are also not directly linked 
to the effects of trade policy.  
 
Data on imports and exports are the annual averages between two survey years. Data on 
exports and imports are derived from the IFS database. Population growth rates are taken from 
World Bank development reports. The secondary school enrolment is at the beginning of the 
period and is derived from World Bank database. Data on the ratio of government expenditure 
and investment as shares of GDP are averages for the period between two survey years and 
come from the IFS33. The data set includes countries from all regions of the developing world, 
including 12 countries from South and East Asia, 24 countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe, 15 countries from Latin America, 12 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa and 7 
countries from the Middle East and North Africa. 
 
6.4. Model  
 
                                                 
33
 Description of variables is shown in appendix. 
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6.4.1 Model 
In order to estimate the links between inequality and growth in the data, we will follow a 
standard empirical growth equation: 
 
( ) )1.....(............................................................,.........1'11 ittiititititit uvgxyyy εβωδ +++++=− −−−
                                                
Where ( )1−− itit yy  is average growth rate of per capita GDP, g is a measure of inequality in 
the previous period; x represents a set of control variables other than lagged income, which we 
shall discuss shortly, iv  is a country specific unobservable effect, and tu  is a time specific 
factor and itε  is an i.i.d. error term. The potential endogeneity of inequality implies that an 
OLS treatment of the data may yield biased coefficient estimates. To diminish such problems 
of the simultaneity bias, we follow the conventional wisdom of using the lagged (initial) 
inequality measure instead of the current level of inequality. 
 
According to (1), growth depends on initial income, initial inequality, and current and/or 
lagged values of the control variables. Our primary focus is to assess the nature and magnitude 
of the estimate of β  in equation (1). If inequality has a positive impact on growth we should 
find β >0, whereas if it has a negative impact on growth we may find β <0. Similarly, if 
inequality has no impact on growth we may find β =0. 
 
Having specified standard growth-inequality equation, we turn to the specification of the set of 
control variables included in x. There is a wide range of potential explanatory variables that 
can be used in this context. In this study, as a starting point, we introduce similar control 
variables to those introduced by Perotti (1996) and Forbes (2000). The former found a definite 
negative effect of inequality on growth and the latter found a definite positive effect of 
inequality on growth. Forbes (2000) specified a growth-inequality equation that is almost 
identical to that used by Perotti (1996). The only change from Perotti’s model is the addition 
of the dummy variables. She included dummies to control for time-invariant omitted-variable 
bias, and the period dummies to control for global shocks, which might affect aggregate 
growth in any period but are not otherwise captured by the explanatory variables. 
 
Forbes introduced all independent variables in lag form while in this study we introduce only 
two lag variables, initial inequality and initial income. Although the introduction of initial 
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inequality and initial income will solve the problem of endogeneity, it may still persist and in 
order to remove it further we will use the instrumental approach of estimation. 
 
( ) )2.......(..................,........43211'11 ittiitititititititit uvInfInvEdugxyyy εββββωδ ++++++++=− −−−
          
Where i represents each country and t represents each time period (with t = 1, 2….T); 
itEducation  is secondary school enrolment rate (as a percentage of the total secondary school- 
aged population). This variable is used as a proxy to human capital; itInvestment is the share of 
gross capital formation in GDP, and; itInflation  is the annual averages between two survey 
years, calculated using the IFS’s CPI data. 
 
The choice of regressors is motivated by three main considerations. First, we need a 
parsimonious model as the number of available observations dramatically falls once we 
estimate the equations for inequality, a variable for which data availability is quite limited. 
Second, this choice ensures comparability with existing work in the growth literature. Third, 
the selected controls are relevant as explanatory variables for our growth regressions.  
 
Clearly, omitted variable bias could be problematic if there is strong correlation between the 
dependent variable in question, the inequality variable, and a third omitted variable. Moreover, 
given the large potential number of variables that could be included in a growth regression, it 
is almost impossible to infer how omitted variables could affect the estimates of inequality and 
growth. Here, we will depart from Perotti (1996) and Forbes (2000) by incorporating the issue 
of credit market imperfection and some other control variables that play a key role in 
determining the growth-inequality relationship.  
 
Galdor and Zeira (1993) argue that degree of inequality in the presence of an imperfect capital 
market implies that more individuals face credit constraints. As a result, they are not able to 
carry out productive investments in human or physical capital which can take place in the 
short run or the long run. In addition, more unequal societies generate a rise in the fertility 
differentials that also leads to less investment in human capital by the poor. 
This yields Equations 3, which includes an interaction term for credit market imprecation and 
a dummy variable for high financial intermediation level: 
  204 
 
( ) )3,...(* 6543211'11 ittiitititititititititit uvHFIHFIgInfInvEdugxyyy εββββββωδ ++++++++++=− −−−
  
HFI is a dummy variable equal to one for countries with a high level of financial 
intermediation, zero otherwise. It is expected that β1>0, β5<0, and β6>0 meaning that the 
positive effect of inequality on growth is weaker in countries with high financial 
intermediation levels (or developed financial markets). The coefficient of interaction term 
g*HFI is showing that more inequality in those countries that have relatively more developed 
financial structure lead to decline in economic growth. Countries with high initial inequalities 
in combination with high financial intermediation explains the fact that a majority of the 
population live in lower segment of the inequality and are unable to borrow due to lack of 
collateral. Put another way, the rich have better access to loans to finance physical investment. 
Lower investment in human capital translates its negative effect to economic growth. The poor 
are not only unlikely to invest in human capital but in physical capital as well. Therefore high 
initial inequality co-existing with an imperfect credit market means that investment in human 
and physical capital is unlikely and hence economic growth declines. 
 
Recognition that the increasing openness of an economy to international trade can allow 
greater and more efficient use of labour is likely to increase the growth rate. Hence, our model 
includes trade openness in the regression. 
( ) )4,...(* 76543211'11 ittiititititititititititit uvOpHFIHFIgInfInvEdugxyyy εβββββββωδ +++++++++++=− −−−
          
The variable itOp  is measured as sum of exports and imports as percentage of GDP. It is 
expected that β 7>0 because openness to trade promotes growth by encouraging economies to 
specialise and produce in areas where they have a relative cost advantage over other 
economies. Trade expands the markets that local producers can access, allowing them to 
produce at most efficient scale to keep down the costs and it also disperses new technologies 
and ideas, increasing the productivity of local workers and managers.  
 
In order to address non-linear dimensions of inequality, we introduce a square term for 
inequality. Here our basic hypothesis is that in a linear specification, inequality is positively 
correlated with economic growth. In the case of non-linear specification, a moderate level of 
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inequality positively affects the growth, while a high level of inequality is detrimental to 
economic growth.  
( ) )5,.(*)( 87654321211'11 ittiitititititititititititit uvOpHFIHFIgInfInvEduggxyyy εββββββββωδ ++++++++++++=− −−−−
  
The expected signs are for β 1> 0 β 2<0, as a low level of inequality is economically benign 
while after a threshold level high income inequality becomes socially malign on several 
dimensions.  
 
Finally, recognising the importance of corruption highlighted in recent literature, we extend 
our basic model, equation 2, by controlling the effect of corruption to assess this important 
channel in the growth inequality relationship that has been paid little attention in recent 
literature. 
( ) )6,...(6543211'11 ittiitititititititititit uvCorOpInfInvEdugxyyy εββββββωδ ++++++++++=− −−−
  
It is expected that β 6<0, as corruption deters economic growth by subverting institutions and 
promoting rent-seeking activities. It is obviously possible to include a number of additional 
variables; however, this paper focuses on this simplified specification for three reasons. First, 
this model is typical of that used to estimate the effect of inequality on growth, so any 
discrepancy between this paper and previous work cannot be explained by model 
specification. Second, since sample size is already limited by the availability of inequality 
statistics, and particularly since panel estimation requires a large number of observations, the 
simple specification helps maximise the degree of freedom. Third, by focusing on stock 
variables (initial inequality and income) measured at the start of the periods, rather than flow 
variables measured throughout the periods, endogeneity could be reduced.  
 
6.5.     Results and Discussion 
The panel regression results regarding growth inequality relationship have been reported in 
tables ranging from Table 6-1 to Table 6-18. Table 6-1 to Table 6-4 have been provided in the 
main text while Table 6-5 to Table 6-18 have been reported after concluding section. The first 
column in Table 6-1 provides the list of variables used. All other columns report parameter 
estimates drawn from the 4th equation of the growth model, already specified, using different 
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econometric techniques. The second and third columns report parameter estimates drawn 
using OLS. The variable inequality*high financial intermediation (HFI) is revealed to be 
insignificant with a wrong sign, and an independent effect of HFI is also insignificant while 
the effect of inequality is positive and significant.  
 
Similarly, parameter estimates drawn using random effects, reported in columns 4 and 5, are 
not consistent with the theory as three key variables - inequality,  credit market imperfection 
and trade– are revealed to be insignificant. In column 6, results provided using fixed effects 
technique are much more satisfactory and consistent with the theory. The effect of initial 
inequality on growth is positive and statistically significant at 1% level of significance, while 
the combined effect of initial inequality and HFI is negative and significant at 5% level of 
significance. This finding implies that an independent effect of inequality is beneficial for 
economic growth and negative effects are produced through credit market imperfections. 
Finally, the results provided in column 7 are drawn using the GMM econometrics technique. 
In this case, too, results are satisfactory and robust.  
 
Table 6-1: Parameter Estimates for Economic Growth, Income Inequality and Credit 
Market Imperfections.  
Variables OLS OLS R E RE F E GMM 
Initial 
Inequality 
0.045 
(2.29)** 
0.048 
(1.68)*** 
0.041 
(1.80)*** 
0.049 
(1.46) 
0.238 
(3.01)* 
0.41 
(5.53)* 
Initial Income -0.860 
(-4.69)* 
-0.882 
(-3.83)* 
-1.924 
(-5.84)* 
-1.934 
(5.81)* 
-2.901 
(-6.06)* 
-2.571 
(-4.43)* 
Investment 0.279 
(7.93)* 
0.278 
(7.74)* 
0.270 
(7.30)* 
0.268 
(7.26)* 
0.382 
(7.23)* 
0.071 
(1.80)*** 
Inflation -0.036 
(-7.17)* 
-0.036 
(-6.74)* 
-0.038 
(-7.94)* 
-0.038 
(-7.48) 
-0.034 
(-5.01)* 
-0.098 
(-3.06)* 
Education 0.052 
(4.48)* 
0.052 
(4.35)* 
0.072 
(5.72)* 
0.073 
(5.70)* 
0.067 
(3.40)* 
0.105 
(6.19)* 
Openness -0.014 
(2.40)** 
-0.014 
(2.33)** 
-0.008 
(-1.27) 
-0.008 
(-1.27) 
0.01 
(0.83) 
-0.012 
(-1.45) 
Inequality*HFI 0.000 
(0.08) 
-0.005 
(0.135) 
0.003 
(0.338) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
-0.201 
(-1.94)** 
-0.448 
(-6.02)* 
HFI - 0.262 
(0.161) 
- 0.60 
(0.32) 
- 19.51 
(5.22)* 
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.66 0.644 
Adj. R-squared 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.54 0.626 
D W Stat 1.33 1.33 1.57 1.57 2.23 - 
Observations 330 330 330 330 330 330 
Countries 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Note: The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively   
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The panel regression results regarding growth inequality relationship given in Table 6-1 and 
Table 6-2 confirm the overall positive and significant relationship between growth and 
inequality. The results also show a negative and highly significant relationship between 
growth and initial income per capita. This implies that, keeping other factors constant, a 
country with less initial income per capita tends to grow faster than a rich country. The effect 
of investment share on GDP growth is strong and robust. The parameter estimate for 
macroeconomic instability (measured by inflation) is revealed as negative and significant, as 
expected. The coefficient of the interaction term g*HFI is negative and significant, showing 
that high financial development leads to lower growth in highly unequal societies Due to 
credit market imperfections, the negative impact of a decline in investment in human capital 
on growth is sufficiently strong to dominate the positive impact of investment in physical 
capital on growth, thereby decreasing overall growth rates. 
 
It is expected that β1>0, β5<0, and β6>0. These expected signs together imply that the positive 
influence of inequality on growth is weaker in economies where financial markets are 
developed (or financial intermediation levels are high). The interaction term, Inequality*HFI 
(β5), is revealed to be negative, while HFI (β6) is positive and highly significant as expected. 
The coefficient of interaction term g*HFI shows that high financial development leads to 
lower growth in highly unequal societies.  
 
If a country has high initial inequalities in combination with weak financial development, this 
explains the fact that a majority of the population lives below poverty line and is unable to 
borrow due to lack collateral. On the other hand, the rich have greater access to loans to 
finance physical investment. Since the poor are unable to borrow, they invest less in human 
capital. This lower investment in human capital spills over its negative effects onto economic 
growth over time. Therefore, high initial inequality coexisting with an imperfect credit market 
means investment in human and physical capital is unlikely and hence economic growth 
declines. 
 
To understand the issue of market imperfection more clearly, we divide the sample taken in 
short time period into low and relatively high financial intermediation level (or developed 
  208 
financial markets). The effect of inequality on growth differs between low and high financial 
intermediation sub-samples. The insignificance of the inequality coefficient in Table 6-7 is 
consistent with the argument that inequality has no explanatory power in countries with 
developed financial markets. It is interesting to note that the effect of openness is highly 
significant in countries where financial markets are developed. In the case of low financial 
intermediation markets, (see Table 6-7), credit market imperfections may be a source of the 
positive link between inequality and growth. The results show that inequality enhances growth 
in countries with low levels of financial market development and less credit available to the 
private sector.  
 
In order to gain a deeper insight into the relationship between growth and income inequality, 
we divide the entire sample into a long time period. For the long time period, we include 
observations with a gap of 10 to 20 years between two survey years. The panel regression 
results in the long time period are given in Table 6-6. We did not find sufficient evidence to 
accept our second hypothesis that in the long run, inequality tends to lead to a deterioration in 
economic growth. Therefore, our study finds a positive impact of inequality on growth in both 
the short run and long run. 
 
In order to assess our first hypothesis about the non-linear effect of inequality, we estimate 
equation number 5. Here our basic hypothesis is that in a linear specification, inequality is 
positively correlated with economic growth. While in the case of quadratic specification, a 
moderate level of inequality positively affects growth, a high level of inequality is detrimental 
to growth. The expected signs for β 1> 0 β 2<0 imply that a low level of inequality is 
economically benign while, after a threshold level, high income inequality has adverse effects 
on economic growth.  
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Table 6-2: Non Linear Parameter Estimates for Economic Growth and Credit Market 
Imperfections.  
Variables OLS R E F E FE GMM 
Initial 
Inequality 
0.26 
(2.70)* 
0.47 
(1.74)** 
1.14 
(3.09)* 
1.19 
(3.39)* 
0.770 
(17.67)* 
Inequality 
Square 
-0.003 
(-2.66)* 
-0.005** 
(-1.73) 
-0.01 
(-2.87)* 
-0.01 
(-2.85)* 
-0.008 
(-15.49)* 
Initial Income -1.31 
(-3.29)* 
-1.78 
(-5.12)* 
-2.85 
(-6.08)* 
-2.74 
(-5.85)* 
-2.604 
(-10.02)* 
Investment 0.24 
(5.38)* 
0.25 
(4.95)* 
0.325 
(5.97)* 
0.33 
(6.37)* 
0.028 
(1.04) 
Inflation -0.03 
(-4.55)* 
-0.03 
(-4.96)* 
-0.03 
(-3.88)* 
-0.03 
(-3.79) 
-0.019 
(-1.44)*** 
Education 0.06 
(3.63)* 
0.07 
(4.39)* 
0.07 
(3.07)* 
0.07 
(2.88)* 
0.076 
(11.70)* 
Openness -0.01 
(-1.8)** 
-0.007 
(-0.96) 
0.003 
(0.22) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
- 
Inequality*HFI 0.02 
(0.58) 
-0.01 
(-0.25) 
- -0.14 
(-1.6)*** 
-0.100 
(-2.61)* 
HFI -0.56 
(-0.30) 
0.88 
(0.41) 
- - 6.376 
(3.72)* 
R-squared 0.40 0.42 0.67 0.68 0.92 
Adj. R-squared 0.38 0.40 0.56 0.66 0.91 
D W Stat 1.38 1.63 2.40 2.40 1.45 
Observations 330 330 330 330 330 
Countries 65 65 65 65 65 
Note: The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively   
 
 
Table 6-2 reports the results of the non-linear effect of inequality on economic growth. The 
results for parameters β 1 and β 2 are revealed to be significant with correct signs, where 
former is positive and latter negative, at 1 percent level of significance. Our basic findings, 
reported in Table 6-1, are robust to non-linear specifications of the growth-inequality 
relationship. Thus, we can infer that inequality could be either beneficial or harmful for 
growth, depending on the existing level of inequality. A moderate level (i.e. a Gini coefficient 
equal to 0.38) of inequality is beneficial for growth, while a high level of inequality is 
detrimental to growth. 
 
To best of our knowledge, there is hardly any study which tests the growth-inequality 
relationship for OIC countries. We also find a non-linear relationship between growth and 
inequality in this sub-sample (Table 6-5). Inequality is good for growth when it is primarily 
derived from physical capital but after a certain level its positive effects are tempered, as 
  210 
human capital becomes the prime engine of economic growth that requires a moderate level of 
inequality and a less binding credit market.  
 
Our hypothesis that inequality tends to be negatively related to economic growth in countries 
with lower levels of economic development while positively correlated in the countries with 
higher levels of economic development has been confirmed by empirical evidence. We divide 
developing countries into two groups, according to their per capita income (PCY), i.e. 
countries with lower per capita income and countries with higher per capita income. Results 
reported in Table 6-8 provide clear evidence of the reversal of inequality sign after a certain 
level of economic development. The negative effects of inequality dominate in countries with 
lower PCY and positive effects of inequality dominate in countries with higher PCY. 
 
 
Regional Analysis     
 
To confirm the stability of results that we have derived at aggregate level, our study conducts 
the same analysis at regional level. The panel regression results for each region are given in 
Table 6-3. Whether inequality is harmful or good for economic growth also depends on 
regions. Our study finds out that inequality is good for growth in sub-Saharan African 
countries and transitional economies while bad for growth in South and East Asian countries 
and Middle Eastern and North African countries. The effect of investment and education on 
economic growth is robustly significant across the regions.  
 
Table 6-3 Relationship between Growth and Inequality 
Dependant variable: Growth 
 Explanatory Variables Regions 
Ineq GDP INV INF SCH INE*HFI Trade R-Sq 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
0.498 
(1.78)* 
-9.17 
(-4.26)*** 
5.65 
(2.02)* 
0.035 
(0.95) 
37.29 
(3.8)*** 
-0.68 
(-2.18)* 
0.0004 
(0.016) 
0.96 
Latin America 0.06 
(0.39) 
-2.37 
(-1.66)*** 
0.27 
(1.94)*** 
-0.027 
(-1.25) 
0.07 
(1.65)* 
-0.07 
(-0.40) 
-0.01 
(-0.40) 
0.43 
South and East 
Asia 
-0.19 
(-7.36)*** 
-1.22 
(-4.16)*** 
0.25 
(4.11)*** 
0.03 
(0.85) 
0.025 
(2.30)*** 
0.165 
(1.88)* 
-0.006 
(-0.78) 
0.60 
Transitional 
Economies 
0.34 
(1.81)* 
-4.33 
(-1.60)* 
0.46 
(2.11)** 
-0.018 
(-1.40) 
0.262 
(3.50)*** 
-0.24 
(-0.60) 
0.02 
(0.73) 
0.88 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
-11.39 
(-1.77)*** 
-5.29 
(-2.91)** 
8.87 
(3.57)*** 
-3.10 
(-2.61)** 
0.35 
(0.27) 
-1.94 
(-0.46) 
0.23 
(0.27) 
0.75 
Note: The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively   
 
The effect of initial GDP is robustly negative and significant across the regions. This means 
that keeping other factors constant, consistent with the convergence theory, a country with less 
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initial income per capita tends to grow faster than a rich country. However, openness was not 
revealed to be significant across regions and also its sign is not consistent across regions. 
Possible reasons could be anti-globalisation arguments that state that openness is more 
favourable for developed countries.  
 
We replicate this analysis for Asian countries in order to assess the robustness of results and 
assessment of trade openness in this region. Our basic results seem to hold fairly well in this 
region too. The only element that appears different in this region is the significance of 
openness to trade, at 5 percent level of significance. We can reasonably conjecture that a 
trade-led growth phenomenon cannot be generalized for all developing countries, particularly 
in the success stories of East Asian countries. 
 
Table 6-4: Parameter Estimates for Growth, Inequality and Credit Market 
Imperfections in Asian Countries 
Independent Variables Parameter Estimates 2-SLS 
Initial Inequality 0.729 
(2.82)* 
Income  -4.168 
(-2.88)* 
Investment  0.169 
(1.798)*** 
Inflation   -0.047 
(-0.242) 
Education  0.052 
(1.224) 
Openness  0.031 
(2.017)** 
Inequality*HFI -0.849 
(-2.363)* 
HFI 35.166 
(2.465)* 
Population Growth  -1.994 
(-2.94)* 
No of Countries 18 
R-squared 0.69 
Adj. R-squared 0.66 
D W Stat  1.70 
Note: The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively   
 
The panel regression results regarding growth inequality relationship given in Table 6-4 
confirm a positive and significant relationship between growth and inequality. This implies 
that in this region, high initial income inequality yields higher aggregate savings, capital 
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accumulation and economic growth. Thus, capital accumulation is revealed as the prime 
engine of economic growth, as is evident from a more significant parameter estimate for 
investment as compared to human capital. Although human capital is also positive in 
explaining growth, it is less significant.  
 
The results reported in Table 6-14 to Table 6-16 show that the interaction term, 
inequality*openness, is negative and trade openness is positive and highly significant, as 
expected. The negative sign on inequality*openness implies that the positive growth effect of  
trade is weakened the more unequal is a society.  
 
Theories suggest that some of developing countries are not able to absorb technology transfer 
from developed countries due to lack of human capital, financial development and skilled 
labour. In other words, some countries are not economically and socially capable of taking 
advantage of technology transfer through increased trade. These theoretical considerations 
lend support to the idea that trade does not transfer its positive effect on growth in those 
countries where income inequalities are high.  
 
The panel regression results for the long-term period are given in the fourth and fifth columns 
of Table 6-6, where the main findings of the study in the short run are seem to hold also in the 
long run. Societies with high income inequalities coupled with socio-economic problems, such 
as social conflict, macroeconomic instability, low investment in human capital, unskilled 
labour and weak financial institutions, remain unable to benefit from the positive effects of 
trade even in the long run. 
 
Following the research questions posted by the study, we find out that inequality, in general, is 
not harmful for growth and the negative impact on growth has been explained by the 
combined effect of developed financial markets and inequality, where the negative effect of 
less human capital investment in the past has negative consequences for economic growth 
over time. Openness to trade has been confirmed as positive and significant in Asian countries. 
Furthermore, this study finds that the positive effect of inequality is not consistent across the 
regions and parameter estimates for inequality substantially change in some regions from 
positive to negative and in some cases are insignificant.   
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Similarly, following our hypotheses, this study does not find sufficient evidence to reject the 
first, third, fourth and fifth hypotheses. This study does not find sufficient evidence to accept 
the second hypothesis, i.e. inequality tends to be positively related to economic growth in the 
short term while negatively correlated in the long run. Our study finds that inequality is 
positively related with growth in both the short run and long run. We find strong evidence in 
the case of OIC countries that inequality is positively correlated with economic growth up to a 
moderate level in a linear specification and detrimental to economic growth after a certain 
level in a non-linear specification. Our hypotheses that inequality tends to be negatively 
related to economic growth in countries with lower levels of economic development while 
positively correlated in the countries with higher levels of the economic development has been 
confirmed by empirical evidence. Results reported in Table 6-2 and Table 6-8 provide clear 
evidence of a reversal of inequality sign after a certain level of economic development. The 
negative effects of inequality dominate in countries with a lower PCY and the positive effects 
of inequality dominate in countries with a higher PCY. Finally, the results show that the 
growth effect of trade substantially and significantly differs between countries with low 
income inequalities and countries with high income inequalities, thus confirming our fourth 
hypothesis. 
 
6.6 Robustness  
In order to assess the robustness of our results we make various checks: five-year averages, 
removal of outliers, alternative econometric techniques, inclusion of further control variables 
and estimation of sub-samples. 
 
6.6.1 Five-year averages 
First, to assess whether the findings above are robust, we use data averaged over five 
periods.34 The estimation results are reported in Table 6-9. As can be seen, our hypotheses are 
confirmed using these five-year-averaged data. The effect of inequality on growth is positive 
while the combined effect of inequality and high financial intermediation is negative. The 
signs and significance level of other control variables remain unaffected.  
 
                                                 
34
 Since data for inequality are not always available in a five-year window, we follow Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
and start out with the first available observation and then look for the next observation, that is five years. Hence, 
the number of observations falls to 287.  
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6.6.2 Removing outliers 
We also test for the effect of removing outliers (Table 6-10 and Table 6-11). We estimate the 
basic model after removing the five countries with the lowest and highest average inequality, 
income or growth. In each case, although the values of the coefficients do fluctuate, the 
coefficients remain significant with same signs. 
 
6.6.3 Econometric techniques 
We also use alternative econometric techniques in order to reduce bias. We use 2SLS and 
GMM for the basic model. Our main results hold across different techniques. Although the 
level of significance for parameter estimates improves in the case of GMM, our general 
findings hold across different econometric techniques. The magnitude of the relationship is 
higher in instrumental variables than in OLS, suggesting that the causal effect of inequality on 
development outcomes is in fact understated by the OLS relationship. 
 
6.6.4 Including further controls 
In addition, we introduce some additional control variables such as government spending and 
population growth in order to remove omitted variable bias, and again our main findings hold 
although coefficients do fluctuate (Table 6-12). In the growth literature, government 
consumption is considered an important determinant of growth. The estimated coefficients for 
government consumption are significant with the correct sign, while other control variables 
remain consistent in terms of signs and significance level. Therefore, our primary results are 
robust to the inclusion of further control variables. 
 
6.6.5 Sub-samples 
We also introduce sub-samples, specifically to asses the robustness of credit market 
imperfection. We divide the sample taken in a short time period by low and relatively high 
financial intermediation level. The effects of inequality on growth differ between low and high 
financial intermediation sub-samples. The insignificance of the inequality coefficient in Table 
6-7 is consistent with the argument that inequality has no explanatory power in countries with 
developed financial markets. In the case of low financial intermediation markets, (Table 6-7), 
credit market imperfections may be a source of the positive link between inequality and 
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growth. The results show that inequality stimulates growth in countries with low levels of 
financial market development and credit available to the private sector.  
 
6.7.6 Robustness: the interactive effect of trade and inequality  
In order to assess whether the findings on interactive effect of trade and inequality are robust, 
we use data averaged over five time periods. As can be seen in Table 6-16, the findings of the 
study are robust, as the effect of trade on growth is positive while the combined effect of 
inequality and trade is negative. The signs and significance level of other control variables 
remain unaffected. In Table 6-16, we estimate the basic model, removing the five countries 
with the lowest and highest average inequality and trade. The results remain unaffected while 
treating outliers. This analysis also uses alternative econometric techniques in order to reduce 
bias (Table 6-14 and Table 6-15). Although the level of significance for parameter estimates 
improves in case of GMM, the main findings of the study hold across different econometric 
techniques. This study also introduces some additional control variables, government spending 
and population growth, in order to remove omitted variable bias and again, our main findings 
hold, although coefficients do fluctuate (Table 6-14 and Table 6-15).  
 
6.8.7 Robustness: some additional robustness tests  
Table 6-17 and Table 6-18 report some additional results using some further robustness tests. 
Table 6-17 reports results for different groups of countries according to their level of 
economic development. It is clear that growth-inequality nexus is negative and significant in 
low-income developing countries while it is positive in high income developing countries. 
Table 6-18 reports results for interactive term of inequality and developed financial markets 
using different variables. All of the interactive terms are negative and significant as expected 
while growth impact of inequality is positive and significant which is consistent with our 
earlier findings. 
 
6.7. Conclusion  
The issue of the growth effects of income distribution has long been uncertain in the 
theoretical and empirical literature. Conventional wisdom suggests a positive growth effect of 
inequality through incentives, physical capital accumulation, saving rates or investment 
indivisibility mechanism. On the other hand, the endogenous growth literature predicts a 
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negative growth effect of inequality through socio-political instability, market imperfections, 
fiscal redistribution and distortion, and fertility differential channels. This study contributes to 
the existing literature on income distribution and growth by answering the question as to why 
growth effects of income distribution are not definitely positive or negative.  
 
Similarly, in recent years, the issue of growth effects of trade has also become unresolved in 
the literature. Conventional wisdom suggests a positive growth impact of trade through 
specialisation, technology diffusion and economy of scale mechanisms. However, endogenous 
growth theory models suggest that positive effects of trade on growth depend on forces of 
comparative advantages which push the economy’s resources towards the activities that 
generate long-run growth or divert them from these activities. In addition, theories also 
suggest that some countries are not able to absorb technology transfer from developed 
countries due to lack of human capital, financial development and skilled labour. In other 
words, some countries are not socially capable of taking advantage of technology transfer. 
This study contributes to the existing literature on trade and growth by identifying the critical 
role of income distribution where countries with comparatively less income inequality seem to 
better acquire positive effects of trade for long-run economic growth. 
 
A new panel data set on inequality has been constructed that reduces measurement error and 
ensures comparability across countries and over time. The study identifies credit market 
imperfections in low-income developing countries as the likely reason for a positive 
correlation between inequality and economic growth. This study finds a positive relationship 
between inequality and growth in both the short run and the long run. Moreover, this paper 
finds evidence that more physical and human capital investment have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on economic growth. The inflation rate, which is an indicator of 
macroeconomic instability, has been found robustly negative in all growth equations. This 
study also finds that inequality does matter for economic growth, but differently for different 
regions at various levels of economic development in the developing world. The inequality-
growth nexus is significantly negative for the low-income group but strongly significantly 
positive for the high-income one. The findings of the study are robust to alternative 
econometric techniques, specifications and sub-samples. 
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This study finds a non-linear relationship between growth and inequality in OIC countries. 
Inequality is good for growth when it is primarily derived from physical capital but after a 
certain level its positive effects are tempered, as human capital becomes the prime engine of 
economic growth that requires a moderate level of inequality and a less binding credit market. 
This study does not find sufficient evidence to accept the hypotheses that inequality tends to 
hamper economic growth in the long run and finds a positive impact of inequality on growth 
in both the short run and the long run. From the regional analysis of growth inequality 
relationship, we conclude that it is not necessary that more inequality promotes economic 
growth in all developing countries. The effect of openness is positive and significant in Asian 
countries where some countries follow open-oriented trade policies and achieve high growth 
rates but the success stories of a few Asian countries cannot be generalised to all developing 
countries as the growth effect of trade is not favourable across all developing countries. 
 
Finally, this study finds a positive relationship between trade and growth in both the short run 
and the long run. However, this relationship is substantially influenced by the domestic 
context in terms of the prevalence of high income inequalities. The study identifies high 
income inequalities in developing countries as the likely reason for a strong negative 
relationship between openness to trade and economic growth. The trade-growth nexus is 
significantly negative for the high-income inequalities group but strongly significantly positive 
for the low-income inequalities one. This finding suggests that a redistributive policy that 
alleviates inequality can increase long-run growth in developing countries by taking the 
advantage of the benefits of increased trade openness. We have provided evidence that 
inequality is good for growth only in a linear relationship while inequality is harmful for 
growth after a certain point. This implies that improvement of a high degree of inequality will 
not only have a direct benefit in the form of positive growth but may also have indirect ones, 
by allowing a country to take full advantage of trade openness. 
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Table 6-5: Parameter Estimates for Economic Growth for OIC Countries  
Independent Variables Parameter Estimates  
Initial Inequality +1.96 
(+1.75)** 
Inequality Square  -0.02 
(-2.12)** 
Income  -3.11 
(-2.86)* 
Investment  0.35 
(3.37)* 
Inflation   -0.05 
(-2.09)** 
Education  0.08 
(2.25)** 
Openness  11.87 
(1.95)** 
Openness Square -0.16 
(-1.95)** 
Inequality*HFI 0.55 
(2.54)* 
No of Countries 22 
R-squared 0.73 
Adj. R-squared 0.52 
F Stat 3.55 
(0.000) 
 
 
Table 6-6: Long Term Effects 
Independent Variables Parameter Estimates  
Initial Inequality 0.36 
(2.61)* 
Income  -1.17 
(-1.61)*** 
Investment  6.19 
(1.78)*** 
Inflation   -0.04 
(-2.19)** 
Education  0.03 
(1.66)*** 
Openness  -0.01 
(-0.46) 
Inequality*HFI -0.29 
(-2.1)** 
No of Countries 65 
R-squared 0.76 
Adj. R-squared 0.32 
F Stat  1.75 
(0.03) 
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Table 6-7: High and Low Financial Intermediation Markets 
Independent 
Variables 
Parameter Estimates  Parameter Estimates  
 HFI LFI 
Initial Inequality 0.05 
(0.71)* 
0.13 
(8.84)* 
Income  -1.99 
(-4.29)* 
-4.17 
(-8.08)* 
Investment  0.37 
(7.56)* 
0.27 
(4.84)* 
Inflation   -0.02 
(-1.84)*** 
-0.04 
(-7.87)** 
Education  0.02 
(1.19) 
0.12 
(5.06)* 
Openness  0.02 
(5.11)* 
0.01 
(0.997) 
No of Countries 30 35 
R-squared 0.58 0.71 
Adj. R-squared 0.45 - 
F Stat  4.31 
(0.000) 
46.97 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6-8: High and Low PCY Economies 
Independent 
Variables 
Parameter Estimates Parameter Estimates  
 Low PCY High PCY 
Initial Inequality -0.07 
(-1.6)*** 
0.12 
(2.20)** 
Income  -1.40 
(-2.90)* 
-3.95 
(-5.48)* 
Investment  0.14 
(3.09)* 
0.43 
(5.54)* 
Inflation   -0.05 
(-7.61)* 
-0.03 
(-3.02)* 
Education  0.04 
(2.56)* 
0.087 
(2.86)* 
Openness  - 0.024 
(2.10)** 
No of Countries 31 34 
R-squared 0.49 0.64 
Adj. R-squared 0.47 0.52 
F Stat  18.17 
(0.000) 
5.59 
(0.000) 
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Table 6-9: 5 Year Average Parameter Estimates for Economic Growth 
Independent Variables Parameter Estimates  
Initial Inequality 0.21 
(2.26)** 
Income  -2.85 
(-5.09)* 
Investment  0.4 
(4.45)* 
Inflation   -0.03 
(-6.57)* 
Education  0.06 
(2.31)** 
Openness  0.01 
(1.37) 
Inequality*HFI -0.15 
(-1.64)*** 
No of Countries 65 
R-squared 0.71 
Adj. R-squared 0.56 
F Stat  4.81 
(0.000) 
 
 
Table 6-10: Adjusting Outliers Excluding 5 Extreme High and Inequality Values 
Independent 
Variables 
Parameter Estimates  Parameter Estimates 
 excluding 5 extreme high 
inequality values 
excluding 5 extreme low 
inequality values 
Initial Inequality 0.21 
(2.24)** 
0.23 
(2.51)* 
Income  -2.79 
(-4.63)* 
-2.68 
(-4.87)* 
Investment  0.4 
(4.40)* 
0.39 
(4.33)* 
Inflation   -0.03 
(-6.09)* 
-0.03 
(-5.70)* 
Education  0.06 
(1.99)** 
0.07 
(2.36)* 
Openness  0.015 
(1.40) 
0.002 
(0.17) 
Inequality*HFI -0.16 
(-1.82)*** 
-0.20 
(-2.04)** 
No of Countries 60 60 
R-squared 0.71 0.70 
Adj. R-squared 0.56 0.55 
F Stat  4.75 
(0.000) 
4.59 
(0.000) 
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Table 6-11: Adjusting Outliers Excluding 5 Extreme High and Low Growth Values 
Independent 
Variables 
Parameter Estimates  Parameter Estimates 
 excluding 5 extreme high  
growth values 
excluding 5 extreme low  
growth values 
Initial Inequality 0.21 
(2.33)** 
0.21 
(2.07)** 
Income  -2.78 
(-6.44)* 
-2.59 
(-4.77)* 
Investment  0.41 
(4.40)* 
0.42 
(4.95)* 
Inflation   -0.03 
(-5.64)* 
-0.04 
(-7.50)* 
Education  0.06 
(2.34)** 
0.06 
(2.25)** 
Openness  0.01 
(1.44) 
0.005 
(0.46) 
Inequality*HFI -0.12 
(-1.24) 
-0.17 
(-2.01)** 
No of Countries 60 60 
R-squared 0.68 0.70 
Adj. R-squared 0.51 0.55 
F Stat  4.06 
(0.000) 
4.70 
(0.000) 
 
 
Table 6-12: Including Government Consumption New Specification 
Independent Variables Parameter Estimates  
Initial Inequality 0.23 
(2.82)* 
Income  -2.72 
(-6.60)* 
Investment  0.37 
(5.15)* 
Inflation   -0.03 
(-7.24)* 
Education  0.03 
(1.15) 
Openness  0.002 
(0.21) 
Inequality*HFI -0.23 
(-2.81)* 
Government  -0.14 
(-2.18)** 
No of Countries 65 
R-squared 0.74 
Adj. R-squared 0.60 
F Stat  5.50 
(0.000) 
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Table 6-13: Growth, Corruption and Inequality 2-SLS  
Independent Variables 2-SLS Parameter Estimates  
Initial Inequality 0.03 
(1.80)*** 
Income  -0.50 
(-1.80)*** 
Investment  0.38 
(7.03)* 
Inflation   0.01 
(0.41) 
Education  0.03 
(1.15) 
Corruption -0.73 
(-2.61)* 
No of Countries 65 
R-squared 0.53 
Adj. R-squared 0.52 
DW Stat  1.57 
 
 
 
Table 6-14: Economic Growth, Trade and Income Inequality 
Variables OLS F E R E RE GMM 
Initial 
Inequality 
0.07 
(2.32)** 
0.16 
(1.99)** 
0.14 
(3.13)* 
0.14 
(2.99) 
0.76 
(6.69)* 
Initial Income -0.83 
(-4.27)* 
-2.89 
(-4.06)* 
-2.06 
(-5.87)* 
-0.15 
(-2.99)* 
-4.47 
(-6.47)* 
Investment 0.26 
(9.81)* 
0.29 
(5.91)* 
0.270 
(5.64)* 
0.278 
(5.09)* 
0.18 
(3.42)* 
Inflation -0.035 
(-7.89)* 
-0.04 
(-3.48)* 
-0.037 
(-5.90)* 
-0.039 
(-5.49)* 
-0.098 
(-3.06)* 
Education 0.038 
(4.72)* 
0.049 
(2.33)* 
0.067 
(3.97)* 
0.07 
(4.13)* 
0.103 
(2.02)* 
Openness 0.016 
(0.99) 
0.06 
(1.56) 
0.05 
(2.12)* 
0.05 
(2.16)** 
0.38 
(6.17)* 
Inequality* 
Openness 
-0.001 
(-2.18)* 
-0.001 
(-1.18) 
-0.001 
(-2.65)* 
-0.001 
(-2.74)* 
-0.01 
(-5.39)* 
HFI 0.29 
(0.94) 
- - 0.26 
(0.44) 
1.53 
(2.52)* 
R-squared 0.46 0.67 0.42 0.43 0.69 
Observations 330 330 330 330 330 
Countries 65 65 65 65 65 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 6-15: Economic Growth, Trade and Income Inequality: Sensitivity Analysis 
Variables 2SLS R E RE GMM GMM GMM 
Initial 
Inequality 
0.51 
(6.73)* 
0.16 
(3.30)* 
0.12 
(2.82) 
0.61 
(6.54)* 
1.10 
(7.71)* 
0.87 
(6.01)* 
Initial Income -3.16 
(-6.29)* 
-2.15 
(-5.44)* 
-2.02 
(-5.34)* 
-3.68 
(-5.83)* 
-5.66 
(-7.32)* 
-4.70 
(-5.89)* 
Investment 0.22 
(6.00)* 
0.28 
(5.44)* 
0.26 
(5.45)* 
0.22 
(4.13)* 
0.20 
(3.45)* 
0.21 
(4.70)* 
Inflation -.08 
(-3.00) 
-.04 
(-5.84)* 
-0.034 
(-5.09) 
-0.09 
(-3.25)* 
-0.23 
(-8.15)* 
-0.09 
(-4.79)* 
Education 0.045 
(5.95)* 
0.059 
(3.02)* 
0.06 
(3.88)* 
0.06 
(6.29)* 
0.05 
(2.04)* 
0.05 
(4.07)* 
Openness 0.28 
(7.37)* 
0.047 
(2.04)* 
0.05 
(2.24) 
0.32 
(6.32)* 
0.54 
(8.60)* 
0.50 
(6.43)* 
Inequality* 
Openness 
-.001 
(-7.46) 
-0.001 
(-2.57) 
-0.001 
(-2.76) 
-0.01 
(-6.19)* 
-0.01 
(-8.50)* 
-0.01 
(-6.49)* 
HFI - - 0.46 
(0.69) 
 1.40 
(1.36) 
1.90 
(2.79)* 
Government 
Spending 
  -0.09 
(-2.59)* 
  -0.18 
(-5.95)* 
Population  -0.42 
(-0.82) 
  -1.12 
(-2.48)* 
 
R-squared 0.58 0.44 0.47 0.50 0.60 0.70 
Observations 330 330 330 330 330 330 
Countries 65 65 65 65 65 65 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 6-16: Economic Growth, Trade and Income Inequality: Robustness Tests 
Variables     
 5 Year (FE)  Adjusting 
Outliers 
Long term (RE) Long term (RE) 
Initial 
Inequality 
0.13 
(1.98)** 
0.10 
(2.43)* 
0.09 
(1.24) 
0.10 
(1.43) 
Initial Income -2.95 
(-4.95)* 
-1.97 
(-5.96)* 
-0.79 
(-1.53) 
-0.81 
(-1.6)*** 
Investment 0.41 
(4.34)* 
0.26 
(7.38)* 
0.24 (4.92)* 0.23 
(4.77)* 
Inflation -0.04 
(-6.24)* 
-0.03 
(-7.00)* 
-0.04 
(-3.01)* 
-0.031 
(-2.47)* 
Education 0.07 
(2.79)* 
0.06 
(4.63)* 
0.04 
(2.19) 
0.03 
(1.71)*** 
Openness 0.057 
(2.03)* 
0.05 
(2.14)* 
0.06 
(1.76)*** 
0.077 
(2.14)* 
Inequality* 
Openness 
-0.001 
(-1.72)*** 
-0.001 
(-2.46)* 
-0.001 
(-2.19)* 
-0.002 
(-2.50)* 
Government 
Spending 
 -.092 
(-4.22)* 
 -.06 
(-1.61)*** 
R-squared 0.70 0.46 0.38 0.40 
Observations 330 330 330 330 
Countries 65 65 65 65 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively   
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Table 6-17: Growth- inequality: Disaggregation by income levels (IV) 
 Low Income Low Middle 
Income 
Low Income 
(Full Sample) 
High Income  
Initial 
Inequality 
-0.14 
(-2.19)** 
-0.07 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.10 
(-3.44)* 
0.05 
(1.16) 
Income  -1.44 
(-1.98)** 
-0.20 
(-0.26)** 
-0.76 
(-1.80)*** 
-1.77 
(-2.87)* 
Investment  0.14 
(2.94)* 
0.28 
(4.54)* 
0.20 
(5.24)* 
0.14 
(1.98)** 
Inflation   -0.12 
(-3.59)* 
-0.04 
(-2.27)* 
-0.06 
(-3.76)* 
-0.01 
(-0.90) 
Education  0.08 
(4.40)* 
0.029 
(1.61)*** 
0.04 
(3.46)* 
0.095 
(3.46)* 
Openness  .01 
(0.74) 
.01 
(0.37) 
.003 
(0.31) 
.01 
(0.58) 
R-squared 0.55 0.35 0.38 0.37 
Wald 74.19 
(0.000) 
46.17 
(0.000) 
85.00 
(0.000) 
40.05 
(0.000) 
Sargan  0.47 
(0.92) 
6.94 
(0.08) 
3.68 
(0.30) 
3.27 
(0.51) 
Basman  0.40 
(0.94) 
6.7 
(0.08) 
3.51 
(0.31) 
287 
(0.58) 
Observations  57 87 140 66 
Countries  23 27 50 15 
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Table 6-18: Growth, Inequality and Financial Market (Robustness)  
Variables 
    
Initial Inequality 0.238 
(3.01)* 
0.19 
(2.57)* 
0.18 
(2.85)* 
0.22 
(2.89)* 
Initial Income -2.901 
(-6.06)* 
-3.08 
(-4.08)* 
-2.60 
(-4.75)* 
-2.75 
(-3.56)* 
Investment 0.382 
(7.23)* 
0.43 
(5.54)* 
0.37 
(6.93)* 
0.43 
(5.66)* 
Inflation -0.034 
(-5.01)* 
-0.03 
(-3.58)* 
-0.04 
(-5.46)* 
-0.03 
(-3.56)* 
Education 0.067 
(3.40)* 
0.098 
(1.77)*** 
0.07 
(3.44)* 
0.09 
(1.74)*** 
Openness 0.01 
(0.83) 
0.01 
(0.90) 
0.02 
(1.50) 
0.02 
(1.56) 
Inequality*HFI -0.201 
(-1.94)** 
   
Inequality*Credit 
to Private Sector 
 -0.001 
(-2.23)** 
  
Inequality*Money 
Supply 
  -0.001 
(-1.85)** 
 
Inequality* 
Financial 
Development 
   -0.001 
(-2.75)* 
R-squared 0.66 0.73 0.66 0.73 
Adj. R-squared 0.54 0.57 0.53 0.58 
F Stat 5.45 
(0.000) 
4.56 
(0.000) 
5.37 
(0.000) 
4.69 
(0.000) 
Observations 330 330 330 330 
Countries 65 65 65 65 
Note: The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively   
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Appendix: 
 
1.   Description of Variables 
Variable name Definitions and Sources 
Per capita real GDP Per capita real GDP growth rates are annual averages between two survey years and are 
derived from the IMF, WDI and International Financial Statistics (IFS) databases. 
Gini coefficient It is a measure of income inequality based on Lorenz curve, which plots the share of 
population against the share of income received and has a minimum value of zero 
(reflecting perfect equality) and a maximum value of one (reflecting total inequality). 
The inequality data (Gini coefficient) are derived from World Bank data and the IMF 
staff reports and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). 
Secondary school 
enrollment 
The secondary school enrollment as % of age group is at the beginning of the period. It 
is used as a proxy of investment in human capital and derived from World Bank 
database. 
Investment Investments as shares of GDP are annual average for the period between two survey 
years and are derived from IFS.  
Poverty The poverty is defined as the percentage of population living on less than $1 a day at 
1993 prices and adjusted for purchasing power parity. The sources of the poverty data 
are the World Bank and recent IMF country reports and PRSPs. 
Credit as % of GDP Credit as % of GDP represents Claims on the non-financial private sector/GDP and is 
derived from 32d line of the IFS. 
M2 as %  of GDP It represents Broad money/GDP, and is derived from lines 34 plus 35 of the IFS. 
Trade Liberalization It is the sum of exports and imports as a share of real GDP. Data on exports, imports and 
real GDP are in the form of annual averages between survey years. 
HFI HFI is a dummy variable having a value of one for countries with a high level of 
financial intermediation that is above sample median and 0 otherwise. The level of 
Financial Intermediation is determined by adding M2 as a % of GDP and credit to 
private sector as % of GDP. 
 
2. Empirical Literature Controversy  
   
Authors  Findings  Inequality Coefficient (β) 
Partridge (1997), Li and Zou (1998), Forbes 
(2000), and Lundberg and squire (2003) 
Inequality is beneficial for growth β>0 and significant 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and 
Tabellini (1994), Wan, Lu and Chen (2006), 
and Sukiassyan (2007) 
Inequality is detrimental to growth β <0 and significant 
Barro (2000) Inequality is insignificant in 
explaining growth 
β =0 (insignificant) 
 
 
3. Inequality-Growth Debate (Non Linearity) 
Authors  Findings  
Miyazawa (2006) The link between inequality and growth is at first positive and then may become 
negative in the process of population aging  
Banerjee and Duflo 
(2003); Chen (2003) 
Document an inverted-U relationship between inequality and growth in that higher 
inequality enhances growth in more equal societies but reduces growth in less equal one 
Voitchovsky (2005) Inequality at the top quantiles of the distribution is positively correlated with growth 
while inequality at the lower end of the distribution is negatively linked to growth. 
Fallah and Partridge 
(2007) 
Inequality-growth nexus is positive in the urban sample while the link turns out to be 
negative in the nonmetro sample. 
Bjornskov (2008) Inequality is negatively linked to growth under leftwing governments while the 
connection is positive under rightwing governments. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
In recent years attention has focused on the importance of the elimination of global corruption. 
International organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the UNO have set the 
elimination of corruption as their prime goal. Similarly, regional organizations have been 
advocating anti-corruption policies. Additionally, individual governments have been 
improving and strengthening the rule of law to monitor and punish corrupt officials. Despite 
these initiatives, corruption still exists and in fact it is increasing over time. According to the 
Global Corruption Barometer (2010) “corruption has increased over the last three years say six 
out of 10 people around the world, and one in four people report paying bribes in the last 
year”35. Policy makers often face the challenge of isolating the various avenues of corruption 
because of a lack of understanding of the various causes of corruption. This is because some 
institutional, political and cultural effects on corruption are very subtle and hard to quantify. 
 
This thesis contributes to our understanding of the causes of corruption by identifying a novel 
channel of corruption, namely military participation in politics. This source of corruption is 
extremely important for both academic researchers and policy makers as it stems from the 
institutional, cultural and political settings of a society which are usually hard to quantify. The 
theoretical and empirical analysis of this study is unique because it analyzes the relationship 
between the military in politics and corruption and to our knowledge has not hitherto been 
addressed in the literature. In addition, our study differs from existing studies on the causes of 
corruption by empirically analyzing the importance of developed financial markets for cross 
country variations of corruption levels with special focus on the contagion nature of 
corruption. 
 
How does globalisation determine cross-country variations in inequality and poverty in 
developing countries? This thesis answers this question by examining the consequences of 
globalisation for developing countries in general, and comparatively, for high financial 
intermediation (HFI) countries over a long period 1970 to 2008. The study is unique in the 
way that it disaggregates the consequences of globalisation for two sets of developing 
countries and uses more comparable statistics for inequality and poverty. 
 
                                                 
35
 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2010 
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Finally, this thesis analytically explores and empirically tests the growth-inequality 
relationship. The issue of growth effects of income distribution has long been indecisive in the 
theoretical and empirical literature. On the one hand, conventional wisdom predicts a positive 
growth effect of inequality through incentives, physical capital accumulation, saving rates or 
investment indivisibility mechanism. While, on the other hand, endogenous growth literature 
predicts a negative growth effect of inequality through socio-political instability, market 
imperfections, fiscal redistribution and distortion, and fertility differential channels. This 
thesis contributes to the existing literature on growth-inequality relationship by answering the 
question as to why growth effects of income distribution are not definitely positive or 
negative. Similarly, this thesis also addresses the question as to why growth effects of trade 
are not definitely positive or negative.  
7.1 Summary of the findings  
The main results of this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
 
- Chapter 3 shows that the presence of the military in politics significantly adds to corruption 
in a society. In particular, the results reveal that a one standard deviation increase in the 
presence of military in politics leads to a 0.22 unit increase in the corruption index. This effect 
arises because the presence of the military in politics expands the role of military officials in 
government and they usually hold the key to bureaucratic and administrative positions in the 
government machinery, controlling the scarce resources of the military sector, sectors related 
to military and other non productive activities. These sectors are least accountable to the 
public and so public resources can be exploited for private gain, in the control of elections, the 
distortion of market systems, and these can all cause a rise in corruption. A further novelty in 
our work is the use of quantile regressions to evaluate the conditional distribution of the 
military in politics and corruption. The results reveal that the military in politics substantially 
fosters corruption. This effect is more pronounced in the half of the conditional distribution; 
i.e., among the mean/median corrupt countries.  
 
- Chapter 4 points out that the importance of financial market liberalization in combating 
corruption has been highlighted in the theoretical literature but no one has tested this 
relationship in an empirical settings. This chapter contributes to the existing literature on the 
causes of corruption by introducing the linear and non-monotonic relationship of corruption 
and financial liberalization. By drawing on a large cross sectional, country panels and regional 
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panel data sets over a long period of time (1984-2007), our analysis finds substantial support 
for a negative relationship between financial intermediation and corruption. The results imply 
that a one standard deviation increase in financial liberalization is associated with a decrease 
in corruption of 0.20 points, or 16 percent of a standard deviation in the corruption index. Our 
findings are consistent with respect to a number of robustness checks, including incorporating 
contagion effects alternative corruption indices and regional dynamics. 
 
The existing literature on corruption assumes that the prevalence of corruption is determined 
by country specific factors. Nonetheless, some studies point to corruption as being 
interdependent across bordering countries and it is a common characteristic of low income 
countries. We also contribute to this part of the literature by evaluating the different lag 
lengths of contagious corruption. Our results show that a policy in a neighboring country that 
reduces corruption by one standard deviation in the past five to ten years will reduce 
corruption in the home country by 0.12 points. 
 
- Chapter 5 summarises the following major findings: a non-monotonic relationship between 
income distribution and the level of economic development; globalisation does not have a 
favourable effect on inequality and poverty although it does appear to be pro-poor in 
economies where financial systems are relatively developed; finally, the government emerges 
as a major player in reducing inequality in developing countries. The potential link between 
globalisation and financial development can be described as follows: In economies where 
financial market imperfections prevail, globalisation (economic integration) tends to increase 
inequality by amplifying the income differences within the entrepreneurial class. Economic 
integration favours the richest entrepreneurs by providing them new investment opportunities 
and relieving them from lending to poorer entrepreneurs through underdeveloped financial 
system. This process increases the domestic borrowing rate which hurts the small firms as they 
mainly depend on external finance (Foellmi and Oechslin (2010). 
 
The evidence on the existence of the Kuznets curve are relatively strong in HFI countries and 
this implies financial sector liberalization could be a source of achieving the threshold level of 
economic development earlier, and this has a beneficial spillover effect for the poorer segment 
of society. In our modelling of the poverty consequences of globalisation for the developing 
world we found that, globalisation accentuates rather than ameliorates poverty and amongst 
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domestic factors we find that economic growth is good for the poor while high income 
inequality clearly hurts poor people and increases their suffering. However, we find that a 
sharp contrast arises in our comparative analysis of HFI and LFI countries. In the HFI 
economies both openness to trade and FDI are good for the poor, as the estimated coefficients 
on both are highly significant with negative signs. In contrast, our results show that 
globalisation hurts the poor in LFI countries as the coefficient on both openness to trade and 
FDI are highly significant, with positive signs. 
 
- Chapter 6 finds out positive effects of inequality and trade on growth both in the short run 
and long run. However, the growth effect of inequality is substantially influenced by the 
domestic context in terms of prevalence of credit market imperfections. The study identifies 
credit market imperfections in low-income developing countries as the likely reason for a 
positive relationship between inequality and economic growth. Similarly, growth effect of 
trade is found to be negative in economies where inequalities are relatively high. The results 
show that inequality does matter for economic growth but differently for different regions at 
different level of economic development. The inequality-growth nexus is significantly 
negative for the low-income group but strongly significantly positive for the high-income one. 
The findings of the study are robust to alternative econometric techniques, specifications, 
control of nonlinearity, inclusion of additional control variables, exclusion of outliers and sub-
samples. 
7.2 Academic Contribution  
The main contributions of the thesis can be summarized as follows: 
 
In Chapter 3, this thesis differs in several important aspects to previous work in the area of 
causes of corruption. First, we believe that this chapter is unique as it provides the first 
analysis of the military in politics, both theoretically and empirically, and therefore should 
provide a deeper understanding of the causes of corruption. Second, this chapter not only 
replicates earlier findings in the literature on corruption but also provides a better explanation 
of those causes of corruption which are inconclusive and have received least attention using 
recent data sets. Third, in contrasts to previous studies which generally focus one or two years 
of data, we use both cross sectional and panel data sets over a long period of time. Fourth, this 
chapter contributes to the existing literature on the sources of corruption by analyzing the 
distribution of the dependent variable (corruption). Fifth, existing studies on the topic focus on 
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either panels or cross sectional data bases which do not distinguish between developing and 
developed countries; in this study we make that distinction clear. Sixth, in this chapter we use 
a variety of econometric techniques to account for time dynamics and to control for the 
problem of endogeneity.  
 
In Chapter 4, this thesis has a number of unique and novel elements compared to extant work 
in the area of causes of corruption. First, we believe that this is the first study that tests 
empirically the relationship between the financial intermediation and corruption. Second, this 
is also the first study to test for the presence of a threshold in shaping the link between 
corruption and financial development. Third, our study introduces the concept of regional 
panels in addition to cross sectional or cross country panels. Fourth, we introduce the concept 
of alternative lag lengths to trace out the repercussion effects of policy reforms in neighboring 
countries. Fifth, we model the role of spatially weighted corruption that takes account of the 
common political, cultural and regional factors and, sixth, we use a variety of econometric 
techniques to account for time dynamics and to control for the possible problem of 
endogeneity.  
 
In Chapter 5, this thesis builds the argument that estimating the actual impact of globalisation 
on inequality and poverty remains largely an empirical issue. The available evidence, 
however, does not produce a consensus and the effect of globalisation on inequality and 
poverty remains ambiguous. Also, no previous study has tried to quantify the relative 
contributions of globalisation and other fundamental variables on inequality and poverty in 
developing countries. Clearly, from the national and international policy perspectives, it is 
imperative to explore both the nature and the importance of various factors in generating 
inequality and poverty. In this chapter we attempt to fill the gaps in the existing literature and 
lend a fresh perspective to the globalisation, inequality and poverty debate. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 6 we analytically explore and empirically test the growth-inequality 
relationship. This chapter contributes in number of ways in the extant area of growth-
inequality nexus. First, this chapter systemically evaluates and empirically tests the 
mechanisms of positive or/ and negative growth impact of inequality. Second, this chapter 
introduces non-linear dimensions of inequality in affecting growth. The chapter argues that 
inequality exerts negative influence on growth when an optimal level of inequality is 
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surpassed. In addition to the optimal level of inequality, this chapter shows that inequality is 
harmful for growth in those counties where the level of development is low while its effect 
turns out to be favourable in those economies where the level of development is high. Third, 
thanks to the availability of long data series that enabled us to test the very nature of long term 
growth-inequality relationship that is missing in previous studies. Fourth, this chapter argues 
that growth benefits of trade are not similar across regions. Particularly, success stories of East 
Asian countries that openness is good for growth can not be generalized for all developing 
counties. Fifth, and finally, this chapter provides unique and deeper insights into the trade-
growth relationship by noting the role and importance of existing inequalities. 
7.3 Policy Implications 
In addition to the academic contribution, the analysis and the findings of this thesis suggest a 
number of policy implications, which are as follows: 
 
1- The results reported in Chapter 3 suggest that the involvement of the military in the 
economic and political spheres of a country fosters corruption. This finding can help 
international and regional organisations and also domestic governments to devise policies 
which ensure the separation of the military from involvement in the political and economic life 
of a country. The military should not play a part in politics, as involvement of the military in 
politics breeds corruption. 
 
2- The results of Chapter 4 suggest that market reforms, particularly domestic financial 
reforms, can substantially combat corruption. However, the possibility of a U-shaped 
relationship between financial liberalisation and corruption may be considered to keep the 
liberalisation within certain limits. 
 
3- The results in Chapter Five have shown that globalisation accentuates rather than 
ameliorates inequality and poverty; although it does appear to be pro-poor in economies where 
financial systems are relatively developed. In this respect, policy makers may improve and 
reform financial institutions in order fully to reap the favourable effects of globalisation for 
poor members of society. Furthermore, in this situation, governments can also play an 
important role in safeguarding the interests of the poor, as the results in Chapter Five have 
clearly shown that the role of domestic governments is conducive to reducing cross-country 
inequalities and poverty incidence.  
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4- The results of Chapter Six suggest that the growth effect of inequality is non-monotonic, 
which provides a solid foundation to support and justify the argument that a redistributive 
policy that alleviates inequality can increase long-run growth in developing countries. Since 
findings also show that the growth effects of trade are positive in less segregated economies; a 
redistributive policy, in addition, can allow a country to take full advantage of trade openness.
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